[35]
Since you make this statement, and lay down
this principle, “that, if Caecina, when he was actually in his farm, had been driven
from it, then it would have been right for him to be restored by means of this interdict; but
now he can by no means be said to have been from a place where he has not been; and,
therefore, we have gained nothing by this interdict;” I ask you, if, this day, when
you are returning home, men collected in a body, and armed, not only prevent you from crossing
the threshold and from coming under the roof of your own house, but keep you off from
approaching it— from even entering the court yard,—what will you do? My
friend Lucius Calpurnius reminds you to say the same thing that he said before, namely that
you would bring an action for the injury. But what has this to do with possession? What has
this to do with restoring a man who ought to be restored? or with the civil law?
**** I will grant you even more. I will allow you not only to bring your action, but also to succeed in it. Will you be any the more in possession of your property for that? For an action for injury done does not carry with it, even if successful, any right of possession; but merely makes up to a man for the loss he sustains through the diminution of his liberty, by the trial and penalty imposed upon the offender.
**** I will grant you even more. I will allow you not only to bring your action, but also to succeed in it. Will you be any the more in possession of your property for that? For an action for injury done does not carry with it, even if successful, any right of possession; but merely makes up to a man for the loss he sustains through the diminution of his liberty, by the trial and penalty imposed upon the offender.