17. However, if I were to indulge my own inclinations in expatiating on this subject, I should go
[p. 327]
on for ever. Let us therefore pass to the next
question and consider whether rhetoric is an art.
[
2]
No one of those who have laid down rules for
oratory has ever doubted that it is an art. It is clear
even from the titles of their books that their theme
is the art of rhetoric, while Cicero
1 defines rhetoric
as
artistic eloquence. And it is not merely the orators
who have claimed this distinction for their studies
with a view to giving them an additional title to
respect, but the Stoic and Peripatetic philosophers for
the most part agree with them.
[
3]
Indeed I will confess
that I had doubts as to whether I should discuss this
portion of my inquiry, for there is no one, I will not
say so unlearned, but so devoid of ordinary sense, as
to hold that building, weaving or moulding vessels
from clay are arts, and at the same time to consider
that rhetoric, which, as I have already said, is the
noblest and most sublime of tasks, has reached such
a lofty eminence without the assistance of art.
[
4]
For
my own part I think that those who have argued
against this view did not realise what they were
saying, but merely desired to exercise their wits by
the selection of a difficult theme, like Polycrates,
when he praised Busiris and Clytemnestra; I may
add that he is credited with a not dissimilar performance, namely the composition of a speech which
was delivered against Socrates.
[
5]
Some would have it that rhetoric is a natural gift
though they admit that it can be developed by practice.
So Antonius in the
de Oralore2 of Cicero styles it a
knack
derived from experience, but denies that it is an art:
[
6]
this statement is however not intended to be accepted
by us as the actual truth, but is inserted to make
[p. 329]
Antonius speak in character, since he was in the
habit of concealing his art. Still Lysias is said to
have maintained this same view, which is defended
on the ground that uneducated persons, barbarians
and slaves, when speaking on their own behalf, say
something that resembles an
exordiam, state the facts
of the case, prove, refute and plead for mercy just as
an orator does in his peroration.
[
7]
To this is added
the quibble that nothing that is based on art can
have existed before the art in question, whereas men
have always from time immemorial spoken in their
own defence or in denunciation of others: the
teaching of rhetoric as an art was, they say, a later
invention dating from about the time of Tisias and
Corax: oratory therefore existed before art and
consequently cannot be an art.
[
8]
For my part I am not
concerned with the date when oratory began to be
taught. Even in Homer we find Phoenix
3 as an
instructor not only of conduct but of speaking, while
a number of orators are mentioned, the various styles
are represented by the speeches of three of the
chiefs
4 and the young men are set to contend among
themselves in contests of eloquence:
5 moreover lawsuits and pleaders are represented in the engravings
on the shield of Achilles.
6
[
9]
It is sufficient to call
attention to the fact that everything which art has
brought to perfection originated in nature. Otherwise we might deny the title of art to medicine,
which was discovered from the observation of
sickness and health, and according to some is
entirely based upon experiment: wounds were bound
up long before medicine developed into an art, and
fevers were reduced by rest and abstention from food,
long before the reason for such treatment was
[p. 331]
known, simply because the state of the patient's
health left no choice.
[
10]
So too building should not be
styled an art; for primitive man built himself a hut
without the assistance of art. Music by the same
reasoning is not an art; for every race indulges in
some kind of singing and dancing. If therefore any
kind of speech is to be called eloquence, I will admit
that it existed before it was an art.
[
11]
If on the other
hand not every man that speaks is an orator and
primitive man did not speak like an orator, my
opponents must needs acknowledge that oratory is
the product of art and did not exist before it. This
conclusion also rules out their argument that men
speak who have never learnt how to speak, and that
which a man does untaught can have no connexion
with art.
[
12]
In support of this contention they adduce
the fact that Demades was a waterman and Aeschines
an actor, but both were orators. Their reasoning is
false. For no man can be an orator untaught and it
would be truer to say that these orators learned
oratory late in life than that they never learned at all;
although as a matter of fact Aeschines had an
acquaintance with literature from childhood since his
father was a teacher of literature, while as regards
Demades, it is quite uncertain that he never studied
rhetoric and in any case continuous practice in
speaking was sufficient to bring him to such proficiency as he attained: for experience is the best of all
schools.
[
13]
On the other hand it may fairly be asserted
that he would have achieved greater distinction, if he
had received instruction: for although he delivered
his speeches with great effect, he never ventured to
write them for others.
[
14]
Aristotle, it is true, in his
Gryllus7 produces some tentative arguments to
[p. 333]
the contrary, which are marked by characteristic
ingenuity. On the other hand he also wrote three
books on the art of rhetoric, in the first of which
he not merely admits that rhetoric is an art, but
treats it as a department of politics and also of
logic.
[
15]
Critolaus and Athenodorus of Rhodes have
produced many arguments against this view, while
Agnon renders himself suspect by the very title of
his book in which he proclaims that he is going to
indict rhetoric. As to the statements of Epicurus
on this subject, they cause me no surprise, for he is
the foe of all systematic training.
[
16]
These gentlemen talk a great deal, but the
arguments on which they base their statements are
few. I will therefore select the most important of
them and will deal with them briefly, to prevent the
discussion lasting to all eternity.
[
17]
Their first contention is based on the subject-matter; for they
assert that all arts have their own subject-matter
(which is true) and go on to say that rhetoric has
none, which I shall show in what follows to be false.
[
18]
Another slander is to the effect that no art will
acquiesce in false opinions: since an art must be
based on direct perception, which is always true:
now, say they, rhetoric does give its assent to false
conclusions and is therefore not an art.
[
19]
I will admit
that rhetoric sometimes substitutes falsehood for
truth, but I will not allow that it does so because its
opinions are false, since there is all the difference
between holding a certain opinion oneself and
persuading someone else to adopt an opinion. For
instance a general frequently makes use of falsehood: Hannibal when hemmed in by Fabius
persuaded his enemy that he was in retreat by
[p. 335]
tying brushwood to the horns of oxen, setting fire
to them by night and driving the herds across
the mountains opposite.
8 But though he deceived
Fabius, he himself was fully aware of the truth.
[
20]
Again when the Spartan Theopompus changed
clothes with his wife and escaped from custody
disguised as a woman, he deceived his guards,
but was not for a moment deceived as to his own
identity.
9 Similarly an orator, when he substitutes
falsehood for the truth, is aware of the falsehood
and of the fact that he is substituting it for the
truth.
[
21]
He therefore deceives others, but not himself. When Cicero boasted that he had thrown
dust in the eyes of the jury in the case of
Cluentius, he was far from being blinded himself.
And when a painter by his artistic skill makes us
believe that certain objects project from the picture,
while others are withdrawn into the background, he
knows perfectly well that they are really all in the
same plane.
[
22]
My opponents further assert that every
art has some definite goal towards which it directs its
efforts, but that rhetoric as a rule has no such goal,
while at other times it professes to have an aim, but
fails to perform its promise. They lie: I have already
shown that rhetoric has a definite purpose and have
explained what it is.
[
23]
And, what is more, the orator
will always make good his professions in this respect,
for he will always speak well. On the other hand
this criticism may perhaps hold good as against those
who think persuasion the end of oratory. But our
orator and his art, as we define it, are independent of
results. The speaker aims at victory, it is true, but if
he speaks well, he has lived up to the ideals of his art,
even if he is defeated.
[
24]
Similarly a pilot will desire
[p. 337]
to bring his ship safe to harbour; but if he is swept
out of his course by a storm, he will not for that
reason cease to be a pilot, but will say in the wellknown words of the old poet
10 “Still let me steer
straight on!”
[
25]
So too the doctor seeks to heal the
sick; but if the violence of the disease or the refusal
of the patient to obey his regimen or any other
circumstance prevent his achieving his purpose, he
will not have fallen short of the ideals of his art,
provided he has done everything according to reason.
So too the orator's purpose is fulfilled if he has spoken
well. For the art of rhetoric, as I shall show later,
is realised in action, not in the result obtained.
[
26]
From
this it follows that there is no truth in yet another
argument which contends that arts know when they
have attained their end, whereas rhetoric does not.
For every speaker is aware when he is speaking well.
These critics also charge rhetoric with doing what
no art does, namely making use of vices to serve its
ends, since it speaks the thing that is not and excites
the passions.
[
27]
But there is no disgrace in doing
either of these things, as long as the motive be good:
consequently there is nothing vicious in such action.
Even a philosopher is at times permitted to tell a lie,
while the orator must needs excite the passions, if
that be the only way by which he can lead the
judge to do justice.
[
28]
For judges are not always
enlightened and often have to be tricked to prevent
them falling into error. Give me philosophers as
judges, pack senates and assemblies with philosophers,
and you will destroy the power of hatred, influence,
prejudice and false witness; consequently there will
be very little scope for eloquence whose value will
lie almost entirely in its power to charm.
[
29]
But if, as is
[p. 339]
the case, our hearers are fickle of mind, and truth is
exposed to a host of perils, we must call in art to aid
us in the fight and employ such means as will help
our case. He who has been driven from the right road
cannot be brought back to it save by a fresh detour.
[
30]
The point, however, that gives rise to the greatest
number of these captious accusations against rhetoric,
is found in the allegation that orators speak indifferently on either side of a case. From which they
draw the following arguments: no art is self-contradictory, but rhetoric does contradict itself; no art
tries to demolish what itself has built, but this does
happen in the operations of rhetoric; or again:—
rhetoric teaches either what ought to be said or what
ought not to be said; consequently it is not an art
because it teaches what ought not to be said, or
because, while it teaches what ought to be said, it
also teaches precisely the opposite.
[
31]
Now it is obvious
that all such charges are brought against that type
of rhetoric with which neither good men nor virtue
herself will have anything to do; since if a case be
based on injustice, rhetoric has no place therein and
consequently it can scarcely happen even under the
most exceptional circumstances that an orator, that
is to say, a good man, will speak indifferently on either
side.
[
32]
Still it is in the nature of things conceivable
that just causes may lead two wise men to take
different sides, since it is held that wise men may fight
among themselves, provided that they do so at the
bidding of reason. I will therefore reply to their
criticisms in such a way that it will be clear that these
arguments have no force even against those who concede the name of orator to persons of bad character.
For rhetoric is not self-contradictory.
[
33]
The conflict is
[p. 341]
between case and case, not between rhetoric and
itself. And even if persons who have learned the
same thing fight one another, that does not prove
that what they have learned is not an art. Were
that so, there could be no art of arms, since gladiators
trained under the same master are often matched
against each other;
[
34]
nor would the pilot's art exist,
because in sea-fights pilots may be found on different
sides; nor yet could there be an art of generalship,
since general is pitted against general. In the same
way rhetoric does not undo its own work. For the
orator does not refute his own arguments, nor does
rhetoric even do so, because those who regard persuasion as its end, or the two good men whom chance has
matched against one another seek merely for probabilities: and the fact that one thing is more credible
than another, does not involve contradiction between
the two.
[
35]
There is no absolute antagonism between
the probable and the more probable, just as there is
none between that which is white and that which is
whiter, or between that which is sweet and that
which is sweeter. Nor does rhetoric ever teach that
which ought not to be said, or that which is contrary
to what ought to be said, but solely what ought to be
said in each individual case.
[
36]
But though the orator
will as a rule maintain what is true, this will not
always be the case: there are occasions when the
public interest demands that he should defend what
is untrue.
The following objections are also put forward in
the second book of Cicero's
de Oratore:11—“Art deals
with things that are known. But the pleading of an
orator is based entirely on opinion, not on knowledge,
because he speaks to an audience who do not know,
[p. 343]
and sometimes himself states things of which he has
no actual knowledge.”
[
37]
Now one of these points,
namely whether the judges have knowledge of what
is being said to them, has nothing to do with the art
of oratory. The other statement, that art is concerned
with things that are known, does however require an
answer. Rhetoric is the art of speaking well and the
orator knows how to speak well.
[
38]
“But,” it is urged,
“he does not know whether what he says is true.”
Neither do they, who assert that all things derive
their origin from fire or water or the four elements
or indivisible atoms; nor they who calculate the
distances of the stars or the size of the earth and sun.
And yet all these call the subject which they teach
an art. But if reason makes them seem not merely
to hold opinions but, thanks to the cogency of the
proofs adduced, to have actual knowledge, reason will
do the same service to the orator.
[
39]
“But,” they say,
“he does not know whether the cause which he has
undertaken is true.” But not even a doctor can tell
whether a patient who claims to be suffering from a
headache, really is so suffering: but he will treat him
on the assumption that his statement is true, and
medicine will still be an art. Again what of the fact
that rhetoric does not always aim at telling the truth,
but always at stating what is probable? The answer
is that the orator knows that what he states is no
more than probable.
[
40]
My opponents further object
that advocates often defend in one case what they
have attacked in another. This is not the fault of the
art, but of the man. Such are the main points that
are urged against rhetoric; there are others as well,
but they are of minor importance and drawn from the
same sources.
[p. 345]
That rhetoric is an art may, however,
[
41]
be proved in
a very few words. For if Cleanthes
12 definition be
accepted that “Art is a power reaching its ends by a
definite path, that is, by ordered methods,” no one
can doubt that there is such method and order in
good speaking: while if, on the other hand, we accept
the definition which meets with almost universal
approval that art consists in perceptions agreeing
and cooperating to the achievement of some useful
end, we shall be able to show that rhetoric lacks none
of these characteristics.
[
42]
Again it is scarcely necessary
for me to point out that like other arts it is based on
examination and practice. And if logic is an art, as
is generally agreed, rhetoric must also be an art, since
it differs from logic in
species rather than in
genus.
Nor must I omit to point out that where it is possible
in any given subject for one man to act without art
and another with art, there must necessarily be an
art in connexion with that subject, as there must also
be in any subject in which the man who has received
instruction is the superior of him who has not.
[
43]
But
as regards the practice of rhetoric, it is not merely
the case that the trained speaker will get the better
of the untrained. For even the trained man will
prove inferior to one who has received a better
training. If this were not so, there would not be so
many rhetorical rules, nor would so many great men
have come forward to teach them. The truth of this
must be acknowledged by everyone, but more
especially by us, since we concede the possession of
oratory to none save the good man.
13