Titus Livius (Livy), The History of Rome, Book 32
Evan T. Sage, Ph.D. Professor of Latin and Head of the Department of Classics in the University of Pittsburgh, Ed.

18. As nothing turned out successfully, the¹ consul was most reluctant to permit a comparison of men and weapons to be made, [2] and at the same time he realized that there was no immediate prospect of capturing the town nor any way to winter his troops far from the sea and in a region wasted by the calamities of war. [3] So he raised the siege, and because there was no harbour on the whole coast of Acarnania and Aetolia which could both accommodate the fleet which brought supplies to the army and at the same time provide shelter [4] for wintering the troops, Anticyra in Phocis, facing the Gulf of Corinth, seemed the most suitable place [5] for this purpose, because it was not far from Thessaly and the enemy's country, and it had in front the Peloponnesus, separated by a narrow expanse of sea, and behind it Aetolia and Acarnania and on the sides Locris and Boeotia. [6] He took Phanotea in Phocis at the first assault and without a struggle. Anticyra caused only a little delay to his siege. Ambrysus next and Hyampolis surrendered. [7] Daulis, because it was located on a lofty hill, could not be taken by escalade or siege. [8] By harassing the defenders with darts and tempting them to make sallies, by alternately retiring and pursuing, and by fighting small engagements of no significance, they brought them to such a pitch of carelessness and to such a feeling of contempt that the Romans, mingling with the defenders as they withdrew into the gate, assaulted the town. [9] Other unimportant strongholds of Phocis surrendered, more from fear than by reason of attack. Elatia closed its gates, and seemed disinclined to admit either commander or Roman army, unless it were compelled by violence.

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