[26]
I injure him, it seems, for I take away the right of adjournment. The most vexatious
thing that the law has in it, the allowing a cause to be twice pleaded, has either
been instituted for my sake rather than for yours, or, at all events, not more for
your sake than for mine. For if to speak twice be an advantage, certainly it is an
advantage which is common to both If there is a necessity that he who has spoken
last should be refuted, then it is for the sake of the prosecutor that the he has
been established that there should be a second discussion. But, as I imagine,
Glaucia first proposed the law that the defendant might have an adjournment; before
that time the decision might either be given at once, or the judges might take time
to consider. Which law, then, do you think the mildest? I think that ancient one, by
which a man might either be acquitted quickly, or condemned after deliberation. I
restore you that law of Acilius, according to which many men who have only been
accused once, whose cause has only been pleaded once, in whose case witnesses have
only been heard once, have been condemned on charges by no means so clearly proved,
nor so flagitious as those on which you are convicted. Think that you are pleading
your cause, not according to that severe law, but according to that most merciful
one. I will accuse you; you shall reply. Having produced my witnesses, I will lay
the whole matter before the bench in such a way, that even if the law gave them a
power of adjournment, yet they shall think it discreditable to themselves not to
decide at the first hearing.
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