[55]
Many such cases occur to me at present, and still more to you, I am quite
sure. But not to dwell on too many such points, and not to wander too far from where we set
out, let us consider this very interdict which is now before the court; for by that very
document you will understand, that if we determine that the law depends on its precise words,
we shall lose all the advantage of this interdict, while we wish to be very acute and clever.
“Whence you, or your household, or your agent . . . ” Suppose your steward
by himself had driven me away, your household would not, as I suppose, have driven me away,
but only a member of your household. Would you then have a right to say that you had made the
necessary restitution? No doubt; for what can be more easy than to prove to all those who
understood the Latin language, that the name of a household does not apply to one single
slave? But suppose you have not even one slave besides the one who drove me away; then you
would cry out, “If I have a household, I will admit that you were driven away by my
household.” Nor is there any doubt, that, if we are influenced in our decisions by
the mere letter of the law, and not by the facts, we must understand a household to consist of
many slaves, and we must admit that one slave is not a household.
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