[27]
But in any case of injustice it makes a vast deal1
[p. 29]
of difference whether the wrong is done as a result
of some impulse of passion, which is usually brief
and transient, or whether it is committed wilfully and
with premeditation; for offences that come through
some sudden impulse are less culpable than those
committed designedly and with malice aforethought.
But enough has been said on the subject of inflicting injury.
1 The motives to wrong.
M. Tullius Cicero. De Officiis. With An English Translation. Walter Miller. Cambridge. Harvard University Press; Cambridge, Mass., London, England. 1913.
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