Book I: Moral Goodness
1. My dear son Marcus, you have now been studying
1 a full year under Cratippus, and that too in
Athens, and you should be fully equipped with the
practical precepts and the principles of philosophy; so
much at least one might expect from the pre-eminence not only of your teacher but also of the city;
the former is able to enrich you with learning, the
latter to supply you with models. Nevertheless, just
as I for my own improvement have always combined
Greek and Latin studies—and I have done this not
only in the study of philosophy but also in the practice of oratory—so I recommend that you should do
the same, so that you may have equal command of
both languages. And it is in this very direction that
I have, if I mistake not, rendered a great service
to our countrymen, so that not only those who are
unacquainted with Greek literature but even the
cultured consider that they have gained much both
in oratorical power and in mental training.
[
2]
You will, therefore, learn from the foremost of
2
present-day philosophers, and you will go on learning
as long as you wish; and your wish ought to continue
as long as you are not dissatisfied with the progress
you are making. For all that, if you will read my
philosophical books, you will be helped; my philosophy
is not very different from that of the Peripatetics (for
both they and I claim to be followers of Socrates and
Plato). As to the conclusions you may reach, I leave
that to your own judgment (for I would put no hindrance in your way), but by reading my philosophical
[p. 5]
writings you will be sure to render your mastery of
the Latin language more complete. But I would by
no means have you think that this is said boastfully.
For there are many to whom I yield precedence in
knowledge of philosophy; but if I lay claim to the
orator's peculiar ability to speak with propriety,
clearness, elegance, I think my claim is in a measure
justified, for I have spent my life in that profession.
[
3]
And therefore, my dear Cicero, I cordially recommend
3 you to read carefully not only my orations
but also these
4 books of mine on philosophy, which
are now about as extensive. For while the orations
exhibit a more vigorous style, yet the unimpassioned,
restrained style of my philosophical productions is
also worth cultivating. Moreover, for the same man
to succeed in both departments, both in the forensic
style and in that of calm philosophic discussion has
not, I observe, been the good fortune of any one of the
Greeks so far, unless, perhaps, Demetrius of Phalerum
can be reckoned in that number—a clever reasoner,
indeed, and, though rather a spiritless orator, he is
yet charming, so that you can recognize in him the
disciple of Theophrastus. But let others judge how
much I have accomplished in each pursuit; I have
at least attempted both.
[
4]
I believe, of course, that if Plato had been willing
to devote himself to forensic oratory, he could have
spoken with the greatest eloquence and power; and
that if Demosthenes had continued the studies he
pursued with Plato and had wished to expound his
views, he could have done so with elegance and
brilliancy. I feel the same way about Aristotle and
Isocrates, each of whom, engrossed in his own profession, undervalued that of the other.
[p. 7]
2. But since I have decided to write you a little
5
now (and a great deal by and by), I wish, if possible,
to begin with a matter most suited at once to your
years and to my position. Although philosophy
offers many problems, both important and useful,
that have been fully and carefully discussed by
philosophers, those teachings which have been
handed down on the subject of moral duties seem
to have the widest practical application. For no
phase of life, whether public or private, whether in
business or in the home, whether one is working on
what concerns oneself alone or dealing with another,
can be without its moral duty; on the discharge
of such duties depends all that is morally right,
and on their neglect all that is morally wrong in
life.
[
5]
Moreover, the subject of this inquiry is the common
6 property of all philosophers; for who would
presume to call himself a philosopher, if he did not
inculcate any lessons of duty? But there are some
schools that distort all notions of duty by the theories
they propose touching the supreme good and the
supreme evil. For he who posits the supreme good
as having no connection with virtue and measures it
not by a moral standard but by his own interests—
if he should be consistent and not rather at times
over-ruled by his better nature, he could value
neither friendship nor justice nor generosity; and
brave he surely cannot possibly be that counts pain
the supreme evil, nor temperate he that holds
pleasure to be the supreme good.
[
6]
Although these truths are so self-evident that the
7
subject does not call for discussion, still I have discussed it in another connection. If, therefore, these
[p. 9]
schools should claim to be consistent, they could not
say anything about duty; and no fixed, invariable,
natural rules of duty can be posited except by those
who say that moral goodness is worth seeking solely
or chiefly for its own sake. Accordingly, the teaching of ethics is the peculiar right of the Stoics, the
Academicians, and the Peripatetics; for the theories
of Aristo, Pyrrho, and Erillus have been long since
rejected; and yet they would have the right to discuss duty if they had left us any power of choosing
between things, so that there might be a way of
finding out what duty is. I shall, therefore, at this
time and in this investigation follow chiefly the
Stoics, not as a translator, but, as is my custom, I
shall at my own option and discretion draw from
those sources in such measure and in such manner
as shall suit my purpose.
[
7]
Since, therefore, the whole discussion is to be on
the subject of duty, I should like at the outset to
define what duty is, as, to my surprise, Panaetius has
failed to do. For every systematic development of any
subject ought to begin with a definition, so that everyone may understand what the discussion is about.
3. Every treatise on duty has two parts: one,
8
dealing with the doctrine of the supreme good; the
other, with the practical rules by which daily life in all
its bearings may be regulated. The following questions are illustrative of the first part: whether all
duties are absolute; whether one duty is more important than another; and so on. But as regards
special duties for which positive rules are laid down,
though they are affected by the doctrine of the
supreme good, still the fact is not so obvious, because
they seem rather to look to the regulation of everyday
[p. 11] life; and it is these special duties that I propose
to treat at length in the following books.
[
8]
And yet there is still another classification of
duties: we distinguish between “mean”
9 duty, so called, and “absolute” duty. Absolute duty we
may, I presume, call “right,” for the Greeks call it
κατόρθωμα, while the ordinary duty they call
καθῆκον.
And the meaning of those terms they fix thus: whatever is right they define as “absolute” duty, but
“mean” duty, they say, is duty for the performance
of which an adequate reason may be rendered.
[
9]
The consideration necessary to determine conduct
10
is, therefore, as Panaetius thinks, a threefold one:
first, people question whether the contemplated act
is morally right or morally wrong; and in such
deliberation their minds are often led to widely
divergent conclusions. And then they examine and
consider the question whether the action contemplated is or is not conducive to comfort and happiness
in life, to the command of means and wealth, to
influence, and to power, by which they may be able
to help themselves and their friends; this whole
matter turns upon a question of expediency. The
third type of question arises when that which seems
to be expedient seems to conflict with that which is
morally right; for when expediency seems to be pulling one way, while moral right seems to be calling
back in the opposite direction, the result is that the
mind is distracted in its inquiry and brings to it the
irresolution that is born of deliberation.
[
10]
Although omission is a most serious defect in
11
classification, two points have been overlooked in
[p. 13]
the foregoing:
12 for we usually consider not only
whether an action is morally right or morally wrong,
but also, when a choice of two morally right courses
is offered, which one is morally better; and likewise,
when a choice of two expedients is offered, which one
is more expedient. Thus the question which Panaetius thought threefold ought, we find, to be divided
into five parts. First, therefore, we must discuss the
moral—and that, under two sub-heads; secondly, in
the same manner, the expedient; and finally, the
cases where they must be weighed against each other.
[
11]
4. First of all, Nature has endowed every species
13
of living creature with the instinct of self-preservation, of avoiding what seems likely to cause injury
to life or limb, and of procuring and providing everything needful for life—food, shelter, and the like.
A common property of all creatures is also the
reproductive instinct (the purpose of which is the
propagation of the species) and also a certain amount
14
of concern for their offspring. But the most marked
difference between man and beast is this: the beast,
just as far as it is moved by the senses and with
very little perception of past or future, adapts itself
to that alone which is present at the moment; while
man—because he is endowed with reason, by which
he comprehends the chain of consequences, perceives
the causes of things, understands the relation of
cause to effect and of effect to cause, draws analogies,
and connects and associates the present and the
future—easily surveys the course of his whole life
and makes the necessary preparations for its conduct.
[
12]
Nature likewise by the power of reason associates
man with man in the common bonds of speech and
15
life; she implants in him above all, I may say, a
[p. 15]
strangely tender love for his offspring. She also
prompts men to meet in companies, to form public
assemblies and to take part in them themselves; and
she further dictates, as a consequence of this, the
effort on man's part to provide a store of things that
minister to his comforts and wants—and not for
himself alone, but for his wife and children and the
others whom he holds dear and for whom he ought
to provide; and this responsibility also stimulates
his courage and makes it stronger for the active
duties of life.
[
13]
Above all, the search after truth and its eager
16
pursuit are peculiar to man. And so, when we have
leisure from the demands of business cares, we are
eager to see, to hear, to learn something new, and
we esteem a desire to know the secrets or wonders
of creation as indispensable to a happy life. Thus
we come to understand that what is true, simple,
and genuine appeals most strongly to a man's
nature. To this passion for discovering truth there
is added a hungering, as it were, for independence,
so that a mind well-moulded by Nature is unwilling
to be subject to anybody save one who gives rules of
conduct or is a teacher of truth or who, for the
general good, rules according to justice and law.
From this attitude come greatness of soul and a sense
of superiority to worldly conditions.
[
14]
And it is no mean manifestation of Nature and
17
Reason that man is the only animal that has a feeling for order, for propriety, for moderation in word
and deed. And so no other animal has a sense of
beauty, loveliness, harmony in the visible world; and
Nature and Reason, extending the analogy of this
from the world of sense to the world of spirit, find that
[p. 17]
beauty, consistency, order are far more to be maintained in thought and deed, and the same Nature
and Reason are careful to do nothing in an improper
or unmanly fashion, and in every thought and deed
to do or think nothing capriciously.
It is from these elements that is forged and
fashioned that moral goodness which is the subject
of this inquiry—something that, even though it be
not generally ennobled, is still worthy of all honour;
18
and by its own nature, we correctly maintain, it
merits praise, even though it be praised by none.
[
15]
5. You see here, Marcus, my son, the very form
and as it were the face of Moral Goodness; “and if,”
as Plato says, “it could be seen with the physical eye,
it would awaken a marvellous love of wisdom.” But
all that is morally right rises from some one of
four sources: it is concerned either (1) with the
19
full perception and intelligent development of the
true; or (2) with the conservation of organized
society, with rendering to every man his due, and
with the faithful discharge of obligations assumed;
or (3) with the greatness and strength of a noble
and invincible spirit; or (4) with the orderliness
and moderation of everything that is said and done,
wherein consist temperance and self-control.
Although these four are connected and interwoven,
20 still it is in each one considered singly that
certain definite kinds of moral duties have their
origin: in that category, for instance, which was
designated first in our division and in which we
place wisdom and prudence, belong the search after
truth and its discovery; and this is the peculiar
province of that virtue.
[
16]
For the more clearly anyone observes the most essential truth in any given
[p. 19]
case and the more quickly and accurately he can
see and explain the reasons for it, the more understanding and wise he is generally esteemed, and
justly so. So, then, it is truth that is, as it were,
the stuff with which this virtue has to deal and on
which it employs itself.
[
17]
Before the three remaining virtues, on the other
hand, is set the task of providing and maintaining
those things on which the practical business of life
depends, so that the relations of man to man in
human society may be conserved, and that largeness
and nobility of soul may be revealed not only in
increasing one's resources and acquiring advantages
for one's self and one's family but far more in rising
superior to these very things. But orderly behaviour
and consistency of demeanour and self-control and
the like have their sphere in that department of
things in which a certain amount of physical exertion, and not mental activity merely, is required.
For if we bring a certain amount of propriety and
order into the transactions of daily life, we shall be
conserving moral rectitude and moral dignity.
[
18]
6. Now, of the four divisions which we have
21
made of the essential idea of moral goodness, the
first, consisting in the knowledge of truth, touches
human nature most closely. For we are all attracted
and drawn to a zeal for learning and knowing; and
we think it glorious to excel therein, while we count
it base and immoral to fall into error, to wander
from the truth, to be ignorant, to be led astray. In
this pursuit, which is both natural and morally
right, two errors are to be avoided: first, we must
not treat the unknown as known and too readily
accept it; and he who wishes to avoid this error (as
[p. 21]
all should do) will devote both time and attention
to the weighing of evidence.
[
19]
The other error is
that some people devote too much industry and too
deep study to matters that are obscure and difficult
and useless as well.
If these errors are successfully avoided, all the
labour and pains expended upon problems that are
morally right and worth the solving will be fully
rewarded. Such a worker in the field of astronomy,
for example, was Gaius Sulpicius, of whom we have
heard; in mathematics, Sextus Pompey, whom I
have known personally; in dialectics, many; in civil
law, still more. All these professions are occupied
with the search after truth; but to be drawn by
study away from active life is contrary to moral
duty. For the whole glory of virtue is in activity;
activity, however, may often be interrupted, and
many opportunities for returning to study are opened.
Besides, the working of the mind, which is never at
rest, can keep us busy in the pursuit of knowledge
even without conscious effort on our part. Moreover, all our thought and mental activity will be
devoted either to planning for things that are morally
right and that conduce to a good and happy life, or
to the pursuits of science and learning.
With this we close the discussion of the first
source of duty.
[
20]
7. Of the three remaining divisions, the most
22
extensive in its application is the principle by which
society and what we may call its “common bonds”
are maintained. Of this again there are two
divisions—justice, in which is the crowning glory
of the virtues and on the basis of which men are
called “good men”; and, close akin to justice,
[p. 23]
charity, which may also be called kindness or
generosity.
The first office of justice is to keep one man from
doing harm to another, unless provoked by wrong;
and the next is to lead men to use common possessions for the common interests, private property
for their own.
[
21]
There is, however, no such thing as private
23
ownership established by nature, but property becomes private either through long occupancy (as in
the case of those who long ago settled in unoccupied
territory) or through conquest (as in the case of
those who took it in war) or by due process of law,
bargain, or purchase, or by allotment. On this principle the lands of Arpinum are said to belong to the
Arpinates, the Tusculan lands to the Tusculans; and
similar is the assignment of private property. Therefore, inasmuch as in each case some of those things
which by nature had been common property became the property of individuals, each one should
retain possession of that which has fallen to his lot;
and if anyone appropriates to himself anything
beyond that, he will be violating the laws of human
society.
[
22]
But since, as Plato has admirably expressed it, we
are not born for ourselves alone, but our country
claims a share of our being, and our friends a share;
and since, as the Stoics hold, everything that the
earth produces is created for man's use; and as men,
too, are born for the sake of men, that they may be
able mutually to help one another; in this direction
we ought to follow Nature as our guide, to contribute to the general good by an interchange of acts
of kindness, by giving and receiving, and thus by
[p. 25]
our skill, our industry, and our talents to cement
human society more closely together, man to man.
[
23]
The foundation of justice, moreover, is good faith—
24
that is, truth and fidelity to promises and agreements. And therefore we may follow the Stoics,
who diligently investigate the etymology of words;
and we may accept their statement that “good faith”
is so called because what is promised is “made good,”
although some may find this derivation
25 rather farfetched.
There are, on the other hand, two kinds of injustice—the
26 one, on the part of those who inflict wrong,
the other on the part of those who, when they can, do
not shield from wrong those upon whom it is being
inflicted. For he who, under the influence of anger
or some other passion, wrongfully assaults another
seems, as it were, to be laying violent hands upon a
comrade; but he who does not prevent or oppose
wrong, if he can, is just as guilty of wrong as if he
deserted his parents or his friends or his country.
[
24]
Then, too, those very wrongs which people try to inflict on purpose to injure are often the result of fear:
that is, he who premeditates injuring another is
afraid that, if he does not do so, he may himself be
made to suffer some hurt. But, for the most part,
people are led to wrong-doing in order to secure
some personal end; in this vice, avarice is generally
the controlling motive.
[
25]
8. Again, men seek riches partly to supply
the needs of life, partly to secure the enjoyment of
pleasure. With those who cherish higher ambitions,
27
the desire for wealth is entertained with a view to
power and influence and the means of bestowing
favours; Marcus Crassus, for example, not long since
[p. 27]
declared that no amount of wealth was enough for
the man who aspired to be the foremost citizen of
the state, unless with the income from it he could
maintain an army. Fine establishments and the
comforts of life in elegance and abundance also
afford pleasure, and the desire to secure it gives rise
to the insatiable thirst for wealth. Still, I do not
mean to find fault with the accumulation of property,
provided it hurts nobody, but unjust acquisition of
it is always to be avoided.
[
26]
The great majority of people, however, when
they fall a prey to ambition for either military or
civil authority, are carried away by it so completely
that they quite lose sight of the claims of justice.
For Ennius says:
There is no fellowship inviolate,
No faith is kept, when kingship is concerned;
and the truth of his words has an uncommonly wide
application. For whenever a situation is of such
a nature that not more than one can hold preeminence in it, competition for it usually becomes
so keen that it is an extremely difficult matter to
maintain a “fellowship inviolate.” We saw this
28
proved but now in the effrontery of Gaius Caesar,
who, to gain that sovereign power which by a depraved imagination he had conceived in his fancy,
trod underfoot all laws of gods and men. But the
trouble about this matter is that it is in the greatest
souls and in the most brilliant geniuses that we usually
find ambitions for civil and military authority, for power,
and for glory, springing up; and therefore we must be
the more heedful not to go wrong in that direction.
[
27]
But in any case of injustice it makes a vast deal
29
[p. 29]
of difference whether the wrong is done as a result
of some impulse of passion, which is usually brief
and transient, or whether it is committed wilfully and
with premeditation; for offences that come through
some sudden impulse are less culpable than those
committed designedly and with malice aforethought.
But enough has been said on the subject of inflicting injury.
[
28]
9. The motives for failure to prevent injury and
30
so for slighting duty are likely to be various: people
either are reluctant to incur enmity or trouble or
expense; or through indifference, indolence, or incompetence, or through some preoccupation or selfinterest they are so absorbed that they suffer those to
31
be neglected whom it is their duty to protect. And
so there is reason to fear that what Plato declares
of the philosophers may be inadequate, when he
says that they are just because they are busied with
the pursuit of truth and because they despise and
count as naught that which most men eagerly seek
and for which they are prone to do battle against
each other to the death. For they secure one sort
of justice, to be sure, in that they do no positive
wrong to anyone, but they fall into the opposite
injustice; for hampered by their pursuit of learning
they leave to their fate those whom they ought to
defend. And so, Plato thinks, they will not even
assume their civic duties except under compulsion.
But in fact it were better that they should assume
them of their own accord; for an action intrinsically right is just only on condition that it is
voluntary.
[
29]
There are some also who, either from zeal in
32
attending to their own business or through some
[p. 31]
sort of aversion to their fellow-men, claim that they
are occupied solely with their own affairs, without
seeming to themselves to be doing anyone any injury.
But while they steer clear of the one kind of injustice,
they fall into the other: they are traitors to social
life, for they contribute to it none of their interest,
none of their effort, none of their means.
[
30]
Now since we have set forth the two kinds of
33
injustice and assigned the motives that lead to each,
and since we have previously established the principles by which justice is constituted, we shall be in
a position easily to decide what our duty on each
occasion is, unless we are extremely self-centred; for
indeed it is not an easy matter to be really concerned
with other people's affairs; and yet in Terence's play,
we know, Chremes “thinks that nothing that concerns
man is foreign to him.” Nevertheless, when things
turn out for our own good or ill, we realize it more
fully and feel it more deeply than when the same
things happen to others and we see them only, as it
were, in the far distance; and for this reason we
judge their case differently from our own. It is,
therefore, an excellent rule that they give who bid us
not to do a thing, when there is a doubt whether it
be right or wrong; for righteousness shines with a
brilliance of its own, but doubt is a sign that we are
thinking of a possible wrong.
[
31]
10. But occasions often arise, when those duties
34
which seem most becoming to the just man and to
the “good man,” as we call him, undergo a change
and take on a contrary aspect. It may, for example,
not be a duty to restore a trust or to fulfil a promise,
and it may become right and proper sometimes to
evade and not to observe what truth and honour
[p. 33]
would usually demand. For we may well be guided
by those fundamental principles of justice which I
laid down at the outset: first, that no harm be done
to anyone; second, that the common interests be
conserved. When these are modified under changed
circumstances, moral duty also undergoes a change,
and it does not always remain the same.
[
32]
For a given
promise or agreement may turn out in such a way
35
that its performance will prove detrimental either to
the one to whom the promise has been made or to
the one who has made it. If, for example, Neptune,
in the drama, had not carried out his promise to
Theseus, Theseus would not have lost his son
Hippolytus; for, as the story runs, of the three
wishes
36 that Neptune had promised to grant him the
third was this: in a fit of anger he prayed for the
death of Hippolytus, and the granting of this prayer
plunged him into unspeakable grief. Promises are,
therefore, not to be kept, if the keeping of them is
to prove harmful to those to whom you have made
them; and, if the fulfilment of a promise should do
more harm to you than good to him to whom you
have made it, it is no violation of moral duty to give
the greater good precedence over the lesser good.
For example, if you have made an appointment with
anyone to appear as his advocate in court, and if in
the meantime your son should fall dangerously ill, it
would be no breach of your moral duty to fail in what
you agreed to do; nay, rather, he to whom your
promise was given would have a false conception of
duty, if he should complain that he had been deserted
in his time of need. Further than this, who fails to
see that those promises are not binding which are
extorted by intimidation or which we make when
[p. 35]
misled by false pretences? Such obligations are
annulled in most cases by the praetor's edict in
equity,
37 in some cases by the laws.
[
33]
Injustice often arises also through chicanery, that
38
is, through an over-subtle and even fraudulent construction of the law. This it is that gave rise to the
now familiar saw, “More law, less justice.” Through
such interpretation also a great deal of wrong is
committed in transactions between state and state;
thus, when a truce had been made with the enemy
for thirty days, a famous general
39 went to ravaging
their fields by night, because, he said, the truce
stipulated “days,” not nights. Not even our own
countryman's action is to be commended, if what is
told of Quintus Fabius Labeo is true—or whoever it
was (for I have no authority but hearsay): appointed
by the Senate to arbitrate a boundary dispute between Nola and Naples, he took up the case and
interviewed both parties separately, asking them not
to proceed in a covetous or grasping spirit, but to
make some concession rather than claim some accession. When each party had agreed to this, there
was a considerable strip of territory left between
them. And so he set the boundary of each city
as each had severally agreed; and the tract in between he awarded to the Roman People. Now that
is swindling, not arbitration. And therefore such
sharp practice is under all circumstances to be
avoided.
11. Again, there are certain duties that we owe
40
even to those who have wronged us. For there is a
limit to retribution and to punishment; or rather, I
am inclined to think, it is sufficient that the aggressor
should be brought to repent of his wrong-doing, in
[p. 37]
order that he may not repeat the offence and that
others may be deterred from doing wrong.
[
34]
Then, too, in the case of a state in its external
relations, the rights of war must be strictly observed.
For since there are two ways of settling a dispute:
first, by discussion; second, by physical force; and
since the former is characteristic of man, the latter
of the brute, we must resort to force only in case
we may not avail ourselves of discussion.
[
35]
The only.
41
excuse, therefore, for going to war is that we may
live in peace unharmed; and when the victory is
won, we should spare those who have not been
blood-thirsty and barbarous in their warfare. For
42
instance, our forefathers actually admitted to full
rights of citizenship the Tusculans, Aequians, Volscians, Sabines, and Hernicians, but they razed
Carthage and Numantia to the ground. I wish they
had not destroyed Corinth; but I believe they had
some special reason for what they did—its convenient situation, probably—and feared that its very
location might some day furnish a temptation to
renew the war. In my opinion, at least, we should
always strive to secure a peace that shall not admit
of guile. And if my advice had been heeded on
this point, we should still have at least some sort of
constitutional government, if not the best in the
world, whereas, as it is, we have none at all.
Not only must we show consideration for those
whom we have conquered by force of arms but we
must also ensure protection to those who lay down
their arms and throw themselves upon the mercy of
our generals, even though the battering-ram has
hammered at their walls. And among our countrymen justice has been observed so conscientiously in
[p. 39]
this direction, that those who have given promise of
protection to states or nations subdued in war become,
after the custom of our forefathers, the patrons of
those states.
[
36]
As for war, humane laws touching it are drawn
43
up in the fetial code of the Roman People under all
the guarantees of religion; and from this it may be
gathered that no war is just, unless it is entered upon
after an official demand for satisfaction has been submitted or warning has been given and a formal declaration made. Popilius was general in command of
a province. In his army Cato's son was serving on
his first campaign. When Popilius decided to disband one of his legions, he discharged also young
Cato, who was serving in that same legion. But
when the young man out of love for the service
stayed on in the field, his father wrote to Popilius to
say that if he let him stay in the army, he should
swear him into service with a new oath of allegiance,
for in view of the voidance of his former oath he
could not legally fight the foe. So extremely scrupulous was the observance of the laws in regard to the
conduct of war.
[
37]
There is extant, too, a letter of the
elder Marcus Cato to his son Marcus, in which he writes
that he has heard that the youth has been discharged
by the consul,
44 when he was serving in Macedonia in
the war with Perseus. He warns him, therefore, to be
careful not to go into battle; for, he says, the man who is
not legally a soldier has no right to be fighting the foe.
12. This also I observe—that he who would
properly have been called “a fighting enemy”
(
perduellis) was called “a guest” (
hostis), thus relieving the ugliness of the fact by a softened
expression; for “enemy” (
hostis) meant to our ancestors
[p. 41] what we now call “stranger” (
peregrinus).
This is proved by the usage in the Twelve Tables:
“Or a day fixed for trial with a stranger” (
hostis).
And again: “Right of ownership is inalienable for
ever in dealings with a stranger” (
hostis). What can
exceed such charity, when he with whom one is at war
is called by so gentle a name? And yet long lapse of
time has given that word a harsher meaning: for it has
lost its signification of “stranger” and has taken on
the technical connotation of “an enemy under arms.”
[
38]
But when a war is fought out for supremacy and
45
when glory is the object of war, it must still not fail
to start from the same motives which I said a moment
ago were the only righteous grounds for going to
war. But those wars which have glory for their end
must be carried on with less bitterness. For we
contend, for example, with a fellow-citizen in one
way, if he is a personal enemy, in another, if he is a
rival: with the rival it is a struggle for office and
position, with the enemy for life and honour. So
with the Celtiberians and the Cimbrians we fought
as with deadly enemies, not to determine which
should be supreme, but which should survive; but
with the Latins, Sabines, Samnites, Carthaginians,
and Pyrrhus we fought for supremacy. The Carthaginians violated treaties; Hannibal was cruel; the
others were more merciful. From Pyrrhus we have
this famous speech on the exchange of prisoners:
“Gold will I none, nor price shall ye give; for I ask none;
Come, let us not be chaff'rers of war, but warriors embattled.
Nay; let us venture our lives, and the sword, not gold, weigh the outcome.
[p. 43]
Make we the trial by valour in arms and see if Dame Fortune
Wills it that ye shall prevail or I, or what be her judgment.
Hear thou, too, this word, good Fabricius: whose valour soever
Spared hath been by the fortune of war-their freedom I grant them.
Such my resolve. I give and present them to you, my brave Romans;
Take them back to their homes; the great gods' blessings attend you.
”
A right kingly sentiment this and worthy a scion of
the Aeacidae.
[
39]
13. Again, if under stress of circumstances
46
individuals have made any promise to the enemy,
they are bound to keep their word even then. For
instance, in the First Punic War, when Regulus was
taken prisoner by the Carthaginians, he was sent
to Rome on parole to negotiate an exchange of
prisoners; he came and, in the first place, it was
he that made the motion in the Senate that the
prisoners should not be restored; and in the second
place, when his relatives and friends would have
kept him back, he chose to return to a death by
torture rather than prove false to his promise, though
given to an enemy.
[
40]
And again in the Second Punic War, after the
47
Battle of Cannae, Hannibal sent to Rome ten Roman
captives bound by an oath to return to him, if they
did not succeed in ransoming his prisoners; and as
long as any one of them lived, the censors kept them
all degraded and disfranchised, because they were
[p. 45]
guilty of perjury in not returning. And they
punished in like manner the one who had incurred
guilt by an evasion of his oath: with Hannibal's permission this man left the camp and returned a little
later on the pretext that he had forgotten something
or other; and then, when he left the camp the second
time, he claimed that he was released from the obligation of his oath; and so he was, according to the
letter of it, but not according to the spirit. In the
matter of a promise one must always consider the
meaning and not the mere words.
Our forefathers have given us another striking
example of justice toward an enemy: when a deserter from Pyrrhus promised the Senate to administer
poison to the king and thus work his death, the
Senate and Gaius Fabricius delivered the deserter
up to Pyrrhus. Thus they stamped with their disapproval the treacherous murder even of an enemy
who was at once powerful, unprovoked, aggressive,
and successful.
[
41]
With this I will close my discussion of the duties
connected with war.
But let us remember that we must have regard
48
for justice even towards the humblest. Now the
humblest station and the poorest fortune are those
of slaves; and they give us no bad rule who bid us
treat our slaves as we should our employees: they
must be required to work; they must be given their
dues.
While wrong may be done, then, in either of two
49
ways, that is, by force or by fraud, both are bestial:
fraud seems to belong to the cunning fox, force to
the lion; both are wholly unworthy of man, but
fraud is the more contemptible. But of all forms of
[p. 47]
injustice, none is more flagrant than that of the
hypocrite who, at the very moment when he is most
false, makes it his business to appear virtuous.
This must conclude our discussion of justice.
[
42]
14. Next in order, as outlined above, let us
50
speak of kindness and generosity. Nothing appeals
more to the best in human nature than this, but it
calls for the exercise of caution in many particulars:
we must, in the first place, see to it that our act of
kindness shall not prove an injury either to the
object of our beneficence or to others; in the second
place, that it shall not be beyond our means; and
finally, that it shall be proportioned to the worthiness
of the recipient; for this is the corner-stone of
justice; and by the standard of justice all acts of
kindness must be measured. For those who confer
a harmful favour upon someone whom they seemingly wish to help are to be accounted not generous
benefactors but dangerous sycophants; and likewise
those who injure one man, in order to be generous
to another, are guilty of the same injustice as if
they diverted to their own accounts the property of
their neighbours.
[
43]
Now, there are many—and especially those who
51
are ambitious for eminence and glory—who rob one
to enrich another; and they expect to be thought
generous towards their friends, if they put them in
the way of getting rich, no matter by what means.
Such conduct, however, is so remote from moral
duty that nothing can be more completely opposed
to duty. We must, therefore, take care to indulge
only in such liberality as will help our friends and
hurt no one. The conveyance of property by Lucius
Sulla and Gaius Caesar from its rightful owners to
[p. 49]
the hands of strangers should, for that reason, not
be regarded as generosity; for nothing is generous,
if it is not at the same time just.
[
44]
The second point for the exercise of caution was
52
that our beneficence should not exceed our means;
for those who wish to be more open-handed than
their circumstances permit are guilty of two faults:
first, they do wrong to their next of kin; for they
transfer to strangers property which would more
justly be placed at their service or bequeathed to
them. And second, such generosity too often engenders a passion for plundering and misappropriating
property, in order to supply the means for making
large gifts. We may also observe that a great many
people do many things that seem to be inspired
more by a spirit of ostentation than by heart-felt
kindness; for such people are not really generous
but are rather influenced by a sort of ambition to
make a show of being open-handed. Such a pose
is nearer akin to hypocrisy than to generosity or
moral goodness.
[
45]
The third rule laid down was that in acts of
53
kindness we should weigh with discrimination the
worthiness of the object of our benevolence; we
should take into consideration his moral character,
his attitude toward us, the intimacy of his relations
to us, and our common social ties, as well as the
services he has hitherto rendered in our interest.
It is to be desired that all these considerations
should be combined in the same person; if they
are not, then the more numerous and the more
important considerations must have the greater
weight.
[
46]
15. Now, the men we live with are not perfect
[p. 51]
and ideally wise, but men who do very well, if there
be found in them but the semblance of virtue. I
therefore think that this is to be taken for granted,
that no one should be entirely neglected who shows
any trace of virtue; but the more a man is endowed
with these finer virtues—temperance, self-control,
and that very justice about which so much has already been said—the more he deserves to be favoured.
I do not mention fortitude, for a courageous spirit
in a man who has not attained perfection and ideal
wisdom is generally too impetuous; it is those other
virtues that seem more particularly to mark the
good man.
So much in regard to the character of the object
of our beneficence.
[
47]
But as to the affection which anyone may have
54
for us, it is the first demand of duty that we do
most for him who loves us most; but we should
measure affection, not like youngsters, by the ardour
of its passion, but rather by its strength and constancy. But if there shall be obligations already
55
incurred, so that kindness is not to begin with us,
but to be requited, still greater diligence, it seems,
is called for; for no duty is more imperative than
that of proving one's gratitude.
[
48]
But if, as Hesiod bids, one is to repay with interest, if possible, what one has borrowed in time
of need, what, pray, ought we to do when challenged
by an unsought kindness? Shall we not imitate
the fruitful fields, which return more than they
receive? For if we do not hesitate to confer favours
upon those who we hope will be of help to us, how
ought we to deal with those who have already
helped us? For generosity is of two kinds: doing
[p. 53]
a kindness and requiting one. Whether we do
the kindness or not is optional; but to fail to requite
one is not allowable to a good man, provided he
can make the requital without violating the rights
of others.
[
49]
Furthermore, we must make some discrimination
between favours received; for, as a matter of course,
the greater the favour, the greater is the obligation. But in deciding this we must above all give
due weight to the spirit, the devotion, the affection,
that prompted the favour. For many people often
do favours impulsively for everybody without discrimination, prompted by a morbid sort of benevolence or by a sudden impulse of the heart, shifting as
the wind. Such acts of generosity are not to be so
highly esteemed as those which are performed with
judgment, deliberation, and mature consideration.
But in bestowing a kindness, as well as in making
a requital, the first rule of duty requires us—other
things being equal—to lend assistance preferably to
people in proportion to their individual need. Most
people adopt the contrary course: they put themselves most eagerly at the service of the one from
56
whom they hope to receive the greatest favours,
even though he has no need of their help.
[
50]
16. The interests of society, however, and its
57
common bonds will be best conserved, if kindness
be shown to each individual in proportion to the
closeness of his relationship.
But it seems we must trace back to their ultimate
58
sources the principles of fellowship and society that
Nature has established among men. The first
principle is that which is found in the connection subsisting between all the members of the human race;
[p. 55]
and that bond of connection is reason and speech,
which by the processes of teaching and learning, of
communicating, discussing, and reasoning associate
men together and unite them in a sort of natural
fraternity. In no other particular are we farther removed from the nature of beasts; for we admit that
they may have courage (horses and lions, for example);
but we do not admit that they have justice, equity,
and goodness; for they are not endowed with reason
or speech.
[
51]
This, then, is the most comprehensive bond that
unites together men as men and all to all; and
under it the common right to all things that Nature
has produced for the common use of man is to be
maintained, with the understanding that, while
everything assigned as private property by the
statutes and by civil law shall be so held as prescribed by those same laws, everything else shall be
regarded in the light indicated by the Greek proverb: “Amongst friends all things in common.”
59
Furthermore, we find the common property of all
men in things of the sort defined by Ennius; and,
though restricted by him to one instance, the principle may be applied very generally:
“Who kindly sets a wand'rer on his way
Does e'en as if he lit another's lamp by his:
No less shines his, when he his friend's hath lit.
”
In this example he effectively teaches us all to bestow
even upon a stranger what it costs us nothing to give.
[
52]
On this principle we have the following maxims:
Deny no one the water that flows by;
Let
anyone who will take fire from our fire;
Honest
counsel give to one who is in doubt;
[p. 57]
for such acts are useful to the recipient and cause
the giver no loss. We should, therefore, adopt these
principles and always be contributing something to
the common weal. But since the resources of individuals are limited and the number of the needy is
infinite, this spirit of universal liberality must be
regulated according to that test of Ennius—“No
less shines his” —in order that we may continue to
have the means for being generous to our friends.
[
53]
17. Then, too, there are a great many degrees
60
of closeness or remoteness in human society. To
proceed beyond the universal bond of our common
humanity, there is the closer one of belonging to the
same people, tribe, and tongue, by which men are
very closely bound together; it is a still closer relation to be citizens of the same city-state; for fellow-citizens have much in common—forum, temples,
colonnades, streets, statutes laws. Courts, rights of
suffrage, to say nothing of social and friendly circles
and diverse business relations with many.
But a sill closer social union exists between kindred.
61 Starting with that infinite bond of union of the
human race in general, the conception is now confined
to a small and narrow circle.
[
54]
For since the reproductive instinct is by Nature's gift the common possession of all living creatures, the first bond of union
is that between husband and wife; the next, that
between parents and children; then we find one
home, with everything in common. And this is the
foundation of civil government, the nursery, as it
were, of the state. Then follow the bonds between
brothers and sisters, and next those of first and then
of second cousins; and when they can no longer be
sheltered under one roof, they go out into other
[p. 59]
homes, as into colonies. Then follow between these,
in turn, marriages and connections by marriage, and
from these again a new stock of relations; and from
this propagation and after-growth states have their
beginnings. The bonds of common blood hold men
fast through good-will and affection;
[
55]
for it means
much to share in common the same family traditions,
the same forms of domestic worship, and the same
ancestral tombs.
But of all the bonds of fellowship, there is none
62
more noble, none more powerful than when good
men of congenial character are joined in intimate
friendship; for really, if we discover in another that
moral goodness on which I dwell so much, it attracts
us and makes us friends to the one in whose character
it seems to dwell.
[
56]
And while every virtue attracts
us and makes us love those who seem to possess it,
still justice and generosity do so most of all. Nothing,
moreover, is more conducive to love and intimacy
than compatibility of character in good men; for
when two people have the same ideals and the same
tastes, it is a natural consequence that each loves the
other as himself; and the result is, as Pythagoras
requires of ideal friendship, that several are united
in one.
Another strong bond of fellowship is effected by
mutual interchange of kind services; and as long as
these kindnesses are mutual and acceptable, those
between whom they are interchanged are united by
the ties of an enduring intimacy.
[
57]
But when with a rational spirit you have surveyed
63
the whole field, there is no social relation among
them all more close, none more dear than that
which links each one of us with our country. Parents
[p. 61]
are dear; dear are children, relatives, friends; but
one native land embraces all our loves; and who that
is true would hesitate to give his life for her, if by
his death he could render her a service? So much
the more execrable are those monsters who have
torn their fatherland to pieces with every form of
outrage and who are
64 and have been
65 engaged in
compassing her utter destruction.
[
58]
Now, if a contrast and comparison were to be
made to find out where most of our moral obligation
is due, country would come first, and parents; for
their services have laid us under the heaviest obligation; next come children and the whole family, who
look to us alone for support and can have no other
protection; finally, our kinsmen, with whom we live
on good terms and with whom, for the most part,
our lot is one.
All needful material assistance is, therefore, due
first of all to those whom I have named; but intimate relationship of life and living, counsel, conversation, encouragement, comfort, and sometimes even
reproof flourish best in friendships. And that friendship is sweetest which is cemented by congeniality
of character.
[
59]
18. But in the performance of all these duties
66
we shall have to consider what is most needful in
each individual case and what each individual person
can or cannot procure without our help. In this
way we shall find that the claims of social relationship, in its various degrees, are not identical with
the dictates of circumstances; for there are obligations that are due to one individual rather than
to another: for example, one would sooner assist
a neighbour in gathering his harvest than either
[p. 63]
a brother or a friend; but should it be a case in
court, one would defend a kinsman and a friend
rather than a neighbour. Such questions as these
must, therefore, be taken into consideration in every
act of moral duty [and we must acquire the habit
and keep it up], in order to become good calculators
of duty, able by adding and subtracting to strike a
balance correctly and find out just how much is due
to each individual.
[
60]
But as neither physicians nor generals nor orators
can achieve any signal success without experience
and practice, no matter how well they may understand the theory of their profession, so the rules for
the discharge of duty are formulated, it is true, as I
am doing now, but a matter of such importance
requires experience also and practice.
This must close our discussion of the ways in
which moral goodness, on which duty depends, is
developed from those principles which hold good in
human society.
[
61]
We must realize, however, that while we have set
67
down four cardinal virtues from which as sources
moral rectitude and moral duty emanate, that
achievement is most glorious in the eyes of the
world which is won with a spirit great, exalted, and
superior to the vicissitudes of earthly life. And so,
when we wish to hurl a taunt, the very first to rise to
our lips is, if possible, something like this:
“For ye, young men, show a womanish soul, yon maiden68 a man's;
”
and this:
“Thou son of Salmacis, win spoils that cost nor sweat nor blood.
”
[p. 65]
When, on the other hand, we wish to pay a compliment, we somehow or other praise in more eloquent
strain the brave and noble work of some great soul.
Hence there is an open field for orators on the subjects of Marathon, Salamis, Plataea, Thermopylae,
and Leuctra, and hence our own Cocles, the Decii,
Gnaeus and Publius Scipio, Marcus Marcellus, and
countless others, and, above all, the Roman People
as a nation are celebrated for greatness of spirit.
Their passion for military glory, moreover, is shown
in the fact that we see their statues usually in
soldier's garb.
[
62]
19. But if the exaltation of spirit seen in times
69
of danger and toil is devoid of justice and fights for
selfish ends instead of for the common good, it is a
vice; for not only has it no element of virtue, but
its nature is barbarous and revolting to all our finer
feelings. The Stoics, therefore, correctly define
courage as “that virtue which champions the cause
of right.” Accordingly, no one has attained to true
glory who has gained a reputation for courage by
treachery and cunning; for nothing that lacks justice
can be morally right.
[
63]
This, then, is a fine saying of Plato's: “Not only
must all knowledge that is divorced from justice be
called cunning rather than wisdom,” he says, “but
even the courage that is prompt to face danger, if it
is inspired not by public spirit, but by its own selfish
purposes, should have the name of effrontery rather
than of courage.” And so we demand that men
who are courageous and high-souled shall at the
same time be good and straightforward, lovers of
truth, and foes to deception; for these qualities are
the centre and soul of justice.
[p. 67]
[
64]
But the mischief is that from this exaltation and
greatness of spirit spring all too readily self-will and
excessive lust for power. For just as Plato tells us that
the whole national character of the Spartans was on
fire with passion for victory, so, in the same way, the
more notable a man is for his greatness of spirit, the
more ambitious he is to be the foremost citizen, or, I
should say rather, to be sole ruler. But when one
begins to aspire to pre-eminence, it is difficult to
preserve that spirit of fairness which is absolutely
essential to justice. The result is that such men do
not allow themselves to be constrained either by
argument or by any public and lawful authority; but
they only too often prove to be bribers and agitators
in public life, seeking to obtain supreme power and
to be superiors through force rather than equals
through justice. But the greater the difficulty, the
greater the glory; for no occasion arises that can
excuse a man for being guilty of injustice.
[
65]
So then, not those who do injury but those who
70
prevent it are to be considered brave and courageous.
Moreover, true and philosophic greatness of spirit
regards the moral goodness to which Nature most
aspires as consisting in deeds, not in fame, and prefers to be first in reality rather than in name. And
we must approve this view; for he who depends upon
the caprice of the ignorant rabble cannot be numbered among the great. Then, too, the higher a
man's ambition, the more easily he is tempted to
acts of injustice by his desire for fame. We are now,
to be sure, on very slippery ground; for scarcely can
the man be found who has passed through trials and
encountered dangers and does not then wish for
glory as a reward for his achievements.
[p. 69]
[
66]
20. The soul that is altogether courageous and
71
great is marked above all by two characteristics:
one of these is indifference to outward circumstances;
for such a person cherishes the conviction that
nothing but moral goodness and propriety deserves to
be either admired or wished for or striven after, and
that he ought not to be subject to any man or any
passion or any accident of fortune. The second
characteristic is that, when the soul is disciplined in
the way above mentioned, one should do deeds not only
great and in the highest degree useful, but extremely
arduous and laborious and fraught with danger both
to life and to many things that make life worth living.
[
67]
All the glory and greatness and, I may add, all the
72
usefulness of these two characteristics of courage are
centred in the latter; the rational cause that makes
men great, in the former. For it is the former that
73
contains the element that makes souls pre-eminent
and indifferent to worldly fortune. And this quality
is distinguished by two criteria: (1) if one account
moral rectitude as the only good; and (2) if one be
free from all passion. For we must agree that it
takes a brave and heroic soul to hold as slight what
most people think grand and glorious, and to disregard it from fixed and settled principles. And it
requires strength of character and great singleness
of purpose to bear what seems painful, as it comes
to pass in many and various forms in human life, and
to bear it so unflinchingly as not to be shaken in the
least from one's natural state of the dignity of a
philosopher.
[
68]
Moreover, it would be inconsistent
for the man who is not overcome by fear to be overcome by desire, or for the man who has shown himself
invincible to toil to be conquered by pleasure. We
[p. 71]
must, therefore, not only avoid the latter, but also
beware of ambition for wealth; for there is nothing so
characteristic of narrowness and littleness of soul as
the love of riches; and there is nothing more honourable and noble than to be indifferent to money, if
one does not possess it, and to devote it to beneficence
and liberality, if one does possess it.
As I said before, we must also beware of ambition
for glory; for it robs us of liberty, and in defence of
liberty a high-souled man should stake everything.
And one ought not to seek military authority; nay,
rather it ought sometimes to be declined,
74 sometimes
to be resigned.
75
[
69]
Again, we must keep ourselves free from every
76
disturbing emotion, not only from desire and fear, but
also from excessive pain and pleasure, and from anger,
so that we may enjoy that calm of soul and freedom
from care which bring both moral stability and dignity of character. But there have been many and still
77
are many who, while pursuing that calm of soul of
which I speak, have withdrawn from civic duty and
taken refuge in retirement. Among such have been
found the most famous and by far the foremost philosophers
78 and certain other
79 earnest, thoughtful men
who could not endure the conduct of either the
people or their leaders; some of them, too, lived in
the country and found their pleasure in the management of their private estates.
[
70]
Such men have had
the same aims as kings—to suffer no want, to be
subject to no authority, to enjoy their liberty, that
is, in its essence, to live just as they please.
21. So, while this desire is common to men of
political ambitions and men of retirement, of whom
I have just spoken, the one class think they can
[p. 73]
attain their end if they secure large means; the
80
other, if they are content with the little they have
And, in this matter, neither way of thinking is altogether to be condemned; but the life of retirement is
easier and safer and at the same time less burdensome or troublesome to others, while the career
of those who apply themselves to statecraft and to
conducting great enterprises is more profitable to
mankind and contributes more to their own greatness and renown.
[
71]
So perhaps those men of extraordinary genius
who have devoted themselves to learning must be
excused for not taking part in public affairs; likewise, those who from ill-health or for some still
more valid reason have retired from the service of
the state and left to others the opportunity and the
glory of its administration. But if those who have
no such excuse profess a scorn for civil and military
offices, which most people admire, I think that this
should be set down not to their credit but to their
discredit; for in so far as they care little, as they
say, for glory and count it as naught, it is difficult
not to sympathize with their attitude; in reality,
however, they seem to dread the toil and trouble
and also, perhaps, the discredit and humiliation of
political failure and defeat. For there are people
who in opposite circumstances do not act consistently: they have the utmost contempt for pleasure,
but in pain they are too sensitive; they are indifferent to glory, but they are crushed by disgrace;
and even in their inconsistency they show no great
consistency.
[
72]
But those whom Nature has endowed with the
81
capacity for administering public affairs should put
[p. 75]
aside all hesitation, enter the race for public office,
and take a hand in directing the government; for
in no other way can a government be administered
or greatness of spirit be made manifest. Statesmen,
too, no less than philosophers—perhaps even more
so—should carry with them that greatness of spirit
and indifference to outward circumstances to which
I so often refer, together with calm of soul and freedom from care, if they are to be free from worries
and lead a dignified and self-consistent life.
[
73]
This is
easier for the philosophers; as their life is less exposed to the assaults of fortune, their wants are fewer;
and, if any misfortune overtakes them, their fall is not
so disastrous. Not without reason, therefore, are
stronger emotions aroused in those who engage in
public life than in those who live in retirement, and
greater is their ambition for success; the more,
therefore, do they need to enjoy greatness of spirit
and freedom from annoying cares.
If anyone is entering public life, let him beware
of thinking only of the honour that it brings; but
let him be sure also that he has the ability to
succeed. At the same time, let him take care not
to lose heart too readily through discouragement nor
yet to be over-confident through ambition. In a
word, before undertaking any enterprise, careful
preparation must be made.
[
74]
22. Most people think that the achievements
82
of war are more important than those of peace; but
this opinion needs to be corrected. For many men
have sought occasions for war from the mere ambition for fame. This is notably the case with men
of great spirit and natural ability, and it is the more
likely to happen, if they are adapted to a soldier's
[p. 77]
life and fond of warfare. But if we will face the
facts, we shall find that there have been many
instances of achievement in peace more important
and no less renowned than in war.
[
75]
However highly Themistocles, for example, may
83
be extolled—and deservedly—and however much
more illustrious his name may be than Solon's, and
however much Salamis may be cited as witness of
his most glorious victory—a victory glorified above
Solon's statesmanship in instituting the Areopagus
—yet Solon's achievement is not to be accounted less
illustrious than his. For Themistocles's victory served
the state once and only once; while Solon's work
will be of service for ever. For through his legislation the laws of the Athenians and the institutions
of their fathers are maintained. And while Themistocles could not readily point to any instance in
which he himself had rendered assistance to the
Areopagus, the Areopagus might with justice assert
that Themistocles had received assistance from it;
for the war was directed by the counsels of that
senate which Solon had created.
[
76]
The same may be said of Pausanias and Lysander.
84
Although it is thought that it was by their achievements that Sparta gained her supremacy, yet these
are not even remotely to be compared with the
legislation and discipline of Lycurgus. Nay, rather,
it was due to these that Pausanias and Lysander had
armies so brave and so well disciplined. For my own
part, I do not consider that Marcus Scaurus was inferior to Gaius Marius, when I was a lad, or Quintus
Catulus to Gnaeus Pompey, when I was engaged in
public life. For arms are of little value in the field
unless there is wise counsel at home. So, too,
[p. 79]
Africanus, though a great man and a soldier of extraordinary ability, did no greater service to the state by
destroying Numantia than was done at the same time
by Publius Nasica, though not then clothed with
official authority, by removing Tiberius Gracchus.
This deed does not, to be sure, belong wholly to the
domain of civil affairs; it partakes of the nature of
war also, since it was effected by violence; but it was,
for all that, executed as a political measure without
the help of an army.
[
77]
The whole truth, however, is in this verse, against
85
which, I am told, the malicious and envious are wont
to rail:
“Yield, ye arms, to the toga; to civic praises,86 ye laurels.
”
87
Not to mention other instances, did not arms yield
to the toga, when I was at the helm of state? For
never was the republic in more serious peril, never
was peace more profound. Thus, as the result of my
counsels and my vigilance, their weapons slipped
suddenly from the hands of the most desperate
traitors—dropped to the ground of their own accord!
What achievement in war, then, was ever so great?
What triumph can be compared with that?
[
78]
For I
may boast to you, my son Marcus; for to you belong
the inheritance of that glory of mine and the duty
of imitating my deeds. And it was to me, too, that
Gnaeus Pompey, a hero crowned with the honours
of war, paid this tribute in the hearing of many,
when he said that his third triumph would have been
gained in vain, if he were not to have through my
services to the state a place in which to celebrate it.
There are, therefore, instances of civic courage
[p. 81]
that are not inferior to the courage of the soldier.
Nay, the former calls for even greater energy and
greater devotion than the latter.
[
79]
23. That moral goodness which we look for in
88
a lofty, high-minded spirit is secured, of course, by
moral, not by physical, strength. And yet the body
must be trained and so disciplined that it can obey
the dictates of judgment and reason in attending
to business and in enduring toil. But that moral
goodness which is our theme depends wholly upon
the thought and attention given to it by the mind.
And, in this way, the men who in a civil capacity
direct the affairs of the nation render no less important service than they who conduct its wars: by their
statesmanship oftentimes wars are either averted or
terminated; sometimes also they are declared. Upon
Marcus Cato's counsel, for example, the Third Punic
War was undertaken, and in its conduct his influence
was dominant, even after he was dead.
[
80]
And so
diplomacy in the friendly settlement of controversies
is more desirable than courage in settling them on
the battlefield; but we must be careful not to take
that course merely for the sake of avoiding war
rather than for the sake of public expediency. War,
however, should be undertaken in such a way as to
make it evident that it has no other object than to
secure peace.
But it takes a brave and resolute spirit not to be
disconcerted in times of difficulty or ruffled and
thrown off one's feet, as the saying is, but to keep
one's presence of mind and one's self-possession and
not to swerve from the path of reason.
[
81]
Now all this requires great personal courage; but
89
it calls also for great intellectual ability by reflection
[p. 83]
to anticipate the future, to discover some time in
advance what may happen whether for good or for
ill, and what must be done in any possible event, and
never to be reduced to having to say “I had not
thought of that.”
These are the activities that mark a spirit strong,
high, and self-reliant in its prudence and wisdom.
But to mix rashly in the fray and to fight hand to
hand with the enemy is but a barbarous and brutish
kind of business. Yet when the stress of circumstances demands it, we must gird on the sword and
prefer death to slavery and disgrace.
[
82]
24. As to destroying and plundering cities, let
me say that great care should be taken that nothing
be done in reckless cruelty or wantonness. And it is
a great man's duty in troublous times to single out
the guilty for punishment, to spare the many, and in
every turn of fortune to hold to a true and honourable course. For whereas there are many, as I have
said before, who place the achievements of war above
those of peace, so one may find many to whom
adventurous, hot-headed counsels seem more brilliant
and more impressive than calm and well-considered
measures.
[
83]
We must, of course, never be guilty of seeming
90
cowardly and craven in our avoidance of danger; but
we must also beware of exposing ourselves to danger
needlessly. Nothing can be more foolhardy than
that. Accordingly, in encountering danger we
should do as doctors do in their practice: in light
cases of illness they give mild treatment; in cases of
dangerous sickness they are compelled to apply
hazardous and even desperate remedies. It is, therefore, only a madman who, in a calm, would pray
[p. 85]
for a storm; a wise man's way is, when the storm
does come, to withstand it with all the means at his
command, and especially, when the advantages to
be expected in case of a successful issue are greater
than the hazards of the struggle.
The dangers attending great affairs of state fall
91
sometimes upon those who undertake them, sometimes upon the state. In carrying out such enterprises, some run the risk of losing their lives, others
their reputation and the good-will of their fellow-citizens. It is our duty, then, to be more ready to
endanger our own than the public welfare and to
hazard honour and glory more readily than other
advantages.
92
[
84]
Many, on the other hand, have been found who
were ready to pour out not only their money but
their lives for their country and yet would not
consent to make even the slightest sacrifice of personal glory—even though the interests of their
country demanded it. For example, when Callicratidas, as Spartan admiral in the Peloponnesian War,
had won many signal successes, he spoiled everything at the end by refusing to listen to the proposal
of those who thought he ought to withdraw his fleet
from the Arginusae and not to risk an engagement
with the Athenians. His answer to them was that
“the Spartans could build another fleet, if they lost
that one, but he could not retreat without dishonour
to himself.” And yet what he did dealt only a
slight blow to Sparta; there was another which
proved disastrous, when Cleombrotus in fear of criticism recklessly went into battle against Epaminondas. In consequence of that, the Spartan power
fell.
[p. 87]
How much better was the conduct of Quintus
Maximus! Of him Ennius says:
“One man—and he alone—restored our state by delaying.
Not in the least did fame with him take precedence of safety;
Therefore now does his glory shine bright, and it grows ever brighter.
”
This sort of offence
93 must be avoided no less in
political life. For there are men who for fear of
giving offence do not dare to express their honest
opinion, no matter how excellent.
[
85]
25. Those who propose to take charge of the
94
affairs of government should not fail to remember two
of Plato's rules: first, to keep the good of the people
so clearly in view that regardless of their own interests they will make their every action conform to
that; second, to care for the welfare of the whole
body politic and not in serving the interests of some
95
one party to betray the rest. For the administration of the government, like the office of a trustee,
must be conducted for the benefit of those entrusted
to one's care, not of those to whom it is entrusted.
Now, those who care for the interests of a part of
the citizens and neglect another part, introduce
into the civil service a dangerous element—dissension and party strife. The result is that some
are found to be loyal supporters of the democratic,
others of the aristocratic party, and few of the nation
as a whole.
[
86]
As a result of this party spirit bitter strife arose
at Athens,
96 and in our own country not only dissensions
97 but also disastrous civil wars
98 broke out.
[p. 89]
All this the citizen who is patriotic, brave, and worthy
of a leading place in the state will shun with abhorrence; he will dedicate himself unreservedly to his
country, without aiming at influence or power for
himself; and he will devote himself to the state in
its entirety in such a way as to further the interests
of all. Besides, he will not expose anyone to hatred
or disrepute by groundless charges, but he will
surely cleave to justice and honour so closely that he
will submit to any loss, however heavy, rather than
be untrue to them, and will face death itself rather
than renounce them.
[
87]
A most wretched custom, assuredly, is our electioneering
99 and scrambling for office. Concerning
this also we find a fine thought in Plato: “Those
who compete against one another,” he says, “to see
which of two candidates shall administer the government, are like sailors quarrelling as to which one of
them shall do the steering.” And he likewise lays
down the rule that we should regard only those as
adversaries who take up arms against the state, not
those who strive to have the government administered according to their convictions. This was the
spirit of the disagreement between Publius Africanus
and Quintus Metellus: there was in it no trace of
rancour.
[
88]
Neither must we listen to those who think that
100
one should indulge in violent anger against one's
political enemies and imagine that such is the
attitude of a great-spirited, brave man. For
nothing is more commendable, nothing more
becoming in a pre-eminently great man than courtesy and forbearance. Indeed, in a free people,
where all enjoy equal rights before the law, we
[p. 91]
must school ourselves to affability and what is called
“mental poise”;
101 for if we are irritated when
people intrude upon us at unseasonable hours or make
unreasonable requests, we shall develop a sour,
churlish temper, prejudicial to ourselves and offensive
to others. And yet gentleness of spirit and forbearance are to be commended only with the understanding that strictness may be exercised for the
good of the state; for without that, the government cannot be well administered. On the other
hand, if punishment or correction must be administered, it need not be insulting; it ought to have
regard to the welfare of the state, not to the personal
satisfaction of the man who administers the punishment or reproof.
[
89]
We should take care also that the punishment
102
shall not be out of proportion to the offence, and
that some shall not be chastised for the same fault
for which others are not even called to account. In
administering punishment it is above all necessary
to allow no trace of anger. For if anyone proceeds
in a passion to inflict punishment, he will never
observe that happy mean which lies between excess
and defect. This doctrine of the mean is approved
by the Peripatetics—and wisely approved, if only
they did not speak in praise of anger and tell us
that it is a gift bestowed on us by Nature for a good
purpose. But, in reality, anger is in every circumstance to be eradicated; and it is to be desired that
they who administer the government should be like
the laws, which are led to inflict punishment not by
wrath but by justice.
[
90]
26. Again, when fortune smiles and the stream
103
of life flows according to our wishes, let us diligently
[p. 93]
avoid all arrogance, haughtiness, and pride. For it
is as much a sign of weakness to give way to one's
feelings in success as it is in adversity. But it
is a fine thing to keep an unruffled temper, an unchanging mien, and the same cast of countenance
in every condition of life; this, history tells us,
was characteristic of Socrates and no less of Gaius
Laelius. Philip, king of Macedon, I observe, however surpassed by his son in achievements and fame,
was superior to him in affability and refinement.
Philip, accordingly, was always great; Alexander,
often infamously bad. There seems to be sound
advice, therefore, in this word of warning: “The
higher we are placed, the more humbly should we
104
walk.” Panaetius tells us that Africanus, his pupil
and friend, used to say: “As, when horses have
become mettlesome and unmanageable on account
of their frequent participation in battles, their
owners put them in the hands of trainers to make
them more tractable; so men, who through prosperity have become restive and over self-confident,
ought to be put into the training-ring, so to speak,
of reason and learning, that they may be brought to
comprehend the frailty of human affairs and the
fickleness of fortune.”
[
91]
The greater our prosperity, moreover, the more
should we seek the counsel of friends, and the
greater the heed that should be given to their
advice. Under such circumstances also we must
beware of lending an ear to sycophants or allowing
them to impose upon us with their flattery. For
it is easy in this way to deceive ourselves, since
we thus come to think ourselves duly entitled to
praise; and to this frame of mind a thousand delusions
[p. 95] may be traced, when men are puffed up with
conceit and expose themselves to ignominy and
ridicule by committing the most egregious blunders.
So much for this subject.
[
92]
To revert to the original question
105—we must
106
decide that the most important activities, those
most indicative of a great spirit, are performed by
the men who direct the affairs of nations; for such
public activities have the widest scope and touch
the lives of the most people. But even in the life
of retirement there are and there have been many
high-souled men who have been engaged in important inquiries or embarked on most important
enterprises and yet kept themselves within the
limits of their own affairs; or, taking a middle
course between philosophers on the one hand and
statesmen on the other, they were content with
managing their own property—not increasing it by
any and every means nor debarring their kindred
from the enjoyment of it, but rather, if ever there
were need, sharing it with their friends and with
the state. Only let it, in the first place, be honestly
acquired, by the use of no dishonest or fraudulent
means; let it, in the second place, increase by
wisdom, industry, and thrift; and, finally, let it
be made available for the use of as many as possible
(if only they are worthy) and be at the service of
generosity and beneficence rather than of sensuality
and excess.
By observing these rules, one may live in magnificence, dignity, and independence, and yet in honour,
truth and charity toward all.
[
93]
27. We have next to discuss the one remaining
107 division of moral rectitude. That is the one
[p. 97]
in which we find considerateness and self-control,
which give, as it were, a sort of polish to life; it
embraces also temperance, complete subjection of
all the passions, and moderation in all things.
Under this head is further included what, in Latin,
108
may be called
decorum109 (propriety); for in Greek
it is called
πρέπον.110 Such is its essential nature,
that it is inseparable from moral goodness;
[
94]
for what
is proper is morally right, and what is morally right
is proper. The nature of the difference between
morality and propriety can be more easily felt than
expressed. For whatever propriety may be, it is
manifested only when there is pre-existing moral
rectitude. And so, not only in this division of moral
rectitude which we have now to discuss but also in
the three preceding divisions, it is clearly brought out
what propriety is. For to employ reason and speech
111
rationally, to do with careful consideration whatever one does, and in everything to discern the
truth and to uphold it—that is proper. To be
mistaken, on the other hand, to miss the truth,
to fall into error, to be led astray—that is as
improper as to be deranged and lose one's mind.
And all things just are proper; all things unjust,
like all things immoral, are improper.
The relation of propriety to fortitude is similar.
What is done in a manly and courageous spirit seems
becoming to a man and proper; what is done in a
contrary fashion is at once immoral and improper.
[
95]
This propriety, therefore, of which I am speaking belongs to each division of moral rectitude;
and its relation to the cardinal virtues is so close,
that it is perfectly self-evident and does not require
any abstruse process of reasoning to see it. For
[p. 99]
there is a certain element of propriety perceptible
in every act of moral rectitude; and this can be
separated from virtue theoretically better than it
can be practically. As comeliness and beauty of
person are inseparable from the notion of health,
so this propriety of which we are speaking, while
in fact completely blended with virtue, is mentally
and theoretically distinguishable from it.
[
96]
The classification of propriety, moreover, is twofold:
112 (1) we assume a general sort of propriety,
which is found in moral goodness as a whole; then (2)
there is another propriety, subordinate to this, which
belongs to the several divisions of moral goodness.
The former is usually defined somewhat as follows:
“Propriety is that which harmonizes with man's
superiority in those respects in which his nature
differs from that of the rest of the animal creation.”
And they so define the special type of propriety
which is subordinate to the general notion, that they
represent it to be that propriety which harmonizes
with Nature, in the sense that it manifestly embraces temperance and self-control, together with
a certain deportment such as becomes a gentleman.
[
97]
28. That this is the common acceptation of
113
propriety we may infer from that propriety which
poets aim to secure. Concerning that, I have occasion to say more in another connection. Now,
we say that the poets observe propriety, when every
word or action is in accord with each individual
character. For example, if Aeacus or Minos said:
“Let them hate, if only they fear,
”
or:
“The father is himself his children's tomb,
”
[p. 101]
that would seem improper, because we are told that
they were just men. But when Atreus speaks those
lines, they call forth applause; for the sentiment is
in keeping with the character. But it will rest
with the poets to decide, according to the individual
characters, what is proper for each; but to us Nature
herself has assigned a character of surpassing excellence, far superior to that of all other living creatures, and in accordance with that we shall have to
decide what propriety requires.
[
98]
The poets will observe, therefore, amid a great
variety of characters, what is suitable and proper
for all—even for the bad. But to us Nature
114
has assigned the rôles of steadfastness, temperance,
self-control, and considerateness of others; Nature
also teaches us not to be careless in our behaviour
towards our fellow-men. Hence we may clearly see
how wide is the application not only of that propriety which is essential to moral rectitude in
general, but also of the special propriety which is
displayed in each particular subdivision of virtue.
For, as physical beauty with harmonious symmetry
of the limbs engages the attention and delights the
eye, for the very reason that all the parts combine
in harmony and grace, so this propriety, which
shines out in our conduct, engages the approbation
of our fellow-men by the order, consistency, and
self-control it imposes upon every word and deed.
[
99]
We should, therefore, in our dealings with people
115
show what I may almost call reverence toward all
men—not only toward the men who are the best, but
toward others as well. For indifference to public
opinion implies not merely self-sufficiency, but even
total lack of principle. There is, too, a difference between
[p. 103] justice and considerateness in one's relations
to one's fellow-men. It is the function of justice
not to do wrong to one's fellow-men; of considerateness, not to wound their feelings; and in this the
essence of propriety is best seen.
With the foregoing exposition, I think it is clear
what the nature is of what we term propriety.
[
100]
Further, as to the duty which has its source in
116
propriety, the first road on which it conducts us
leads to harmony with Nature and the faithful observance of her laws. If we follow Nature as our
117
guide, we shall never go astray, but we shall be
pursuing that which is in its nature clear-sighted
and penetrating (Wisdom), that which is adapted to
promote and strengthen society (Justice), and that
which is strong and courageous (Fortitude). But
the very essence of propriety is found in the division
of virtue which is now under discussion (Temperance). For it is only when they agree with Nature's
laws that we should give our approval to the movements not only of the body, but still more of the
spirit.
[
101]
Now we find that the essential activity of the
118
spirit is twofold: one force is appetite (that is,
ὁρμή,
in Greek), which impels a man this way and that;
the other is reason, which teaches and explains
what should be done and what should be left undone.
The result is that reason commands, appetite obeys.
29. Again, every action ought to be free from
undue haste or carelessness; neither ought we to
do anything for which we cannot assign a reasonable
motive; for in these words we have practically a
definition of duty.
[
102]
The appetites, moreover, must be made to obey
[p. 105]
the reins of reason and neither allowed to run ahead
of it nor from listlessness or indolence to lag behind;
but people should enjoy calm of soul and be free
from every sort of passion. As a result strength
119
of character and self-control will shine forth in all
their lustre. For when appetites overstep their
bounds and, galloping away, so to speak, whether
in desire or aversion, are not well held in hand
by reason, they clearly overleap all bound and
measure; for they throw obedience off and leave
it behind and refuse to obey the reins of reason,
to which they are subject by Nature's laws. And
not only minds but bodies as well are disordered by
such appetites. We need only to look at the faces
of men in a rage or under the influence of some
passion or fear or beside themselves with extravagant
joy: in every instance their features, voices, motions,
attitudes undergo a change.
[
103]
From all this—to return to our sketch of duty—
we see that all the appetites must be controlled
and calmed and that we must take infinite pains
not to do anything from mere impulse or at random,
without due consideration and care. For Nature has
120
not brought us into the world to act as if we were
created for play or jest, but rather for earnestness
and for some more serious and important pursuits.
We may, of course, indulge in sport and jest, but in
the same way as we enjoy sleep or other relaxations,
and only when we have satisfied the claims of our
earnest, serious tasks. Further than that, the manner
121 of jesting itself ought not to be extravagant or
immoderate, but refined and witty. For as we do
not grant our children unlimited licence to play,
but only such freedom as is not incompatible with
[p. 107]
good conduct, so even in our jesting let the light
of a pure character shine forth.
[
104]
There are, generally
speaking, two sorts of jest: the one, coarse, rude,
vicious, indecent; the other, refined, polite, clever,
witty. With this latter sort not only our own
Plautus and the Old Comedy of Athens, but also
the books of Socratic philosophy abound; and we
have many witty sayings of many men—like those
collected by old Cato under the title of
Bons Mots
(or Apophthegms). So the distinction between the
elegant and the vulgar jest is an easy matter: the
one kind, if well timed (for instance, in hours of
mental relaxation), is becoming to the most dignified
person; the other is unfit for any gentleman, if the
subject is indecent and the words obscene.
Then, too, certain bounds must be observed in
our amusements and we must be careful not to
carry things too far and, swept away by our passions,
lapse into some shameful excess. Our Campus,
however, and the amusements of the chase are
examples of wholesome recreation.
[
105]
30. But it is essential to every inquiry about
duty that we keep before our eyes how far superior
man is by nature to cattle and other beasts: they
have no thought except for sensual pleasure and
this they are impelled by every instinct to seek;
but man's mind is nurtured by study and meditation; he is always either investigating or doing,
and he is captivated by the pleasure of seeing and
hearing. Nay, even if a man is more than ordinarily
inclined to sensual pleasures, provided, of course,
122
that he be not quite on a level with the beasts of
the field (for some people are men only in name,
not in fact)—if, I say, he is a little too susceptible
[p. 109]
to the attractions of pleasure, he hides the fact,
however much he may be caught in its toils, and
for very shame conceals his appetite.
[
106]
From this we see that sensual pleasure is quite
unworthy of the dignity of man and that we ought
to despise it and cast it from us; but if someone
should be found who sets some value upon sensual
gratification, he must keep strictly within the limits
of moderate indulgence. One's physical comforts
and wants, therefore, should be ordered according
to the demands of health and strength, not according to the calls of pleasure. And if we will only
bear in mind the superiority and dignity of our
nature, we shall realize how wrong it is to abandon
ourselves to excess and to live in luxury and voluptuousness, and how right it is to live in thrift, selfdenial, simplicity, and sobriety.
[
107]
We must realize also that we are invested by
123
Nature with two characters, as it were: one of these
is universal, arising from the fact of our being all
alike endowed with reason and with that superiority
which lifts us above the brute. From this all
morality and propriety are derived, and upon it
depends the rational method of ascertaining our
duty. The other character is the one that is
124
assigned to individuals in particular. In the matter
of physical endowment there are great differences;
some, we see, excel in speed for the race, others in
strength for wrestling; so in point of personal appearance, some have stateliness, others comeliness.
Diversities of character are greater still.
[
108]
Lucius
Crassus and Lucius Philippus had a large fund of
wit; Gaius Caesar, Lucius's son, had a still richer
fund and employed it with more studied purpose.
[p. 111]
Contemporary with them, Marcus Scaurus and
Marcus Drusus, the younger, were examples of
unusual seriousness; Gaius Laelius, of unbounded
jollity; while his intimate friend, Scipio, cherished
more serious ideals and lived a more austere life.
Among the Greeks, history tells us, Socrates was
fascinating and witty, a genial conversationalist;
he was what the Greeks call
εἴρων—in every conversation, pretending to need information and professing admiration for the wisdom of his companion.
Pythagoras and Pericles, on the other hand, reached
the heights of influence and power without any
seasoning of mirthfulness. We read that Hannibal,
among the Carthaginian generals, and Quintus
Maximus, among our own, were shrewd and ready
at concealing their plans, covering up their tracks,
disguising their movements, laying stratagems, forestalling the enemy's designs. In these qualities the
Greeks rank Themistocles and Jason of Pherae
above all others. Especially crafty and shrewd was
the device of Solon, who, to make his own life safer
and at the same time to do a considerably larger service for his country, feigned insanity.
[
109]
Then there are others, quite different from these,
straightforward and open, who think that nothing
should be done by underhand means or treachery.
They are lovers of truth, haters of fraud. There are
others still who will stoop to anything, truckle to anybody, if only they may gain their ends. Such, we
saw, were Sulla and Marcus Crassus. The most crafty
and most persevering man of this type was Lysander
of Sparta, we are told; of the opposite type was
Callicratidas, who succeeded Lysander as admiral of
the fleet. So we find that another, no matter how
[p. 113]
eminent he may be, will condescend in social intercourse to make himself appear but a very ordinary
person. Such graciousness of manner we have seen
in the case of Catulus—both father and son—and also
of Quintus Mucius Mancia. I have heard from my
elders that Publius Scipio Nasica was another master
of this art; but his father, on the other hand—the
man who punished Tiberius Gracchus for his nefarious undertakings—had no such gracious manner in
social intercourse [ . . . ], and because of that very
fact he rose to greatness and fame.
Countless other dissimilarities exist in natures and
characters, and they are not in the least to be
criticized.
[
110]
31. Everybody, however, must resolutely hold
125
fast to his own peculiar gifts, in so far as they are
peculiar only and not vicious, in order that propriety,
which is the object of our inquiry, may the more
easily be secured. For we must so act as not to
oppose the universal laws of human nature, but,
while safeguarding those, to follow the bent of our
own particular nature; and even if other careers
should be better and nobler, we may still regulate
our own pursuits by the standard of our own nature.
For it is of no avail to fight against one's nature or to
aim at what is impossible of attainment. From this
fact the nature of that propriety defined above comes
into still clearer light, inasmuch as nothing is proper
that “goes against the grain,” as the saying is—
that is, if it is in direct opposition to one's natural
genius.
[
111]
If there is any such thing as propriety at all,
it can be nothing more than uniform consistency
[p. 115]
in the course of our life as a whole and all its individual actions. And this uniform consistency one
could not maintain by copying the personal traits of
others and eliminating one's own. For as we ought
to employ our mother-tongue, lest, like certain people
who are continually dragging in Greek words, we
draw well-deserved ridicule upon ourselves, so we
ought not to introduce anything foreign into our
actions or our life in general.
[
112]
Indeed, such diversity
126 of character carries with it so great significance
that suicide may be for one man a duty, for another
[under the same circumstances] a crime. Did
Marcus Cato find himself in one predicament, and
were the others, who surrendered to Caesar in
Africa, in another? And yet, perhaps, they would
have been condemned, if they had taken their lives;
for their mode of life had been less austere and
their characters more pliable. But Cato had been
endowed by nature with an austerity beyond belief,
and he himself had strengthened it by unswerving
consistency and had remained ever true to his purpose and fixed resolve; and it was for him to die
rather than to look upon the face of a tyrant.
[
113]
How much Ulysses endured on those long wanderings, when he submitted to the service even of
women (if Circe and Calypso may be called women)
and strove in every word to be courteous and complaisant to all! And, arrived at home, he brooked
even the insults of his men-servants and maidservants, in order to attain in the end the object of
his desire. But Ajax, with the temper he is represented as having, would have chosen to meet death
a thousand times rather than suffer such indignities!
If we take this into consideration, we shall see
[p. 117]
that it is each man's duty to weigh well what are
127
his own peculiar traits of character, to regulate these
properly, and not to wish to try how another man's
would suit him. For the more peculiarly his own
a man's character is, the better it fits him.
[
114]
Everyone, therefore, should make a proper
estimate of his own natural ability and show himself a critical judge of his own merits and defects;
in this respect we should not let actors display
more practical wisdom than we have. They select,
not the best plays, but the ones best suited to their
talents. Those who rely most upon the quality of
their voice take the Epigoni and the Medus; those
who place more stress upon the action choose the
Melanippa and the Clytaemnestra; Rupilius, whom
I remember, always played in the Antiope, Aesopus
rarely in the Ajax. Shall a player have regard to
this in choosing his role upon the stage, and a wise
man fail to do so in selecting his part in life?
We shall, therefore, work to the best advantage
in that rôle to which we are best adapted. But
if at some time stress of circumstances shall thrust
us aside into some uncongenial part, we must devote
to it all possible thought, practice, and pains, that
we may be able to perform it, if not with propriety,
at least with as little impropriety as possible; and
we need not strive so hard to attain to points of
excellence that have not been vouchsafed to us as
to correct the faults we have.
[
115]
32. To the two above-mentioned characters
128
is added a third, which some chance or some circumstance imposes, and a fourth also, which we
assume by our own deliberate choice. Regal powers
and military commands, nobility of birth and political
office, wealth and influence, and their opposites
[p. 119]
depend upon chance and are, therefore, controlled
by circumstances. But what rôle we ourselves may
129
choose to sustain is decided by our own free choice.
And so some turn to philosophy, others to the civil
law, and still others to oratory, while in case of the
virtues themselves one man prefers to excel in one,
another in another.
[
116]
They, whose fathers or forefathers have achieved
130
distinction in some particular field, often strive to
attain eminence in the same department of service:
for example, Quintus, the son of Publius Mucius, in
the law; Africanus, the son of Paulus, in the army.
And to that distinction which they have severally
inherited from their fathers some have added lustre
of their own; for example, that same Africanus, who
crowned his inherited military glory with his own
eloquence. Timotheus, Conon's son, did the same:
he proved himself not inferior to his father in military
renown and added to that distinction the glory of
culture and intellectual power. It happens sometimes,
131 too, that a man declines to follow in the
footsteps of his fathers and pursues a vocation of
his own. And in such callings those very frequently
achieve signal success who, though sprung from
humble parentage, have set their aims high.
[
117]
All these questions, therefore, we ought to bear
thoughtfully in mind, when we inquire into the
nature of propriety; but above all we must decide
who and what manner of men we wish to be and
what calling in life we would follow; and this is the
most difficult problem in the world. For it is in the
years of early youth, when our judgment is most
immature, that each of us decides that his calling in
life shall be that to which he has taken a special
liking. And thus he becomes engaged in some
[p. 121]
particular calling and career in life, before he is fit
to decide intelligently what is best for him.
[
118]
For we cannot all have the experience of Hercules,
132
as we find it in the words of Prodicus in Xenophon:
“When Hercules was just coming into youth's
estate (the time which Nature has appointed unto
every man for choosing the path of life on which
he would enter), he went out into a desert place.
And as he saw two paths, the path of Pleasure and
the path of Virtue, he sat down and debated long
and earnestly which one it were better for him to
take.” This might, perhaps, happen to a Hercules,
“scion of the seed of Jove”; but it cannot well
happen to us; for we copy each the model he fancies,
and we are constrained to adopt their pursuits and
vocations. But usually, we are so imbued with the
teachings of our parents, that we fall irresistibly into
their manners and customs. Others drift with
133
the current of popular opinion and make especial
choice of those callings which the majority find most
attractive. Some, however, as the result either of
some happy fortune or of natural ability, enter upon
the right path of life, without parental guidance.
[
119]
33. There is one class of people that is very
rarely met with: it is composed of those who are
endowed with marked natural ability, or exceptional
advantages of education and culture, or both, and
who also have time to consider carefully what career
in life they prefer to follow; and in this deliberation
the decision must turn wholly upon each individual's
natural bent. For we try to find out from each one's
134
native disposition, as was said above, just what is
proper for him; and this we require not only in case
of each individual act but also in ordering the whole
course of one's life; and this last is a matter to
[p. 123]
which still greater care must be given, in order
that we may be true to ourselves throughout all our
lives and not falter in the discharge of any duty.
[
120]
But since the most powerful influence in the
choice of a career is exerted by Nature, and the next
most powerful by Fortune, we must, of course, take
account of them both in deciding upon our calling
in life; but, of the two, Nature claims the more
attention. For Nature is so much more stable and
steadfast, that for Fortune to come into conflict with
Nature seems like a combat between a mortal and a
goddess. If, therefore, anyone has conformed his
whole plan of life to the kind of nature that is his
(that is, his better nature), let him go on with it
consistently—for that is the essence of Propriety—
unless, perchance, he should discover that he has
made a mistake in choosing his life work. If this
135
should happen (and it can easily happen), he must
change his vocation and mode of life. If circumstances favour such change, it will be effected with
greater ease and convenience. If not, it must be
made gradually, step by step, just as, when friendships become no longer pleasing or desirable, it is
more proper (so wise men think) to undo the bond
little by little than to sever it at a stroke.
[
121]
And when
we have once changed our calling in life, we must
take all possible care to make it clear that we have
done so with good reason.
But whereas I said a moment ago that we have to
follow in the steps of our fathers, let me make the
following exceptions: first, we need not imitate
their faults; second, we need not imitate certain
other things, if our nature does not permit such
imitation; for example, the son of the elder Africanus (that Scipio who adopted the younger Africanus,
[p. 125]
the son of Paulus) could not on account of ill-health.
be so much like his father as Africanus had been
like his. If, then, a man is unable to conduct cases
at the bar or to hold the people spell-bound with
his eloquence or to conduct wars, still it will be his
duty to practise these other virtues, which are within
his reach—justice, good faith, generosity, temperance, self-control—
that his deficiencies in other respects may be less conspicuous. The noblest heritage,
however, that is handed down from fathers to children,
And one more precious than any inherited wealth, is
a reputation for virtue and worthy deeds; and to dishonour this must be branded as a sin and a shame.
[
122]
34. Since, too, the duties that properly belong to different times of life are not the same, but
some belong to the young, others to those more
advanced in years, a word must be said on this distinction also.
It is, then, the duty of a young man to show deference
136 to his elders and to attach himself to the best
and most approved of them, so as to receive the benefit
of their counsel and influence. For the inexperience of youth requires the practical wisdom of age
to strengthen and direct it. And this time of life
is above all to be protected against sensuality and
trained to toil and endurance of both mind and
body, so as to be strong for active duty in military
and civil service. And even when they wish to relax
their minds and give themselves up to enjoyment
they should beware of excesses and bear in mind
the rules of modesty. And this will be easier, if
the young are not unwilling to have their elders join
them even in their pleasures.
[
123]
The old, on the other hand, should, it seems, have
137
their physical labours reduced; their mental activities
[p. 127] should be actually increased. They should
endeavour, too, by means of their counsel and practical wisdom to be of as much service as possible to
their friends and to the young, and above all to the
state. But there is nothing against which old age
has to be more on its guard than against surrendering to feebleness and idleness, while luxury, a vice
in any time of life, is in old age especially scandalous.
But if excess in sensual indulgence is added to
luxurious living, it is a twofold evil; for old age not
only disgraces itself; it also serves to make the
excesses of the young more shameless.
[
124]
At this point it is not at all irrelevant to discuss
the duties of magistrates, of private individuals,
[of native citizens,] and of foreigners.
It is, then, peculiarly the place of a magistrate to
138
bear in mind that he represents the state and that
it is his duty to uphold its honour and its dignity, to
enforce the law, to dispense to all their constitutional
rights, and to remember that all this has been committed to him as a sacred trust.
The private individual ought first, in private relations,
139 to live on fair and equal terms with his fellowcitizens, with a spirit neither servile and grovelling
nor yet domineering; and second, in matters pertaining to the state, to labour for her peace and
honour; for such a man we are accustomed to
esteem and call a good citizen.
[
125]
As for the foreigner or the resident alien, it is his
140
duty to attend strictly to his own concerns, not to pry
into other people's business, and under no condition
to meddle in the politics of a country not his own.
In this way I think we shall have a fairly clear
141
view of our duties when the question arises what is
proper and what is appropriate to each character,
[p. 129]
circumstance, and age. But there is nothing so
essentially proper as to maintain consistency in the
performance of every act and in the conception of
every plan.
[
126]
35. But the propriety to which I refer shows
142
itself also in every deed, in every word, even in every
movement and attitude of the body. And in outward, visible propriety there are three elements—
beauty, tact, and taste; these conceptions are difficult
to express in words, but it will be enough for my
purpose if they are understood. In these three
elements is included also our concern for the good
opinion of those with whom and amongst whom we
live. For these reasons I should like to say a few
words about this kind of propriety also.
First of all, Nature seems to have had a wonderful
plan in the construction of our bodies. Our face and
our figure generally, in so far as it has a comely
appearance, she has placed in sight; but the parts
of the body that are given us only to serve the
needs of Nature and that would present an unsightly
and unpleasant appearance she has covered up and
concealed from view.
[
127]
Man's modesty has followed
143
this careful contrivance of Nature's; all right-minded
people keep out of sight what Nature has hidden
and take pains to respond to Nature's demands as
privately as possible; and in the case of those parts
of the body which only serve Nature's needs, neither
the parts nor the functions are called by their real
names. To perform these functions—if only it be
done in private—is nothing immoral; but to speak
of them is indecent. And so neither public performance of those acts nor vulgar mention of them
is free from indecency.
[p. 131]
[
128]
But we should give no heed to the Cynics (or to
some Stoics who are practically Cynics) who censure
and ridicule us for holding that the mere mention of
some actions that are not immoral is shameful, while
other things that are immoral we call by their real
names. Robbery, fraud, and adultery, for example,
are immoral in deed, but it is not indecent to name
them. To beget children in wedlock is in deed
morally right; to speak of it is indecent. And they
assail modesty with a great many other arguments
to the same purport. But as for us, let us follow
Nature and shun everything that is offensive to our
eyes or our ears. So, in standing or walking, in
sitting or reclining, in our expression, our eyes, or
the movements of our hands, let us preserve what
we have called “propriety.”
[
129]
In these matters we must avoid especially the two
extremes: our conduct and speech should not be
effeminate and over-nice, on the one hand, nor coarse
and boorish, on the other. And we surely must not
admit that, while this rule applies to actors and orators, it is not binding upon us. As for stage-people,
their custom, because of its traditional discipline,
carries modesty to such a point that an actor would
never step out upon the stage without a breech-cloth
on, for fear he might make an improper exhibition,
if by some accident certain parts of his person should
happen to become exposed. And in our own custom,
grown sons do not bathe with their fathers, nor
sons-in-law with their fathers-in-law. We must,
therefore, keep to the path of this sort of modesty,
especially when Nature is our teacher and guide.
[
130]
36. Again, there are two orders of beauty:
144
in the one, loveliness predominates; in the other,
[p. 133]
dignity; of these, we ought to regard loveliness as
the attribute of woman, and dignity as the attribute
of man. Therefore, let all finery not suitable to a
man's dignity be kept off his person, and let him
guard against the like fault in gesture and action.
The manners taught in the palaestra,
145 for example,
are often rather objectionable, and the gestures of
actors on the stage are not always free from affectation; but simple, unaffected manners are commendable in both instances. Now dignity of mien is also to
be enhanced by a good complexion; the complexion
is the result of physical exercise. We must besides
present an appearance of neatness—not too punctilious or exquisite, but just enough to avoid boorish
and ill-bred slovenliness. We must follow the same
principle in regard to dress. In this, as in most
things, the best rule is the golden mean.
[
131]
We must be careful, too, not to fall into a habit of
listless sauntering in our gait, so as to look like carriers in festal processions, or of hurrying too fast,
when time presses. If we do this, it puts us out of
breath, our looks are changed, our features distorted;
and all this is clear evidence of a lack of poise. But
146
it is much more important that we succeed in keeping our mental operations in harmony with Nature's
laws. And we shall not fail in this if we guard
against violent excitement or depression, and if we
keep our minds intent on the observance of propriety.
[
132]
Our mental operations, moreover, are of two
[p. 135]
kinds: some have to do with thought, others with
impulse. Thought is occupied chiefly with the discovery of truth; impulse prompts to action. We
must be careful, therefore, to employ our thoughts
on themes as elevating as possible and to keep our
impulses under the control of reason.
37. The power of speech in the attainment
147
of propriety is great, and its function is twofold: the
first is oratory; the second, conversation. Oratory
is the kind of discourse to be employed in pleadings in
court and speeches in popular assemblies and in the
senate; conversation should find its natural place in
social gatherings, in informal discussions, and in intercourse with friends; it should also seek admission at
dinners. There are rules for oratory laid down by
rhetoricians; there are none for conversation; and
yet I do not know why there should not be. But
where there are students to learn, teachers are
found; there are, however, none who make conversation a subject of study, whereas pupils throng
about the rhetoricians everywhere. And yet the
same rules that we have for words and sentences in
rhetoric will apply also to conversation.
[
133]
Now since we have the voice as the organ of
speech, we should aim to secure two properties
for it: that it be clear, and that it be musical.
We must, of course, look to Nature for both gifts.
But distinctness may be improved by practice; the
musical qualities, by imitating those who speak
with smooth and articulate enunciation.
There was nothing in the two Catuli to lead one
to suppose that they had a refined literary taste;
they were men of culture, it is true; and so were
others; but the Catuli were looked upon as the perfect
[p. 137]
masters of the Latin tongue. Their pronunciation
was charming; their words were neither mouthed
nor mumbled: they avoided both indistinctness and
affectation; their voices were free from strain, yet
neither faint nor shrill. More copious was the speech
of Lucius Crassus and not less brilliant, but the reputation of the two Catuli for eloquence was fully
equal to his. But in wit and humour Caesar, the
elder Catulus's half-brother, surpassed them all:
even at the bar he would with his conversational
style defeat other advocates with their elaborate
orations.
If, therefore, we are aiming to secure propriety in
every circumstance of life, we must master all these
points.
[
134]
Conversation, then, in which the Socratics are the
148
best models, should have these qualities. It should
be easy and not in the least dogmatic; it should have
the spice of wit. And the one who engages in conversation should not debar others from participating
in it, as if he were entering upon a private monopoly;
but, as in other things, so in a general conversation he should think it not unfair for each to have
his turn. He should observe, first and foremost,
what the subject of conversation is. If it is grave,
he should treat it with seriousness; if humorous,
with wit. And above all, he should be on the watch
that his conversation shall not betray some defect in
his character. This is most likely to occur, when
people in jest or in earnest take delight in making
malicious and slanderous statements about the absent,
on purpose to injure their reputations.
[
135]
The subjects of conversation are usually affairs of
the home or politics or the practice of the professions
[p. 139]
and learning. Accordingly, if the talk begins to
drift off to other channels, pains should be taken to
bring it back again to the matter in hand—but with
due consideration to the company present; for we
are not all interested in the same things at all times
or in the same degree. We must observe, too, how
far the conversation is agreeable and, as it had a
reason for its beginning, so there should be a point
at which to close it tactfully.
[
136]
38. But as we have a most excellent rule
149
for every phase of life, to avoid exhibitions of passion,
that is, mental excitement that is excessive and uncontrolled by reason; so our conversation ought to
be free from such emotions: let there be no exhibition
of anger or inordinate desire, of indolence or indifference, or anything of the kind. We must also take
the greatest care to show courtesy and consideration
toward those with whom we converse.
It may sometimes happen that there is need of
150
administering reproof. On such occasions we should,
perhaps, use a more emphatic tone of voice and
more forcible and severe terms and even assume an
appearance of being angry. But we shall have recourse to this sort of reproof, as we do to cautery
and amputation, rarely and reluctantly—never at all,
unless it is unavoidable and no other remedy can be
discovered. We may seem angry, but anger should
be far from us; for in anger nothing right or judicious can be done.
[
137]
In most cases, we may apply a
mild reproof, so combined, however, with earnestness, that, while severity is shown, offensive language
is avoided. Nay more, we must show clearly that
even that very harshness which goes with our reproof is designed for the good of the person reproved.
[p. 141]
The right course, moreover, even in our differences
151
with our bitterest enemies, is to maintain our dignity and to repress our anger, even though we are
treated outrageously. For what is done under some
degree of excitement cannot be done with perfect
self-respect or the approval of those who witness it.
It is bad taste also to talk about oneself—especially
152 if what one says is not true—and, amid the
derision of one's hearers, to play “The Braggart
Captain.”
153
[
138]
39. But since I am investigating this subject
154
in all its phases (at least, that is my purpose), I
must discuss also what sort of house a man of rank
and station should, in my opinion, have. Its prime
object is serviceableness. To this the plan of the
building should be adapted; and yet careful attention should be paid to its convenience and distinction.
We have heard that Gnaeus Octavius—the first
of that family to be elected consul—distinguished
himself by building upon the Palatine an attractive
and imposing house. Everybody went to see it,
and it was thought to have gained votes for the
owner, a new man, in his canvass for the consulship.
That house Scaurus demolished, and on its site he
built an addition to his own house. Octavius, then,
was the first of his family to bring the honour of a
consulship to his house; Scaurus, though the son of
a very great and illustrious man, brought to the
same house, when enlarged, not only defeat, but disgrace and ruin.
[
139]
The truth is, a man's dignity may be
enhanced by the house he lives in, but not wholly
secured by it; the owner should bring honour to his
[p. 143]
house, not the house to its owner. And, as in
everything else a man must have regard not for
himself alone but for others also, so in the home of
a distinguished man, in which numerous guests must
be entertained and crowds of every sort of people
received, care must be taken to have it spacious.
But if it is not frequented by visitors, if it has an
air of lonesomeness, a spacious palace often becomes
a discredit to its owner. This is sure to be the
case if at some other time, when it had a different
owner, it used to be thronged. For it is unpleasant,
when passers-by remark:
“O good old house, alas! how different
The owner who now owneth thee!
”
And in these times that may be said of many a
house!
155
[
140]
One must be careful, too, not to go beyond
proper bounds in expense and display, especially
if one is building for oneself. For much mischief
is done in this way, if only in the example set.
For many people imitate zealously the foibles of
the great, particularly in this direction: for example,
who copies the virtues of Lucius Lucullus, excellent man that he was? But how many there are who
have copied the magnificence of his villas! Some limit
should surely be set to this tendency and it should
be reduced at least to a standard of moderation;
and by that same standard of moderation the comforts and wants of life generally should be regulated.
But enough on this part of my theme.
[p. 145]
[
141]
In entering upon any course of action, then,
156
we must hold fast to three principles: first, that
impulse shall obey reason; for there is no better
way than this to secure the observance of duties;
second, that we estimate carefully the importance
of the object that we wish to accomplish, so that
neither more nor less care and attention may be
expended upon it than the case requires; the third
principle is that we be careful to observe moderation
in all that is essential to the outward appearance
and dignity of a gentleman. Moreover, the best
rule for securing this is strictly to observe that
propriety which we have discussed above, and not
to overstep it. Yet of these three principles, the
one of prime importance is to keep impulse subservient to reason.
[
142]
40. Next, then, we must discuss orderliness of
157
conduct and seasonableness of occasions. These two
qualities are embraced in that science which the
Greeks call
εὐταξία—not that
εὐταξία which we
translate with
moderation [
modestia], derived from
moderate; but this is the
εὐταξία by which we understand
orderly conduct. And so, if we may call it
also
moderation, it is defined by the Stoics as follows:
“Moderation is the science of disposing aright
everything that is done or said.” So the essence
of
orderliness and of right-placing, it seems, will be
the same; for
orderliness they define also as “the
arrangement of things in their suitable and appropriate places.” By “place of action,” moreover,
they mean
seasonableness of circumstance; and the
seasonable circumstance for an action is called in
Greek
εὐκαιρία, in Latin
occasio (occasion). So it
comes about that in this sense
moderation, which we
[p. 147]
explain as I have indicated, is the science of doing
the right thing at the right time.
[
143]
A similar definition can be given for prudence, of
which I have spoken in an early chapter. But in
this part we are considering temperance and self-control and related virtues. Accordingly, the
properties which, as we found, are peculiar to prudence were discussed in their proper place, while
those are to be discussed now which are peculiar to
these virtues of which we have for some time been
speaking and which relate to considerateness and to
the approbation of our fellow-men.
[
144]
Such orderliness of conduct is, therefore, to be observed, that everything in the conduct of our life
shall balance and harmonize, as in a finished speech.
158
For it is unbecoming and highly censurable, when
upon a serious theme, to introduce such jests as are
proper at a dinner, or any sort of loose talk. When
Pericles was associated with the poet Sophocles as
his colleague in command and they had met to
confer about official business that concerned them
both, a handsome boy chanced to pass and Sophocles
said: “Look, Pericles; what a pretty boy!” How
pertinent was Pericles's reply: “Hush, Sophocles,
a general should keep not only his hands but his
eyes under control.” And yet, if Sophocles had
made this same remark at a trial of athletes, he
would have incurred no just reprimand. So great
is the significance of both place and circumstance.
For example, if anyone, while on a journey or on a
walk, should rehearse to himself a case which he is
preparing to conduct in court, or if he should under
similar circumstances apply his closest thought to
some other subject, he would not be open to censure
[p. 149]
but if he should do that same thing at a dinner,
he would be thought ill-bred, because he ignored
the proprieties of the occasion.
[
145]
But flagrant breaches of good breeding, like singing
159 in the streets or any other gross misconduct, are
easily apparent and do not call especially for admonition and instruction. But we must even more
carefully avoid those seemingly trivial faults which
pass unnoticed by the many. However slightly out
of tune a harp or flute may be, the fault is still
detected by a connoisseur; so we must be on the
watch lest haply something in our life be out of
tune—nay, rather, far greater is the need for painstaking, inasmuch as harmony of actions is far better
and far more important than harmony of sounds.
[
146]
41. As, therefore, a musical ear detects even the
160
slightest falsity of tone in a harp, so we, if we wish
161
to be keen and careful observers of moral faults, shall
often draw important conclusions from trifles. We
observe others and from a glance of the eyes, from
a contracting or relaxing of the brows, from an air
of sadness, from an outburst of joy, from a laugh,
from speech, from silence, from a raising or lowering
of the voice, and the like, we shall easily judge which
of our actions is proper, and which is out of accord
with duty and Nature. And, in the same manner, it
is not a bad plan to judge of the nature of our every
action by studying others, that so we may ourselves
avoid anything that is unbecoming in them. For it
happens somehow or other that we detect another's
failings more readily than we do our own; and so
in the school-room those pupils learn most easily
to do better whose faults the masters mimic for the
sake of correcting them.
[p. 151]
[
147]
Nor is it out of place in making a choice between
162
duties involving a doubt, to consult men of learning
or practical wisdom and to ascertain what their views
are on any particular question of duty. For the
majority usually drift as the current of their own
natural inclinations carries them; and in deriving
counsel from one of these, we have to see not only
what our adviser says, but also what he thinks, and
what his reasons are for thinking as he does. For,
as painters and sculptors and even poets, too, wish
to have their works reviewed by the public, in order
that, if any point is generally criticized, it may be
improved; and as they try to discover both by themselves and with the help of others what is wrong in
their work; so through consulting the judgment of
others we find that there are many things to be done
and left undone, to be altered and improved.
[
148]
But no rules need to be given about what is done
163
in accordance with the established customs and conventions of a community; for these are in themselves
rules; and no one ought to make the mistake of
supposing that, because Socrates or Aristippus did
or said something contrary to the manners and established customs of their city, he has a right to do the
same; it was only by reason of their great and superhuman virtues that those famous men acquired this
special privilege. But the Cynics' whole system of
philosophy must be rejected, for it is inimical to moral
sensibility, and without moral sensibility nothing
can be upright, nothing morally good.
[
149]
It is, furthermore, our duty to honour and reverence
164 those whose lives are conspicuous for conduct
in keeping with their high moral standards, and who,
as true patriots, have rendered or are now rendering
[p. 153]
efficient service to their country, just as much as if
they were invested with some civil or military authority; it is our duty also to show proper respect to old
age, to yield precedence to magistrates, to make a
distinction between a fellow-citizen and a foreigner,
and, in the case of the foreigner himself, to discriminate according to whether he has come in an official
or a private capacity. In a word, not to go into details, it is our duty to respect, defend, and maintain
the common bonds of union and fellowship subsisting between all the members of the human race.
[
150]
42. Now in regard to trades and other means
165
of livelihood, which ones are to be considered
becoming to a gentleman and which ones are
vulgar, we have been taught, in general, as follows.
First, those means of livelihood are rejected as undesirable which incur people's ill-will, as those
of tax-gatherers and usurers. Unbecoming to a
gentleman, too, and vulgar are the means of livelihood of all hired workmen whom we pay for mere
manual labour, not for artistic skill; for in their
case the very wage they receive is a pledge of their
slavery. Vulgar we must consider those also who
buy from wholesale merchants to retail immediately;
for they would get no profits without a great deal
of downright lying; and verily, there is no action
that is meaner than misrepresentation. And all
mechanics are engaged in vulgar trades; for no
workshop can have anything liberal about it. Least
respectable of all are those trades which cater for
sensual pleasures:
“Fishmongers, butchers, cooks, and poulterers,
And fishermen,
”
[p. 155]
as Terence says. Add to these, if you please, the
perfumers, dancers, and the whole
corps de ballet166
[
151]
But the professions in which either a higher
167
degree of intelligence is required or from which no
small benefit to society is derived—medicine and
architecture, for example, and teaching—these are
proper for those whose social position they become.
Trade, if it is on a small scale, is to be considered
vulgar; but if wholesale and on a large scale, importing large quantities from all parts of the world
and distributing to many without misrepresentation,
it is not to be greatly disparaged. Nay, it even
seems to deserve the highest respect, if those who
are engaged in it, satiated, or rather, I should say,
satisfied with the fortunes they have made, make
their way from the port to a country estate, as they
have often made it from the sea into port. But of
all the occupations by which gain is secured, none
is better than agriculture, none more profitable,
none more delightful, none more becoming to a
freeman. But since I have discussed this quite
fully in, my Cato Major, you will find there the
material that applies to this point.
[
152]
43. Now, I think I have explained fully
168
enough how moral duties are derived from the four
divisions of moral rectitude. But between those
very actions which are morally right, a conflict and
comparison may frequently arise, as to which of two
moral actions is morally better—a point overlooked by
Panaetius. For, since all moral rectitude springs from
four sources (one of which is prudence; the second,
social instinct; the third, courage; the fourth, temperance),it
[p. 157] is often necessary in deciding a question of
duty that these virtues be weighed against one
another.
[
153]
My view, therefore, is that those duties are closer
169
to Nature which depend upon the social instinct
than those which depend upon knowledge; and this
view can be confirmed by the following argument:
(1) suppose that a wise man should be vouchsafed
such a life that, with an abundance of everything
pouring in upon him, he might in perfect peace
study and ponder over everything that is worth
knowing, still, if the solitude were so complete that
he could never see a human being, he would die.
And then, the foremost of all virtues is wisdom—what
the Greeks call
σοφία; for by prudence, which they
call
φρόνησις, we understand something else, namely,
the practical knowledge of things to be sought for
and of things to be avoided. (2) Again, that wisdom
which I have given the foremost place is the knowledge of things human and divine, which is concerned
also with the bonds of union between gods and men
and the relations of man to man. If wisdom is the
most important of the virtues, as it certainly is, it
necessarily follows that that duty which is connected
with the social obligation is the most important duty.
170
And (3) service is better than mere theoretical knowledge, for the study and knowledge of the universe
would somehow be lame and defective, were no practical results to follow. Such results, moreover, are best
seen in the safeguarding of human interests. It is
[p. 159]
essential, then, to human society; and it should,
therefore, be ranked above speculative knowledge.
[
154]
Upon this all the best men agree, as they prove
by their conduct. For who is so absorbed in the
investigation and study of creation, but that, even
though he were working and pondering over tasks
never so much worth mastering and even though he
thought he could number the stars and measure the
length and breadth of the universe, he would drop
all those problems and cast them aside, if word were
suddenly brought to him of some critical peril to his
country, which he could relieve or repel? And he
would do the same to further the interests of parent
or friend or to save him from danger.
[
155]
From all this we conclude that the duties
scribed by justice must be given precedence
the pursuit of knowledge and the duties imp
by it; for the former concern the welfare of
fellow-men; and nothing ought to be more sacred
in men's eyes than that.
44. And vet scholars, whose whole life and
171
interests have been devoted to the pursuit of knowledge, have not, after all, failed to contribute to the
advantages and blessings of mankind. For they have
trained many to be better citizens and to render
larger service to their country. So, for example, the
Pythagorean Lysis taught Epaminondas of Thebes;
Plato, Dion of Syracuse; and many, many others. As
for me myself, whatever service I have rendered to
my country—if, indeed, I have rendered any—I
came to my task trained and equipped for it by my
teachers and what they taught me.
[
156]
And not only
while present in the flesh do they teach and train those
who are desirous of learning, but by the written
[p. 161]
memorials of their learning they continue the same
service after they are dead. For they have overlooked no point that has a bearing upon laws, customs,
or political science; in fact, they seem to have devoted their retirement to the benefit of us who are
engaged in public business. The principal thing done,
therefore, by those very devotees of the pursuits of
learning and science is to apply their own practical
wisdom and insight to the service of humanity. And
for that reason also much speaking (if only it contain
wisdom) is better than speculation never so profound
without speech; for mere speculation is self-centred,
while speech extends its benefits to those with whom
we are united by the bonds of society.
[
157]
And again, as swarms of bees do not gather for
the sake of making honeycomb but make the honeycomb because they are gregarious by nature, so human
beings—and to a much higher degree—exercise their
skill together in action and thought because they are
naturally gregarious. And so, if that virtue [Justice]
172
which centres in the safeguarding of human interests, that is, in the maintenance of human society,
were not to accompany the pursuit of knowledge,
that knowledge would seem isolated and barren of
results. In the same way, courage [Fortitude], if
unrestrained by the uniting bonds of society, would
be but a sort of brutality and savagery. Hence it
follows that the claims of human society and the
bonds that unite men together take precedence of
the pursuit of speculative knowledge.
[
158]
And it is not true, as certain people maintain, that
the bonds of union in human society were instituted
in order to provide for the needs of daily life; for,
they say, without the aid of others we could not
[p. 163]
secure for ourselves or supply to others the things
that Nature requires; but if all that is essential to our
wants and comfort were supplied by some magic
wand, as in the stories, then every man of first-rate
ability could drop all other responsibility and devote
himself exclusively to learning and study. Not at
all. For he would seek to escape from his loneliness
and to find someone to share his studies; he would
wish to teach, as well as to learn; to hear, as well as
to speak. Every duty, therefore, that tends effectively to maintain and safeguard human society should
be given the preference over that duty which arises
from speculation and science alone.
[
159]
45. The following question should, perhaps, be
173
asked: whether this social instinct, which is the
deepest feeling in our nature, is always to have precedence over temperance and moderation also. I think
not. For there are some acts either so repulsive or so
wicked, that a wise man would not commit them,
even to save his country. Posidonius has made a
large collection of them; but some of them are so
shocking, so indecent, that it seems immoral even
to mention them. The wise man, therefore, will not
think of doing any such thing for the sake of his
country; no more will his country consent to have
it done for her. But the problem is the more easily
disposed of because the occasion cannot arise when
it could be to the state's interest to have the wise
man do any of those things.
[
160]
This, then, may be regarded as settled: in choosing
174 between conflicting duties, that class takes precedence which is demanded by the interests of
human society. [And this is the natural sequence;
for discreet action will presuppose learning and practical
[p. 165] wisdom; it follows, therefore, that discreet
action is of more value than wise (but inactive)
speculation.]
So much must suffice for this topic. For, in its
essence, it has been made so clear, that in determining a question of duty it is not difficult to
see which duty is to be preferred to any other.
Moreover, even in the social relations themselves
there are gradations of duty so well defined that
it can easily be seen which duty takes precedence of any other: our first duty is to the immortal
gods; our second, to country; our third, to parents;
and so on, in a descending scale, to the rest.
[
161]
From this brief discussion, then, it can be understood that people are often in doubt not only whether
an action is morally right or wrong, but also, when
a choice is offered between two moral actions, which
one is morally better. This point, as I remarked
above, has been overlooked by Panaetius. But let us
now pass on to what remains.