14.
After spending several days in the same camp, the guards of the
Bellovaci, learning that Caius Trebonius was
advancing nearer with his legions, and fearing a siege like that of Alesia , send off by night all who were disabled by age or
infirmity, or unarmed, and along with them their whole baggage. While they are
preparing their disorderly and confused troop for march (for the Gauls are always attended by a vast multitude of
wagons, even when they have very light baggage), being overtaken by day-light,
they drew their forces out before their camp, to prevent the Romans attempting a pursuit before the line of their baggage had
advanced to a considerable distance. But Caesar did not
think it prudent to attack them when standing on their defense, with such a
steep hill in their favor, nor keep his legions at such a distance that they
could quit their post without danger: but, perceiving that his camp was divided
from the enemy's by a deep morass, so difficult to cross that he could not
pursue with expedition, and that the hill beyond the morass, which extended
almost to the enemy's camp, was separated from it only by a small valley, he
laid a bridge over the morass and led his army across, and soon reached the
plain on the top of the hill, which was fortified on either side by a steep
ascent. Having there drawn up his army in order of battle, he marched to the
furthest hill, from which he could, with his engines, shower darts upon the
thickest of the enemy.
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