M. Tullius Cicero, For Sestius
C. D. Yonge, Ed.

[92] And there is no point in which there is so much difference between this manner of life, polished by civilization and that savage one, as in the fact of law being the ruling principle of the one, and violence of the other. If we do not choose to be guided by one we must adopt the other. Do we wish violence to be put an end to? Law must inevitably prevail; that is to say, courts of justice must, for in them all law and justice are comprehended. Do we disapprove of courts of justice, or are they destroyed or suspended? In a moment violence must be supreme. Everybody sees this. Milo saw it and acted in such a manner as to try the power of law and to banish violence. He wished to avail himself of the one, in order that courage and virtue might defeat audacity; he had recourse to the other from compulsion, in order to prevent virtue and courage from being defeated by audacity. And the principle of conduct of Publius Sestius was the same if not in prosecuting Clodius, (for, it does not follow that exactly the same details of conduct are to be pursued by every one,) still at all events in the necessity of defending his safety, and in preparing a defence against force and personal violence.