[7]
On the other hand, when we are
pleading before judges who have to give their
verdict in accordance with the prescriptions of law,
it would be absurd to give them advice as to how
they should deal with a criminal who admits his
guilt. Consequently, when it is impossible either to
deny the facts or to raise the question of competence, we must attempt to justify the facts as
best we can, or else throw up the case. I have
pointed out that there are two ways in which a fact
can be denied: it can be denied absolutely, or it
may be denied that a fact is of the nature alleged.
[p. 317]
When it is impossible to plead justification or to
raise the question of competence,1 we must deny the
facts, and that not merely when a definition of the
facts will serve our case, but even when nothing
except an absolute denial is left for us.
1 i.e. if we cannot say “The act was right” or “This court is not competent to try it” or “The prosecutor has no locus standi.” See n. on § 2.
Quintilian. With An English Translation. Harold Edgeworth Butler. Cambridge. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann, Ltd. 1921.
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