Extract from the Preface
SUCH are the most conspicuous transactions of this
142d Olympiad, B. C. 212-208. |
Olympiad, that is, of the four years which an
Olympiad must be reckoned to contain; and I
shall endeavour to include the history of them
in two books.
I am quite aware that my history has an element of
austerity in it, and is adapted to, and will be approved by
only one class of readers, owing to the uniformity of its plan.
Nearly all other historians, or at any rate most, attract a
variety of readers by entering upon all the various branches of
history. The curious reader is attracted by the genealogical
style; the antiquarian by the discussion of colonisations,
origins of cities, and ties of blood, such as is found in
Ephorus; the student of polities by the story of tribes, cities,
and dynasties. It is to this last branch of the subject that I
have had a single eye, and have devoted my whole work; and
accordingly have, as I said before, accommodated all my
plans to one particular class of narrative. The result is that I
have made my work by no means attractive reading to the
majority. Why I thus neglected other departments of history,
and deliberately resolved to confine myself to chronicling
actions, I have already stated at length; however, there is
no reason why I should not briefly remind my readers
of it again in this place, for the sake of impressing it upon
them.
Why Focus on Actions
Seeing that many writers have discussed in many
varieties of style the question of genealogies, myths, and
colonisations, as well as of the foundations of cities and the
consanguinity of peoples, there was nothing left for a writer at
this date but to copy the words of others and claim them as his
own,—than which nothing could be more dishonourable; or,
if he did not choose to do that, to absolutely waste his labour,
being obliged to acknowledge that he is composing a history
and bestowing thought on what has already been sufficiently set
forth and transmitted to posterity by his predecessors. For
these and sundry other reasons I abandoned such themes as
these, and determined on writing a history of actions: first,
because they are continually new and require a new narrative,
—as of course one generation cannot give us the history of
the next; and secondly, because such a narrative is of all
others the most instructive. This it has always been: but it
is eminently so now, because the arts and sciences have made
such an advance in our day, that students are able to arrange
every event as it happens according to fixed rules, as it were,
of scientific classification. Therefore, as I did not aim so
much at giving pleasure to my readers, as at profiting those
who apply to such studies, I omitted all other themes and
devoted myself wholly to this. But on these points, those who
give a careful attention to my narrative will be the best
witnesses to the truth of what I say. . . .
The Hannibalian War
In the previous year (212 B. C.) Syracuse had fallen: the
two Scipios had been conquered and killed in Spain: the siegeworks had been constructed round Capua, at the very time of the
fall of Syracuse, i. e. in the autumn, Hannibal being engaged in
fruitless attempts upon the citadel of Tarentum. See Livy, 25, 22.
Entirely surrounding the position of Appius Claudius,
B. C. 211. Coss. Gnaeus Fulvius Centumalus, P. Sulpicius Galba. The Romans were still engaged in the siege of Capua. |
Hannibal at first skirmished, and tried all he
could to tempt him to come out and give him
battle. But as no one attended to him, his
attack became very like an attempt to storm
the camp; for his cavalry charged in their
squadrons, and with loud cries hurled their
javelins inside the entrenchments, and the
infantry attacked in their regular companies,
and tried to pull down the palisading round
the camp.
Q. Fulvius and Appius Claudius, the Consuls of the previous year,
were continued in command there, with orders not to leave the place till it fell. Livy, 26, 1. Hannibal
tries to raise the siege. |
But not even so could he move the
Romans from their purpose: they employed
their light-armed troops to repulse those who
were actually attacking the palisade, but protecting themselves with their heavy shields
against the javelins of the enemy, they remained
drawn up near their standards without moving.
Discomfited at being neither able to throw himself into
Capua,
nor induce the Romans to leave their camp, Hannibal retired
to consult as to what was best to be done.
It is no wonder, in my opinion, that the Carthaginians
The determination and cautious tactics of the Romans. |
were puzzled. I think any one who heard
the facts would be the same. For who would
not have received with incredulity the statement
that the Romans, after losing so many battles to
the Carthaginians, and though they did not venture to meet
them on the field, could not nevertheless be induced to give
up the contest or abandon the command of the country?
Up to this time, moreover, they had contented themselves
with hovering in his neighbourhood, keeping along the skirts
of the mountains; but now they had taken up a position on
the plains, and those the fairest in all
Italy, and were besieging
the strongest city in it; and that with an enemy attacking
them, whom they could not endure even the thought of
meeting face to face: while the Carthaginians, who beyond
all dispute had won the battles, were sometimes in as great
difficulties as the losers. I think the reason of the strategy
adopted by the two sides respectively was, that they both had
seen that Hannibal's cavalry was the main cause of the
Carthaginian victory and Roman defeat. Accordingly the
plan of the losers after the battles, of following their enemies
at a distance, was the natural one to adopt; for the country
through which they went was such that the enemy's cavalry
would be unable to do them any damage. Similarly what
now happened at
Capua to either side was natural and
inevitable.
The Siege of Capua
For the Roman army did not venture to come out
Carthaginian difficulties. |
and give battle, from fear of the enemy's
horse, but remained resolutely within their
entrenchment; well knowing that the cavalry,
by which they had been worsted in the battles, could not
hurt them there. While the Carthaginians, again, naturally
could not remain any longer encamped with their cavalry,
because all the pastures in the surrounding country had been
utterly destroyed by the Romans with that very view; and it was
impossible for animals to come from such a distance, carrying
on their backs hay and barley for so large a body of cavalry,
and so many beasts of burden; nor again did they venture,
when encamped without their cavalry, to attack an enemy
protected by a palisade and fosse, with whom a contest, even
without these advantages in their favour, was likely to be a
doubtful one if they had not got their cavalry. Besides this
they were much alarmed about the new Consuls, lest they
should come and encamp against them, and reduce them to
serious straits by cutting off their supplies of provisions.
These considerations convinced Hannibal that it was
Hannibal determines on creating a diversion by threatening Rome. |
impossible to raise the siege by an open attack,
and he therefore changed his tactics. He
imagined that if by a secret march he could
suddenly appear in the neighbourhood of
Rome,
he might by the alarm which he would inspire
in the inhabitants by his unexpected movement, perhaps do
something worth while against the city itself; or, if he could not
do that, would at least force Appius either to raise the siege of
Capua, in order to hasten to the relief of his native town, or
to divide the Roman forces; which would then be easier for
him to conquer in detail.
Hannibal Advances Upon Rome
With this purpose in his mind he sent a letter-carrier
Hannibal informs the Capuans of his purpose |
into
Capua. This he did by persuading one of
his Libyans to desert to the Roman camp, and
thence to
Capua. He took this trouble to
secure the safe delivery of his letter, because he was very
much afraid that the Capuans, if they saw him departing,
would consider that he despaired of them, and would therefore
give up hope and surrender to the Romans. He wrote therefore
an explanation of his design, and sent the Libyan the day
after, in order that the Capuans, being acquainted with the
purpose of his departure, might go on courageously sustaining
the siege.
When the news had arrived at
Rome that Hannibal had
Excitement and activity at Rome |
encamped over against their lines, and was
actually besieging their forces, there was a
universal excitement and terror, from a
feeling that the result of the impending battle would
decide the whole war. Consequently, with one heart and
soul, the citizens had all devoted themselves to sending out
reinforcements and making preparations for this struggle. On
their part, the Capuans were encouraged by the receipt of
Hannibal's letter, and by thus learning the object of the
Carthaginian movement, to stand by their determination, and
to await the issue of this new hope.
At the end of the fifth day,
therefore, after his arrival on the ground, Hannibal ordered his
men to take their supper as usual, and leave
their watch-fires burning; and started with such
secrecy, that none of the enemy knew what was happening.
He took the road through Samnium, and marched at a great
pace and without stopping, his skirmishers always keeping
before him to reconnoitre and occupy all the posts along the
route: and while those in
Rome had their thoughts still wholly
occupied with
Capua and the campaign there, he crossed the
Anio without being observed; and having arrived at a distance of not more than forty stades from
Rome, there pitched
his camp.
Rome Saved by Luck
On this being known at
Rome, the utmost confusion
and terror prevailed among the inhabitants,—
this movement of Hannibal's being as unexpected as it was sudden; for he had never
been so close to the city before. At the same time their
alarm was increased by the idea at once occurring to them,
that he would not have ventured so near, if it were not that
the armies at
Capua were destroyed. Accordingly, the men
at once went to line the walls, and the points of vantage in the
defences of the town; while the women went round to the
temples of the gods and implored their protection, sweeping
the pavements of the temples with their hair: for this is their
customary way of behaving when any serious danger comes
upon their country. But just as Hannibal had encamped,
and was intending to attempt the city itself next day, an
extraordinary coincidence occurred which proved fortunate
for the preservation of
Rome.
For Gnaeus Fulvius and Publius Sulpicius, having already
The Consular levies fortunately
being at Rome enable the Romans to make a counter-demonstration |
enrolled one consular army, had bound the men
with the usual oath to appear at
Rome armed on
that very day; and were also engaged on that day
in drawing out the lists and testing the men for
the other army:
1 whereby it so happened that a
large number of men had been collected in
Rome
spontaneously in the very nick of time. These troops the
Consuls boldly led outside the walls, and, entrenching themselves there, checked Hannibal's intended movement. For the
Carthaginians were at first eager to advance, and were not
altogether without hope that they would be able to take
Rome
itself by assault.
But when they saw the enemy drawn up in
order, and learnt before long from a prisoner what had
happened, they abandoned the idea of attacking
the city, and began devasting the country-side
instead, and setting fire to the houses. In
these first raids they collected an innumerable amount of booty,
for the field of plunder upon which they were entered was
one into which no one had ever expected an enemy to set foot.
Hannibal In Sight of Rome
But presently, when the Consuls ventured to encamp
Hannibal starts on his return. |
within ten stades of him, Hannibal broke up his
quarters before daylight. He did so for three
reasons:—first, because he had collected an
enormous booty; secondly, because he had given up all hope
of taking
Rome; and lastly, because he reckoned that the
time had now come at which he expected, according to
his original idea, that Appius would have learnt the danger
threatening
Rome, and would have raised the siege of
Capua
and come with his whole force to the relief of the city; or at
any rate would hurry up with the greater part, leaving a detachment
to carry on the siege.
Publius had caused the bridges
over the Anio to be broken down, and thus compelled
Hannibal to get his army across by a ford; and
he now attacked the Carthaginians as they were
engaged in making the passage of the stream
and caused them great distress. They were not able however
to strike an important blow, owing to the number of Hannibal's
cavalry, and the activity of the Numidians in every part of the
field. But before retiring to their camp they wrested the
greater part of the booty from them, and killed about three
hundred men; and then, being convinced that the Carthaginians were beating a hasty retreat in a panic, they followed
in their rear, keeping along the line of hills.
Hannibal turns upon his pursuers. |
At first Hannibal
continued to march at a rapid pace, being anxious to meet the
force which he expected; but at the end of the fifth day,
being informed that Appius had not left the
siege of
Capua, he halted; and waiting for the
enemy to come up, made an attack upon his
camp before daylight, killed a large number of them, and drove
the rest out of their camp. But when day broke, and he saw
the Romans in a strong position upon a steep hill, to which
they had retired, he decided not to continue his attack upon
them; but marching through Daunia and
Bruttium he
appeared at
Rhegium, so unexpectedly, that he was within an
ace of capturing the city, and did cut off all who were out in
the country; and during this excursion captured a very large
number of the Rhegini.
Epaminondas and Hannibal Compared
It seems to me that the courage and determination both
of the Carthaginians and Romans at this crisis were truly remarkable; and merit quite as much admiration as the conduct
of Epaminondas, which I will describe here for the sake of
pointing the comparison.
He reached
Tegea with the allies, and when he saw that
the Lacedaemonians with their own forces in
full were come to
Mantinea, and that their allies
had mustered together in the same city, with the
intention of offering the Thebans battle; having
given orders to his men to get their supper
early, he led his army out immediately after
nightfall, on the pretext of being anxious to
seize certain posts with a view to the coming battle. But
having impressed this idea upon the common soldiers, he led
them along the road to
Lacedaemon itself; and having arrived
at the city about the third hour of his march, contrary to all
expectation, and finding
Sparta destitute of defenders, he
forced his way right up to the market-place, and occupied the
quarters of the town which slope down to the river. Then
however a contretemps occurred: a deserter
made his way into
Mantinea and told Agesilaus
what was going on.
A Cretan warns Agesilaus. |
Assistance accordingly
arrived just as the city was on the point of being taken; and
Epaminondas was disappointed of his hope. But having
caused his men to get their breakfast along the bank of the
Eurotas, and recovered them from their fatigue, he started to
march back again by the same road, calculating that, as the
Lacedaemonians and their allies had come to the relief of
Sparta,
Mantinea would in its turn be left undefended: which
turned out to be the case. So he exhorted the Thebans to
exert themselves; and, after a rapid night march, arrived at
Mantinea about mid-day, finding it entirely destitute of
defenders.
But the Athenians, who were at that time zealously supporting the Lacedaemonians in their contest with the Thebans, had
arrived in virtue of their treaty of alliance; and just as the
Theban vanguard reached the temple of Poseidon, seven stades
from the town, it happened that the Athenians showed themselves, by design, as if on the brow of the hill overhanging
Mantinea. And when they saw them, the Mantineans who
had been left behind at last ventured to man the wall and
resist the attack of the Thebans. Therefore historians are
justified in speaking with some dissatisfaction of these events,
2
when they say that the leader did everything which a good
general could, but that, while conquering his enemies, Epaminondas was conquered by Fortune.
When Audacity is the Truest Safety
Much the same remark applies to Hannibal. For who
can refrain from regarding with respect and admiration a
general capable of doing what he did? First he attempted by
harassing the enemy with skirmishing attacks to raise the siege:
having failed in this he made direct for
Rome itself: baffled
once more by a turn of fortune entirely independent of human
calculation, he kept his pursuers in play,
3 and waited till the
moment was ripe to see whether the besiegers of
Capua
stirred: and finally, without relaxing in his determination, swept
down upon his enemies to their destruction, and all but
depopulated
Rhegium. One would be inclined however to
judge the Romans to be superior to the Lacedaemonians at this
crisis. For the Lacedaemonians rushed off en masse at the
first message and relieved
Sparta, but, as far as they were
concerned, lost
Mantinea. The Romans guarded their own
city without breaking up the siege of
Capua: on the contrary,
they remained unshaken and firm in their purpose, and in fact
from that time pressed the Capuans with renewed spirit.
I have not said this for the sake of making a panegyric on
either the Romans or Carthaginians, whose great qualities I
have already remarked upon more than once: but for the sake
of those who are in office among the one or the other people, or
who are in future times to direct the affairs of any state whatever; that by the memory, or actual contemplation, of exploits
such as these they may be inspired with emulation. For in an
adventurous and hazardous policy it often turns out that
audacity was the truest safety and the finest sagacity;
4 and
success or failure does not affect the credit and excellence of
the original design, so long as the measures taken are the result
of deliberate thought. . . .
When the Romans were besieging
Tarentum, Bomilcar the
The Carthaginian fleet invited from Sicily
to relieve Tarentum does more harm than good, and departs to the joy of the people, B. C. 211. Livy, 26, 20. |
admiral of the Carthaginian fleet came to its
relief with a very large force; and being unable
to afford efficient aid to those in the town,
owing to the strict blockade maintained by the
Romans, without meaning to do so he used up
more than he brought; and so after having
been constrained by entreaties and large
promises to come, he was afterwards forced at
the earnest supplication of the people to depart. . . .
The Spoils of Syracuse: Works of Art Taken To Rome
A city is not really adorned by what is brought from
without, but by the virtue of its own inhabitants. . . .
The Romans, then, decided to transfer these things to their
own city and to leave nothing behind.
Whether
they were right in doing so, and consulted their
true interests or the reverse, is a matter admitting
of much discussion; but I think the balance of
argument is in favour of believing it to have been
wrong then, and wrong now. If such had been
the works by which they had exalted their
country, it is clear that there would have been
some reason in transferring thither the things by which they
had become great. But the fact was that, while leading lives
of the greatest simplicity themselves, as far as possible removed from the luxury and extravagance which these things
imply, they yet conquered the men who had always possessed
them in the greatest abundance and of the finest quality. Could
there have been a greater mistake than theirs? Surely it
would be an incontestable error for a people to abandon the
habits of the conquerors and adopt those of the conquered;
and at the same time involve itself in that jealousy which is the
most dangerous concomitant of excessive prosperity. For the
looker-on never congratulates those who take what belongs
to others, without a feeling of jealousy mingling with his pity for
the losers. But suppose such prosperity to go on increasing, and
a people to accumulate into its own hands all the possessions
of the rest of the world, and moreover to invite in a way the
plundered to share in the spectacle they present, in that case
surely the mischief is doubled. For it is no longer a case of
the spectators pitying their neighbours, but themselves, as they
recall the ruin of their own country. Such a sight produces
an outburst, not of jealousy merely, but of rage against the
victors. For the reminder of their own disaster serves to enhance
their hatred of the authors of it. To sweep the gold and silver,
however, into their own coffers was perhaps reasonable; for it
was impossible for them to aim at universal empire without
crippling the means of the rest of the world, and securing the
same kind of resources for themselves. But they might have
left in their original sites things that had nothing to do with
material wealth; and thus at the same time have avoided
exciting jealousy, and raised the reputation of their country:
adorning it, not with pictures and statues, but with dignity of
character and greatness of soul. I have spoken thus much as
a warning to those who take upon themselves to rule over
others, that they may not imagine that, when they pillage cities,
the misfortunes of others are an honour to their own country.
The Romans, however, when they transferred these things to
Rome, used such of them as belonged to individuals to increase
the splendour of private establishments, and such as belonged
to the state to adorn the city. . . .
The leaders of the Carthaginians, though they had
The two Scipios fall in B. C. 212. |
conquered their enemies, could not control
themselves: and having made up their minds
that they had put an end to the Roman war,
they began quarrelling with each other, finding continual
subjects of dispute through the innate covetousness and
ambition of the Phoenician character; among
whom Hasdrubal, son of Gesco, pushed his
authority to such a pitch of iniquity as to
demand a large sum of money from Andobales,
the most faithful of all their Iberian friends,
who had some time before lost his chieftainship
for the sake of the Carthaginians, and had but recently
recovered it through his loyalty to them. When Andobales,
trusting to his long fidelity to
Carthage, refused this demand,
Hasdrubal got up a false charge against him and compelled
him to give up his daughters as hostages. . . .
On the Art of Commanding Armies
The chances and accidents that attend military expeditions require great circumspection; and it is possible to
provide for all of them with precision, provided that a man
gives his mind to the conduct of his plan of campaign. Now
that fewer operations in war are carried out openly and by
mere force, than by stratagem and the skilful use of opportunity, any one that chooses may readily learn from the history
of the past. And again that operations depending on the
choice of opportunity oftener fail than succeed is easily proved
from experience. Nor can there be any doubt that the greater
part of such failures are due to the folly or carelessness of the
leaders. It is time therefore to inquire into the rules of this
art of strategy.
Such things as occur in campaigns without having been
calculated upon in any way we must not speak of as operations,
but as accidents or casualties. It is the conduct of a campaign in accordance with an exact plan that I am to set forth:
omitting all such things as do not fall under a scientfic rule,
and have no fixed design.
Scientific Strategy
Every operation requires a time fixed for its commencement, a period and place for its execution,
The points of inherent importance in the conduct of a campaign,—time, place, secrecy, code of signals, agents, and method. |
secrecy, definite signals, persons by whom and
with whom it is to be executed, and a settled plan
for conducting it. It is evident that the man
who has rightly provided for each of these details
will not fail in the ultimate result, while he who
has neglected any single one of them will fail in
the whole. Such is the order of nature, that one insignificant
circumstance will suffice for failure, while for success rigid
perfection of every detail is barely enough.
Leaders then should neglect no single point in conducting
such expeditions.
Now the head and front of such precautions is silence; and
Things necessary. 1. Silence. |
not to allow either joy at the appearance of an
unexpected hope, or fear, or familiarity, or
natural affection, to induce a man to communicate his plans to any one unconcerned, but to impart it
to those and those alone without whom it is impossible to
complete his plan; and not even to them a moment sooner
than necessary, but only when the exigencies of the particular
service make it inevitable. It is necessary, moreover, not only
to be silent with the tongue, but much more so in the mind.
For it has happened to many generals before now, while
preserving an inviolable silence, to betray their thoughts
either by the expression of their countenances or by their
actions.
The second requisite is to know accurately the conditions
2. Knowledge of the capabilities of the force in moving. |
under which marches by day or night may be
performed, and the distances to which they can
extend; and not only marches on land, but also
voyages by sea.
The third and most important is to have some knowledge
of the seasons, and to be able to adapt the design to them.
Nor again is the selection of the ground for the operation
to be regarded as unimportant, since it often happens that it
is this which makes what seems impossible possible, and what
seemed possible impossible.
Finally there must be no neglect of the
3. Care in concerting signals. 4. Care in selecting men. |
subject of signals and counter signals; and the
choice of persons by whom and with whom the
operation is to be carried out.
Generals Also Need to Know Science
Of these points some are learnt by experience, some
5. Knowledge of localities. |
from history, and others by the study of
scientific strategy. It is a most excellent thing
too that the general should have a personal
knowledge both of the roads, and the locality which he has
to reach, and its natural features; as well as of the persons by
whom and with whom he is to act. If that is not possible, the
next best thing is that he should make careful inquiries and
not trust just any one: and men who undertake to act as
guides to such places should always deposit security with
those whom they are conducting.
These,—and other points like them, it is perhaps possible
6. Accurate knowledge of natural
phenomena enabling a general to make accurate calculation of time. |
that leaders may learn sufficiently from the mere
study of strategy, whether practical or in books.
But scientific investigation requires scientific
processes and demonstrations, especially in
astronomy and geometry; the working out of
which is not much to our present point, though
their results are important, and may contribute largely to the
success of such undertakings.
The most important operation in astronomy is the calculation of the lengths of the days and nights. If these had been
uniform it would not have been a matter requiring any study,
but the knowledge would have been common to all the world:
since however they not only differ with each other but also
with themselves, it is plainly necessary to be acquainted with
the increase and diminution of both the one and the other.
How can a man calculate a march, and the distance practicable
in a day or in a night, if he is unacquainted with the variation of
these periods of time? In fact nothing can be done up to time
without this knowledge,—it is inevitable otherwise that a man
should be sometimes too late and sometimes too soon. And
these operations are the only ones in which being too soon is a
worse fault than being too late. For the general who overstays
the proper hour of action only misses his chance, since he can
find out that he has done so before he arrives, and so get off
safely: but he that anticipates the hour is detected when he
comes up; and so not only misses his immediate aim, but runs
a risk of ruining himself altogether.
Mode of Calculating Time
In all human undertakings opportuneness is the most
important thing, but especially in operations of war. Therefore a general must have at his fingers' ends the season of the
summer and winter solstice, the equinoxes, and the periods
between them in which the days and nights increase and
diminish. For it is by this knowledge alone that he can
compute the distance that can be done whether by sea or
land.
The divisions of the day; |
Again, he must necessarily understand the subdivisions both of the day and
the night, in order to know at what hour to
order the reveille, or the march out; for the end cannot be
attained unless the beginning be rightly taken. As for the
periods of the day, they may be observed by the shadows or
by the sun's course, and the quarter of the heaven in which
it has arrived, but it is difficult to do the same for the
night, unless a man is familiar with the phenomenon of the twelve signs of the Zodiac,
and their law and order: and this is easy to those who
have studied astronomy.
For since, though the nights are
unequal in length, at least six of the signs of the Zodiac are
nevertheless above the horizon every night, it is plain that in
the same portions of every night equal portions of the twelve
signs of the Zodiac rise. Now as it is known what portion of
the sphere is occupied by the sun during the day, it is evident
that when he has set the are subtended by the diameter of
his are must rise. Therefore the length of the night is exactly
commensurate with the portion of the Zodiac which appears
above the horizon after sunset. And, given that we know the
number and size of the signs of the Zodiac, the corresponding
divisions of the night are also known. If however the nights
be cloudy, the moon must be watched, since owing to its size
its light as a general rule is always visible, at whatsoever point
in the heaven it may be. The hour may be guessed sometimes by observing the time and place of its rising, or again of
its setting, if you only have sufficient acquaintance with this
phenomenon to be familiar with the daily variation of its rising.
And the law which it too follows admits of being easily
observed; for its revolution is limited by the period of one
month, which serves as a model to which all subsequent
revolutions conform.
Example: Ulysses
And here one may mention with admiration that
Homer represents Ulysses, that truest type of
a leader of men, taking observations of the
stars, not only to direct his voyages, but his operations on land also. For such accidents as baffle expectation,
and are incapable of being accurately reckoned upon, are
quite sufficient to bring us to great and frequent distress,
for instance, downpours of rain and rise of torrents, excessive
frosts and snows, misty and cloudy weather, and other things
like these;—but if we also neglect to provide for those which
can be foreseen, is it not likely that we shall have ourselves
to thank for frequent failures? None of these means then
must be neglected, if we wish to avoid those errors into which
many others are said to have fallen, as well as the particular
generals whom I am about to mention by way of examples.
Failures Arising From Ignorance
When Aratus, the Strategus of the Achaean league,
Aratus fails at Cynaetha. |
attempted to take Cynaetha by treachery, he
arranged a day with those in the town who
were co-operating with him, on which he was to arrive on the
banks of the river which flows past Cynaetha, and to remain
there quietly with his forces: while the party inside the town
about midday, when they got an opportunity, were to send
out one of their men quietly, wrapped in a cloak, and order
him to take his stand upon a tomb agreed upon in front of
the city; the rest were to attack the officers who were accustomed to guard the gate while taking their siesta. This being
done, the Achaeans were to rise from their ambush and to
make all haste to occupy the gate. These arrangements
made, and the time having come, Aratus arrived; and having
concealed himself down by the river, waited there for the
signal. But about an hour before noon, a man, whose profession it was to keep a fine kind of sheep near the town,
wishing to ask some business question of the shepherd, came
out of the gate with his cloak on, and standing upon the same
tomb looked round to find the shepherd. Whereupon Aratus,
thinking that the signal had been given, hurried with all his
men as fast as he could towards the gate. But the gate being
hurriedly closed by the guard, owing to no preparations having yet been made by the party in the town, the result was
that Aratus not only failed in his attempt but was the cause
of the worst misfortunes to his partisans. For being thus
detected they were dragged forward and put to death. What
is one to say was the cause of this catastrophe? Surely that
the general arranged only for a single signal, and being then
quite young had no experience of the accuracy secured by
double signals and counter-signals. On so small a point in
war does the success or failure of an operation turn.
Cleomenes Tries to Take Megalopolis
Again the Spartan Cleomenes, when proposing to take
Megalopolis by a stratagem, arranged with the
guards of that part of the wall near what is called
the Cavern to come out with all their men in the third watch,
the hour at which his partisans were on duty on the wall;
but not having taken into consideration the fact that at the
time of the rising of the Pleiads the nights are
very short, he started his army from
Sparta
about sunset.
The result was that he was not able to get
there in time, but being overtaken by daybreak, made a rash
and ill-considered attempt to carry the town, and was repulsed
with considerable loss and the danger of a complete overthrow.
Now if he had, in accordance with his arrangement, hit the
proper time, and led in his men while his partisans were in
command of the entrance, he would not have failed in his
attempt.
Similarly, once more, King Philip, as I have already
stated, when carrying on an intrigue in the
city of
Meliteia, made a mistake in two ways.
The ladders which he brought were too short
for their purpose, and he mistook the time. For having
arranged to arrive about midnight, when every one was fast
asleep, he started from Larissa and arrived in the territory of
Meliteia too early, and was neither able to halt, for fear of his
arrival being announced in the city, nor to get back again
without being discovered. Being compelled therefore to continue his advance, he arrived at the city while the inhabitants
were still awake. Consequently he could neither carry the
wall by an escalade, because of the insufficient length of the
ladders; nor enter by the gate, because it was too early for his
partisans inside to help him. Finally, he did nothing but
irritate the people of the town; and, after losing a considerable
number of his own men, retired unsuccessful and covered with
disgrace; having only given a warning to the rest of the
world to distrust him and be on their guard against him.
Example: Why Nicias Failed at Syracuse
Again Nicias, the general of the Athenians, had it in
his power to have saved the army besieging
Syracuse, and
had selected the proper time of the night
for escaping the observation of the enemy, and
retiring to a place of safety.
And then because the moon was
eclipsed, regarding it superstitiously as of evil portent, he
stopped the army from starting. Thanks to this it came
about that, when he started the next day, the enemy had obtained information of his intention, and army and generals
alike fell into the hands of the Syracusans. Yet if he had
asked about this from men acquainted with such phenomena, he
might not only have avoided missing his opportunity for such
an absurd reason, but have also used the occurrence for his
own benefit owing to the ignorance of the enemy. For the
ignorance of their neighbours contributes more than anything
else to the success of the instructed.
Such then are examples of the necessity of studying celestial
The method of judging of the length necessary for scaling ladders. |
phenomena. But as for securing the proper
length of scaling ladders, the following is the
method of making the calculation. Suppose
the height of the wall to be given by one of the
conspirators within, the measurement required
for the ladders is evident; for example, if the height of the
wall is ten feet or any other unit, the ladders must be full
twelve; and the interval between the wall and the foot of the
ladder must be half the length of the ladder, that the ladders
may not break under the weight of those mounting if they
are set farther away, nor be too steep to be safe if set nearer
the perpendicular. But supposing it not to be possible to
measure or get near the wall: the height of any object which
rises perpendicularly on its base can be taken by those who
choose to study mathematics.
Need of Some Knowledge of Mathematics
Once more, therefore, those who wish to succeed in
military projects and operations must have studied geometry,
not with professional completeness, but far enough to have a
comprehension of proportion and equations. For it is not
only in such cases that these are necessary, but also for raising
the scale of the divisions of a camp. For sometimes the
problem is to change the entire form of the camp, and yet to
keep the same proportion between all the parts included: at
other times to keep the same shape in the parts, and to increase
or diminish the whole area on which the camp stands, adding
or subtracting from all proportionally. On which point I
have already spoken in more elaborate detail in my Notes on
Military Tactics. For I do not think that any one will reasonably object to me that I add a great burden to strategy, in
urging on those who endeavour to acquire it the study of
astronomy and geometry: for, while rather rejecting all that
is superfluous in these studies, and brought in for show and
talk, as well as all idea of enjoining their prosecution beyond
the point of practical utility, I am most earnest and eager for
so much as is barely necessary. For it would be strange if
those who aim at the sciences of dancing and flute-playing
should study the preparatory sciences of rhythms and music,
(and the like might be said of the pursuits of the palaestra),
from the belief that the final attainment of each of these
sciences requires the assistance of the latter; while the students
of strategy are to feel aggrieved if they find that they require
subsidiary sciences up to a certain point. That would mean
that men practising common and inferior arts are more diligent
and energetic than those who resolve to excel in the best
and most dignified subject; which no man of sense would admit. . . .
The Computation of the Size of Cities
Most people calculate the area merely from the
length of the circumference [of towns or
camps]. Accordingly, when one says that
the city of
Megalopolis has a circuit of fifty
stades, and that of
Sparta forty-eight, but that
Sparta is twice
the size of
Megalopolis, they look upon the assertion as incredible. And if one, by way of increasing the difficulty, were
to say that a city or camp may have a circuit of forty stades
and yet be double the size of one having a perimeter of a
hundred, the statement would utterly puzzle them. The
reason of this is that we do not remember the lessons in
geometry taught us at school. I was led to make these
remarks because it is not only common people, but actually
some statesmen and military commanders, who have puzzled
themselves sometimes by wondering whether it were possible
that
Sparta should be bigger, and that too by a great deal,
than
Megalopolis, while having a shorter circuit; and at other
times by trying to conjecture the number of men by considering the mere length of a camp's circuit. A similar mistake
is also made in pronouncing as to the number of the inhabitants of cities. For most people imagine that cities in which
the ground is broken and hilly contain more houses than a
flat site. But the fact is not so; because houses are built at
right angles not to sloping foundations but to the plains below,
upon which the hills themselves are excrescences. And this
admits of a proof within the intelligence of a child. For if
one would imagine houses on slopes to be raised until they
were of the same height; it is evident that the plane of the
roofs of the houses thus united will be equal and parallel
to the plane underlying the hills and foundations.
So much for those who aspire to be leaders and statesmen and
are yet ignorant and puzzled about such facts as these. . . .
Those who do not enter upon undertakings with good will
and zeal cannot be expected to give real help when the time
comes to act. . . .
The Hannibalian War, B.C. 211
Such being the position of the Romans and Carthaginians,
Fortune continually oscillating between the two, we may say
with the poet
"Pain hard by joy possessed the souls of each."
5 . . .
There is profound truth in the observation which I have
often made, that it is impossible to grasp or get a complete
view of the fairest of all subjects of contemplation, the tendency
of history as a whole, from writers of partial histories. . . .
Estimate of Hannibal
Of all that befell the Romans and Carthaginians, good
or bad, the cause was one man and one mind,—Hannibal.
For it is notorious that he managed the Italian campaigns in
person, and the Spanish by the agency of the elder of his
brothers, Hasdrubal, and subsequently by that of Mago, the
leaders who killed the two Roman generals in
Spain about the
same time. Again, he conducted the Sicilian campaign at
first through Hippocrates and afterwards through Myttonus
6
the Libyan. So also in
Greece and Illyria: and, by brandishing before their faces the dangers arising from these latter
places, he was enabled to distract the attention of the Romans,
thanks to his understanding with Philip. So great and wonderful is the influence of a Man, and a mind duly fitted by
original constitution for any undertaking within the reach of
human powers.
But since the position of affairs has brought us to an
inquiry into the genius of Hannibal, the occasion seems to
me to demand that I should explain in regard to him the
peculiarities of his character which have been especially the
subject of controversy. Some regard him as having been
extraordinarily cruel, some exceedingly grasping of money.
But to speak the truth of him, or of any person engaged in
public affairs, is not easy. Some maintain that men's real
natures are brought out by their circumstances, and that they
are detected when in office, or as some say when
in misfortunes, though they have up to that time
completely maintained their secrecy.
I, on the
contrary, do not regard this as a sound dictum. For I think
that men in these circumstances are compelled, not only
occasionally but frequently, either by the suggestions of friends
or the complexity of affairs, to speak and act contrary to their
real principles.
Examples of Actions Contrary to Principles
And there are many proofs of this to be found in past
Examples to the contrary. 1. Agathocles. |
history if any one will give the necessary
attention. Is it not universally stated by
the historians that Agathocles, tyrant of
Sicily, after having the reputation of extreme cruelty in his
original measures for the establishment of his dynasty, when
he had once become convinced that his power over the
Siceliots was firmly established, is considered to have become
the most humane and mild of rulers? Again, was not
Cleomenes of
Sparta a most excellent king, a
most cruel tyrant, and then again as a private
individual most obliging and benevolent? And yet it is not
reasonable to suppose the most opposite dispositions to exist
in the same nature.
They are compelled to change with the
changes of circumstances: and so some rulers often display to
the world a disposition as opposite as possible to their true
nature. Therefore the natures of men not only are not brought
out by such things, but on the contrary are rather obscured.
The same effect is produced also not only in commanders,
despots, and kings, but in states also, by the suggestions of
friends.
For instance, you will find the
Athenians responsible for very few tyrannical
acts, and of many kindly and noble ones, while Aristeides and
Pericles were at the head of the state: but quite the reverse
when Cleon and Chares were so.
And when the Lacedaemonians were supreme in
Greece, all the
measures taken by King Cleombrotus were
conceived in the interests of their allies, but those by
Agesilaus not so. The characters of states therefore vary
with the variations of their leaders.
King
Philip again, when Taurion and Demetrius
were acting with him, was most impious in his conduct, but
when Aratus or Chrysogonus, most humane.
Estimate of Hannibal
The case of Hannibal seems to me to be on a par
Hannibal mastered by circumstances. |
with these. His circumstances were so extraordinary and shifting, his closest friends
so widely different, that it is exceedingly
difficult to estimate his character from his proceedings
in
Italy. What those circumstances suggested to him may
easily be understood from what I have already said, and what
is immediately to follow; but it is not right to omit the
suggestions made by his friends either, especially as this
matter may be rendered sufficiently clear by one instance of
the advice offered him. At the time that Hannibal was
meditating the march from
Iberia to
Italy with his army,
he was confronted with the extreme difficulty of providing
food and securing provisions, both because the journey
was thought to be of insuperable length, and because the
barbarians that lived in the intervening country were so
numerous and savage.
It appears that at that time this
difficulty frequently came on for discussion at
the council; and that one of his friends, called
Hannibal Monomachus, gave it as his opinion that there was
one and only one way by which it was possible to get as far as
Italy. Upon Hannibal bidding him speak out, he said that
they must teach the army to eat human flesh, and make them
accustomed to it. Hannibal could say nothing against the
boldness and effectiveness of the idea, but was unable to persuade himself or his friends to entertain it. It is this man's
acts in
Italy that they say were attributed to Hannibal, to
maintain the accusation of cruelty, as well as such as were the
result of circumstances.
Hannibal's Greed
Fond of money indeed he does seem to have
been to a conspicuous degree, and to have
had a friend of the same character—Mago,
who commanded in
Bruttium. That account I got from
the Carthaginians themselves; for natives know best not
only which way the wind lies, as the proverb has it, but
the characters also of their fellow-countrymen. But I
heard a still more detailed story from Massanissa, who
maintained the charge of money-loving against all Carthaginians generally, but especially against Hannibal and Mago
called the Samnite. Among other stories, he told me that
these two men had arranged a most generous subdivision of
operations between each other from their earliest youth; and
though they had each taken a very large number of cities in
Iberia and
Italy by force or fraud, they had never taken part in
the same operation together; but had always schemed against
each other, more than against the enemy, in order to prevent
the one being with the other at the taking of a city: that they
might neither quarrel in consequence of things of this sort,
nor have to divide the profit on the ground of their equality
of rank.
Hannibal Treats Different Cities in Different Ways
The influence of friends then, and still more that of
circumstances, in doing violence to and changing the natural
character of Hannibal, is shown by what I have narrated and
will be shown by what I have to narrate.
Effect of the fall of Capua, B. C. 211. |
For as soon
as
Capua fell into the hands of the Romans
the other cities naturally became restless,
and began to look round for opportunities and pretexts for revolting back again to
Rome. It
was then that Hannibal seems to have been at his lowest
point of distress and despair. For neither was he able to
keep a watch upon all the cities so widely removed from each
other,—while he remained entrenched at one spot, and the
enemy were manœuvering against him with several armies,—
nor could he divide his force into many parts; for he would
have put an easy victory into the hands of the enemy by
becoming inferior to them in numbers, and finding it impossible to be personally present at all points. Wherefore he was
obliged to completely abandon some of the cities, and withdraw his garrisons from others: being afraid lest, in the course
of the revolutions which might occur, he should lose his own
soldiers as well. Some cities again he made up his mind to
treat with treacherous violence, removing their inhabitants to
other cities, and giving their property up to plunder; in
consequence of which many were enraged with him, and
accused him of impiety or cruelty. For the fact was that
these movements were accompanied by robberies of money,
murders, and violence, on various pretexts at the hands of the
outgoing or incoming soldiers in the cities, because they
always supposed that the inhabitants that were left behind
were on the verge of turning over to the enemy. It is, therefore, very difficult to express an opinion on the natural
character of Hannibal, owing to the influence exercised on it
by the counsel of friends and the force of circumstances. The
prevailing notion about him, however, at
Carthage was that
he was greedy of money, at
Rome that he was cruel.
7 . . .
The city of
Agrigentum is not only superior to most
cities in the particulars I have mentioned, but
above all in beauty and elaborate ornamentation. It stands within eighteen stades of the
sea, so that it participates in every advantage
from that quarter; while its circuit of fortification is particularly strong both by nature and
art. For its wall is placed on a rock, steep and
precipitous, on one side naturally; on the other made so
artificially. And it is enclosed by rivers: for along the south
side runs the river of the same name as the town, and along
the west and south-west side the river called Hypsas. The
citadel overlooks the city exactly at the south-east, girt on the
outside by an impassable ravine, and on the inside with only
one approach from the town. On the top of it is a temple of
Athene and of Zeus Atabyrius as at
Rhodes: for as
Agrigentum was founded by the Rhodians, it is natural that this
deity should have the same appellation as at
Rhodes. The
city is sumptuously adorned in other respects also with
temples and colonnades. The temple of Zeus Olympius is
still unfinished, but in its plan and dimensions it seems to
be inferior to no temple whatever in all
Greece. . . .
Marcus Valerius persuaded these refugees,
The treatment of the refugees and
desperadoes who had collected at Agathyrna in Sicily. See Livy, 26, 40 fin. |
on giving them a pledge for the security of
their lives, to leave
Sicily and go to
Italy, on
condition that they should receive pay from the
people of
Rhegium for plundering
Bruttium,
and retain all booty obtained from hostile
territory. . . .
Greece: Philip Reduces Thessaly
Speech of Chlaeneas, the Aetolian, at Sparta. In the
autumn of B. C. 211 the Consul-designate, M. Valerius
Laevinus, induced the Aetolians, Scopas being their Strategus,
to form an alliance with them against Philip. The treaty, as
finally concluded, embraced also the Eleans, Lacedaemonians,
King Attalus of Pergamum, the Thracian King Pleuratus, and
the Illyrian Scerdilaidas. A mission was sent from Aetolia to
persuade the Lacedaemonians to join. See Livy, 26, 24.
"That the Macedonian supremacy, men of Sparta, was
the beginning of slavery to the Greeks, I am persuaded that
no one will venture to deny; and you may satisfy yourselves
by looking at it thus. There was a league of Greeks living in
the parts towards Thrace who were colonists from Athens and
Chalcis, of which the most conspicuous and powerful was the
city of Olynthus. Having enslaved and made
an example of this town, Philip not only became
master of the Thraceward cities, but reduced Thessaly also to
his authority by the terror which he had thus set up. Not
long after this he conquered the Athenians in
a pitched battle, and used his success with
magnanimity, not from any wish to benefit the
Athenians—far from it, but in order that his favourable treatment of them might induce the other states to submit to him
voluntarily. The reputation of your city was still such that
it seemed likely, that, if a proper opportunity arose, it would
recover its supremacy in Greece. Accordingly, without waiting
for any but the slightest pretext, Philip came with his army
and cut down everything standing in your fields, and destroyed
the houses with fire. Succession of Alexander the Great, B. C. 336. |
And at last, after destroying towns and
open country alike, he assigned part of your territory to the
Argives, part to Tegea and Megalopolis, and
part to the Messenians: determined to benefit
every people in spite of all justice, on the sole
condition of their injuring you. Destruction of Thebes, B. C. 335. |
Alexander succeeded Philip
on the throne, and how he destroyed Thebes,
because he thought that it contained a spark of
Hellenic life, however small, you all I think
know well.
Speech of Chlaeneas
"And why need I speak in detail of how the successors
of this king have treated the Greeks? For surely there is
no man living, so uninterested in public affairs, as not to have
heard how Antipater in his victory at
Lamia treated the unhappy
Athenians, as well as the other Greeks; and how he
went so far in violence and brutality as to institute man-hunters, and send them to the various
cities to catch all who had ever spoken against,
or in any way annoyed, the royal family of
Macedonia: of whom some were dragged by force from the
temples, and others from the very altars, and put to death
with torture, and others who escaped were forced to leave
Greece entirely; nor had they any refuge save the Aetolian
nation alone.
Battle of Crannon, ending the Lamian war, 7th Aug., B. C. 322. |
For the Aetolians were the only people in
Greece who withstood Antipater in behalf of those unjustly
defrauded of safety to their lives: they alone faced the invasion of Brennus and his barbarian army:
and they alone came to your aid when called
upon, with a determination to assist you in
regaining your ancestral supremacy in
Greece.
8
Who again is ignorant of the deeds of Cassander, Demetrius,
and Antigonus Gonatas? For owing to their recency the
knowledge of them still remains distinct. Some of them by
introducing garrisons, and others by implanting despots in the
cities, effectually secured that every state should share the
infamous brand of slavery. But passing by all these I will
now come to the last Antigonus,
9 lest any of you, viewing his
policy unsuspiciously, should consider that you are under an
obligation to the Macedonians. For it was with no purpose
of saving the Achaeans that he undertook the war against
you, nor from any dislike of the tyranny of Cleomenes inducing him to free the Lacedaemonians. If any man among you
holds this opinion, he must be simple indeed. No! It was
because he saw that his own power would not be secure if
you got the rule of the
Peloponnese; and because he saw that
Cleomenes was of a nature well calculated to secure this
object, and that fortune was splendidly seconding your efforts,
that he came in a tumult of fear and jealousy, not to help
Peloponnesians, but to destroy your hopes and abase your
power. Therefore you do not owe the Macedonians so much
gratitude for not destroying your city when they had taken it,
as hostility and hatred, for having more than once already
stood in your way, when you were strong enough to grasp the
supremacy of
Greece.
Impiety of Philip
"Again, what need to speak more on the wickedness of
Philip? For of his impiety towards the gods
his outrages on the temples at Thermus are a
sufficient proof; and of his cruelty towards man, his perfidy
and treachery to the Messenians.
"So much for the past. But as to the present resolution
before you, it is in a way necessary to draft it, and vote on it,
as though you were deciding on war, and yet in real truth not
to regard it as a war. For it is impossible for the Achaeans,
beaten as they are, to damage your territory: but I imagine
that they will be only too thankful to heaven if they can but
protect their own, when they find themselves surrounded by
war with Eleans and Messenians as allied to us, and with ourselves at the same time. And Philip, I am persuaded, will
soon desist from his attack, when involved in a war by land
with Aetolians, and by sea with
Rome and King Attalus.
The future may be easily conjectured from the past. For if
he always failed to subdue Aetolians when they were his only
enemies, can we conceive that he will be able to support the
war if all these combine?
Conclusion of the Speech
"I have said thus much with the deliberate purpose of
showing you that you are not hampered by previous engagements, but are entirely free in your deliberations as to which
you ought to join—Aetolians or Macedonians. If you are
under an earlier engagement, and have already made up your
minds on these points, what room is there for further argument? For if you had made the alliance now existing
between yourselves and us, previous to the good services done
you by Antigonus, there might perhaps have been some
reason for questioning whether it were right to neglect an old
treaty in gratitude for recent favours. But since it was
subsequent to this much vaunted freedom and security given
you by Antigonus, and with which they are perpetually
taunting you, that, after deliberation and frequent consideration
as to which of the two you ought to join, you decided
to combine with us Aetolians; and have actually exchanged
pledges of fidelity with us, and have fought by our side in the
late war against
Macedonia, how can any one entertain a
doubt on the subject any longer? For the obligations of
kindness between you and Antigonus and Philip were
cancelled then. It now remains for you to point out some
subsequent wrong done you by Aetolians, or subsequent
favour by Macedonians: or if neither of these exist, on what
grounds are you now, at the instance of the very men to whom
you justly refused to listen formerly, when no obligation
existed, about to undo treaties and oaths—the strongest
bonds of fidelity existing among mankind."
Such was the conclusion of what was considered a very
cogent speech by Chlaeneas.
Lyciscus Replies To Chlaeneas
After him the ambassador of the Acarnanians, Lyciscus,
came forward: and at first he paused, seeing the multitude
talking to each other about the last speech; but when at last
silence was obtained, he began his speech as follows:—
"I and my colleagues, men of
Sparta, have been sent to
Speech of Lyciscus,
envoy from Acarnania, which country was to fall to the Aetolians by the proposed new treaty. See Livy, 26, 24. |
you by the common league of the Acarnanians;
and as we have always shared in the same
prospects as the Macedonians, we consider
that this mission also is common to us and
them. For just as on the field of war, owing to
the superiority and magnitude of the Macedonian, force, our safety is involved in their
valour; so, in the controversies of diplomacy,
our interests are inseparable from the rights of the Macedonians.
Now Chlaeneas in the peroration of his address gave a
summary of the obligations existing between the Aetolians and
yourselves. For he said, If subsequent to your making the
alliance with them any fresh injury or offence had been committed by Aetolians, or any kindness done by Macedonians,
the present proposal ought properly to be discussed as a fresh
start; but that if, nothing of the sort having taken place, we
believe that by quoting the services of Antigonus, and your
former decrees, we shall be able to annul existing oaths and
treaties, we are the greatest simpletons in the world.' To this
I reply by acknowledging that I must indeed be the most
foolish of men, and that the arguments I am about to put
forward are indeed futile, if, as he maintains, nothing fresh has
happened, and Greek affairs are in precisely the same position
as before. But if exactly the reverse be the case, as I shall
clearly prove in the course of my speech,—then I imagine that
I shall be shown to give you some salutary advice, and Chlaeneas
to be quite in the wrong. We are come, then, expressly
because we are convinced that it is needful for us to speak on
this very point: namely, to point out to you that it is at once
your duty and your interest, after hearing of the evils threatening
Greece, to adopt if possible a policy excellent and worthy of
yourselves by uniting your prospects with ours; or if that cannot
be, at least to abstain from this movement for the present.
Defence of Macedonian Policy
"But since the last speaker has ventured to go back to
ancient times for his denunciations of the Macedonian royal
family, I feel it incumbent on me also to say a few words first
on these points, to remove the misconception of those who have
been carried away by his words.
"Chlaeneas said, then, that Philip son of Amyntas became
Sacred war, B. C. 357-346. Onomarchus
killed near the gulf of Pagasae. B. C. 352. See Diodor, 16, 32-35. |
master of
Thessaly by the ruin of
Olynthus. But I conceive
that not only the Thessalians, but the other Greeks also, were
preserved by Philip's means. For at the time
when Onomarchus and Philomelus, in defiance
of religion and law, seized
Delphi and made
themselves masters of the treasury of the god,
who is there among you who does not know
that they collected such a mighty force as no
Greek dared any longer face? Nay, along with
this violation of religion, they were within an ace of becoming
lords of all
Greece also. At that crisis Philip volunteered his
assistance; destroyed the tyrants, secured the temple, and
became the author of freedom to the Greeks, as is testified
even to posterity by the facts.
Philip elected generalissimo against Persia in the congress of allies at Corinth, B. C. 338. |
For Philip
was unanimously elected general-in-chief by
land and sea, not, as my opponent ventured
to assert, as one who had wronged
Thessaly;
but on the ground of his being a benefactor
of
Greece: an honour which no one had previously obtained.
'Ay, but,' he says, 'Philip came with an armed force into
Laconia.' Yes, but it was not of his own choice, as you know: he
reluctantly consented to do so, after repeated invitations and
appeals by the Peloponnesians, under the name of their friend
and ally. And when he did come, pray observe, Chlaeneas,
how he behaved. Though he could have availed himself of
the wishes of the neighbouring states for the destruction of these
men's territory and the humiliation of their city, and have won
much gratitude too by his act, he by no means lent himself to
such a policy; but, by striking terror into the one and the other
alike, he compelled both parties to accommodate their
differences in a congress, to the common benefit of all: not
putting himself forward as arbitrator of the points in dispute,
but appointing a joint board of arbitration selected from all
Greece. Is that a proceeding which deserves to be held up to
reproach and execration?
Contrast Between Alexander and the Aetolians
"Again, you bitterly denounced Alexander, because,
Alexander's services to Greece. |
when he believed himself to be wronged, he
punished
Thebes: but of his having exacted
vengeance of the Persians for their outrages
on all the Greeks you made no mention at all; nor of
his having released us all in common from heavy miseries,
by enslaving the barbarians, and depriving them of the
supplies which they used for the ruin of the Greeks,—sometimes pitting the Athenians against the ancestors of these
gentlemen here, at another the Thebans; nor finally of his
having subjected
Asia to the Greeks.
"As for Alexander's successors how had you the audacity
to mention them? They were indeed, according
to the circumstances of the time, on many occasions the authors of good to some and of harm to others: for
which perhaps others might be allowed to bear them a grudge.
But to
you Aetolians it is in no circumstance open to do so,—
you who have never been the authors of anything good to
any one, but of mischief to many and on many occasions!
Who was it that called in Antigonus son of
Demetrius to the partition of the Achaean
league? Who was it that made a sworn treaty
with Alexander of
Epirus for the enslaving and dismembering
of
Acarnania? Was it not you? What nation ever sent out
military commanders duly accredited of the sort that you
have? Men that ventured to do violence to the sanctity of
asylum itself! Timaeus violated the sanctuary of Poseidon on
Taenarum, and of Artemis at
Lusi. Pharylus and Polycritus
plundered, the former the sacred enclosure of Here in
Argos,
the latter that of Poseidon at
Mantinea. What again about
Lattabus and Nicostratus? Did not they make a treacherous
attack on the assembly of the Pan-Boeotians in time of peace,
committing outrages worthy of Scythians and Gauls? You
will find no such crimes as these committed by the Diadochi.
Services of Macedonians To Greece
"Not being able to say anything in defence of
any of these acts, you talk pompously about
your having resisted the invasion of
Delphi
by the barbarians, and allege that for this
Greece ought
to be grateful to you. But if for this one service some gratitude is owing to the Aetolians; what high honour do the
Macedonians deserve, who throughout nearly their whole
lives are ceaselessly engaged in a struggle with the barbarians
for the safety of the Greeks? For that
Greece would have
been continually involved in great dangers, if we had not had
the Macedonians and the ambition of their kings as a barrier,
who is ignorant? And there is a very striking
proof of this.
Defeat and death of Ptolemy Ceraunus in the battle
with the Gauls, B.C. 280. See Pausan. 10.19.7. |
For no sooner had the Gauls
conceived a contempt for the Macedonians, by
their victory over Ptolemy Ceraunus, than,
thinking the rest of no account, Brennus
promptly marched into the middle of
Greece.
And this would often have happened if the
Macedonians had not been on our frontiers.
"However, though I have much that I could say on the past,
I think this is enough. Of all the actions of Philip, they have
selected his destruction of the temple, to fasten the charge of
impiety upon him. They did not add a word about their own
outrage and crime, which they perpetrated in regard to the
temples in Dium, and
Dodona, and the sacred enclosures of
the gods. The speaker should have mentioned this first.
But anything you Aetolians have suffered you recount to these
gentlemen with exaggeration: but the things you have inflicted
unprovoked, though many times as numerous as the others,
you pass over in silence; because you know full well that everybody lays the blame of acts of injustice and mischief on those
who give the provocation by unjust actions themselves.
Sparta Should Have Allied Herself with the Macedonians
"Of Antigonus I will only make mention so far, as to
avoid appearing to despise what was done, or to treat as
unimportant so great an undertaking. For my part I think
that history does not contain the record of a more admirable
service than that which Antigonus performed for you: indeed
it appears to me to be unsurpassable. And the following facts
will show this. Antigonus went to war with you and conquered
you in a pitched battle. By force of arms he became master
of your territory and city at once. He might have exercised
all the rights of war upon you: but he was so far from
inflicting any hardships upon you, that, besides other benefits,
he expelled your tyrant and restored your laws and ancestral
constitution. In return for which, in the national assemblies,
calling the Greeks to witness your words, you proclaimed
Antigonus your benefactor and preserver.
"What then ought to have been your policy? I will speak
what I really think, gentlemen of Sparta: and you will I am sure
bear with me. For I shall do this now from no wish to go out
of my way to bring railing accusations against you, but under
the pressure of circumstances, and for the common good. What
then am I to say? This: that both in the late war you ought to
have allied yourselves not with Aetolians but with Macedonians;
and now again, in answer to these invitations, you ought to join
Philip rather than the former people. But, it may be objected,
you will be breaking a treaty. Which will be the graver
breach of right on your part,—to neglect a private arrangement
made with Aetolians, or one that has been inscribed on a
column and solemnly consecrated in the sight of all
Greece?
On what ground are you so careful of breaking faith with this
people, from whom you have never received any favour, while
you pay no heed to Philip and the Macedonians, to whom
you owe even the very power of deliberating to-day? Do you
regard it as a duty to keep faith with friends? Yet it is not
so much a point of conscience to confirm written pledges of
faith, as it is a violation of conscience to go to war with those
who preserved you: and this is what, in the present instance,
the Aetolians are come to demand of you.
A Mightly Cloud is Coming From the West
"Let it, however, be granted that what I have now said
may in the eyes of severe critics be regarded as beside the
subject. I will now return to the main point at issue, as they
state it. It was this: 'If the circumstances are the same now
as at the time when you made alliance with the Aetolians, then
your policy ought to remain on the same lines.' That was
their first proposition. 'But if they have been entirely changed,
then it is fair that you should now deliberate on the demands
made to you as on a matter entirely new and unprejudiced.'
I ask you therefore, Cleonicus and Chlaeneas, who were your
allies on the former occasion when you invited this people to
join you? Were they not all the Greeks? But with whom
are you now united, or to what kind of federation are
you now inviting this people? Is it not to one with the
foreigner? A mighty similarity exists, no doubt, in your
minds, and no diversity at all!
Then you were contending for
glory and supremacy with Achaeans and Macedonians, men of
kindred blood with yourselves, and with Philip their leader;
now a war of slavery is threatening
Greece against men of
another race, whom you think to bring against Philip, but
have really unconsciously brought against yourselves and all
Greece. For just as men in the stress of war, by introducing into their cities garrisons superior in strength to their own
forces, while successfully repelling all danger from the enemy,
put themselves at the mercy of their friends,—just so are the
Aetolians acting in the present case. For in their desire to
conquer Philip and humble
Macedonia, they have unconsciously brought such a mighty cloud from the west, as for the
present perhaps will overshadow
Macedonia first, but which in
the sequel will be the origin of heavy evils to all
Greece.
Contrast of the Aetolian Policy
"All Greeks indeed have need to be on the alert
for the crisis which is coming on: but Lacedaemonians above all. For why was it, do you
suppose, men of
Sparta, that your ancestors,
when Xerxes sent an ambassador to your town demanding
earth and water, thrust the man into a well, and, throwing earth upon him, bade him take back word to Xerxes
that he had got from the Lacedaemonians what he had
demanded from them,—earth and water? Why was it again,
do you suppose, that Leonidas and his men
started forth to a voluntary and certain death?
Was it not that they might have the glory of being the
forlorn hope, not only of their own freedom, but of that
of all
Greece also? And it would indeed be a worthy action
for descendants of such heroes as these to make a league
with the barbarians now, and to serve with them; and
to war against Epirotes, Achaeans, Acarnanians, Boeotians,
Thessalians, and in fact against nearly every Greek state
except Aetolians! To these last it is habitual to act thus:
and to regard nothing as disgraceful, so long only as it is
accompanied by an opportunity of plunder.
It is not so,
however, with you. And what must we expect these people to
do, now that they have obtained the support of the Roman
alliance? For when they obtained an accession of strength
and support from the Illyrians, they at once set about acts of
piracy at sea, and treacherously seized Pylus; while by land
they stormed the city of Cleitor, and sold the Cynethans into
slavery. Once before they made a treaty with Antigonus, as I
said just now, for the destruction of the Achaean and Acarnanian races; and now they have done the same with
Rome
for the destruction of all
Greece.
Sparta Must Be On Guard Against Attack from Rome
"With a knowledge of such transactions before his eyes
who could help suspecting an attack from
Rome, and feeling
abhorrence at the abandoned conduct of the Aetolians in
daring to make such a treaty? They have already wrested
Oeniadae and Nesus from the Acarnanians, and recently
seized the city of the unfortunate Anticyreans, whom, in conjunction with the Romans,
they have sold into slavery.
10 Their
children and women are led off by the Romans to suffer all
the miseries which those must expect who fall into the hands
of aliens; while the houses of the unhappy inhabitants are
allotted among the Aetolians. Surely a noble alliance this to
join deliberately! Especially for Lacedaemonians: who, after conquering the barbarians,
decreed that the Thebans, for being the only Greeks that
resolved to remain neutral during the Persian invasion, should
pay a tenth of their goods to the gods.
"The honourable course then, men of
Sparta, and the one
becoming your character, is to remember from what ancestors
you are sprung; to be on your guard against an attack from
Rome; to suspect the treachery of the Aetolians. Above all
to recall the services of Antigonus: and so once more show
your loathing for dishonest men; and, rejecting the friendship
of the Aetolians, unite your hopes for the future with those of
Achaia and
Macedonia. If, however, any of your own
influential citizens are intriguing against this policy, then at
least remain neutral, and do not take part in the iniquities of
these Aetolians. . . ."
In the autumn of B. C. 211, Philip being in Thrace, Scopas
made a levy of Aetolians to invade Acarnania. The Acarnanians
sent their wives, children, and old men to Epirus, while the rest
of them bound themselves by a solemn execration never to rejoin
their friends except as conquerors of the invading Aetolians.
Livy, 26, 25.
When the Acarnanians heard of the intended invasion
of the Aetolians, in a tumult of despair and fury they adopted
a measure of almost frantic violence. . .
If any one of them survived the battle and fled from the
danger, they begged that no one should receive him in any
city or give him a light for a fire. And this they enjoined on
all with a solemn execration, and especially on the Epirotes,
to the end that they should offer none of those who fled an
asylum in their territory. . . .
When Philip was informed of the invasion he advanced
promptly to the relief of Acarnania; hearing of which the
Aetolians returned home. Livy, l. c.
Zeal on the part of friends, if shown in time, is of great
service; but if it is dilatory and late, it renders the assistance
nugatory,—supposing, of course, that they wish to keep the
terms of their alliance, not merely on paper, but by actual
deeds.
11 . . .
Investment of Echinus by Philip
Having determined to make his approach upon the
In the campaigns of Philip, during the time that Publius Sulpicius Galba
as Proconsul commanded a Roman fleet in Greek waters, i.e. from B. C. 209 to B. C. 206. See
Livy, 26, 22, 28; 28, 5-7; 29, 12. |
town at the two towers, he erected opposite
to them diggers' sheds and rams; and opposite the space between the towers he erected
a covered way between the rams, parallel
to the wall. And when the plan was complete, the appearance of the works was very
like the style of the wall. For the superstructures on the pent-houses had the appearance and style of towers, owing to the placing
of the wattles side by side; and the space
between looked like a wall, because the row of
wattles at the top of the covered way were divided into battlements by the fashion in which they were woven. In the
lowest division of these besieging towers the diggers employed
in levelling inequalities, to allow the stands of the batteringrams to be brought up, kept throwing on earth, and the ram
was propelled forward: in the second story were water vessels
and other appliances for quenching fires, and along with them
the catapults: and on the third a considerable body of men
were placed to fight with all who tried to damage the rams;
and they were on a level with the city towers. From the
covered way between the besieging towers a double trench
was to be dug towards the wall, between the city towers.
There were also three batteries for stone-throwing machines,
one of which carried stones of a talent weight, and the other
two half that weight. From the camp to the pent-houses and
diggers' sheds underground tunnels had been constructed,
to prevent men, going to the works from the camp or returning from the works, being wounded in any way by missiles
from the town. These works were completed in a very few
days, because the district round produced what was wanted for
this service in abundance. For
Echinus is situated on the
Melian Gulf, facing south, exactly opposite the territory of
Thronium, and enjoys a soil rich in every kind of produce;
thanks to which circumstance Philip had no scarcity of anything he required for his purpose. Accordingly, as I said, as
soon as the works were completed, they begun at once pushing
the trenches and the siege machinery towards the walls. . . .
While Philip was investing
Echinus, and had
secured his position excellently on the side of the town, and
had strengthened the outer line of his camp with a trench and
wall, Publius Sulpicius, the Roman pro-consul,
and Dorimachus, Strategus of the Aetolians,
arrived in person,—Publius with a fleet, and
Dorimachus with an army of infantry and cavalry,—and
assaulted Philip's entrenchment. Their repulse led to greater
exertions on Philip's part in his attack upon the Echinaeans,
who in despair surrendered to him. For Dorimachus was
not able to reduce Philip by cutting off his supplies, as he
got them by sea. . . .
When
Aegina was taken by the Romans, such of the
Aegina taken before the end of 208 B. C.,
for Sulpicius wintered there between 208-207 B. C. See Livy, 27, 32. |
inhabitants as had not escaped crowded together
at the ships, and begged the pro-consul to allow
them to send ambassadors to cities of their kinsmen to obtain ransom. Publius at first returned
a harsh answer, saying, that "When they were
their own masters was the time that they ought
to have sent ambassadors to their betters to ask for mercy,
not now when they were slaves. A little while ago they had
not thought an ambassador from him worthy of even a word;
now that they were captives they expected to be allowed to
send ambassadors to their kinsfolk: was that not sheer folly?"
So at the time he dismissed those who came to him with these
words. But next morning he called all the captives together
and said that, as to the Aeginetans, he owed them no favour;
but for the sake of the rest of the Greeks he would allow
them to send ambassadors to get ransom, since that was the
custom of their country. . . .
Nature of the Euphrates River
The Euphrates rises in
Armenia and flows through
Syria and the country beyond to
Babylonia. It seems to
discharge itself into the
Red Sea; but in point of fact it does
not do so: for its waters are dissipated among the ditches dug
across the fields before it reaches the sea. Accordingly the
nature of this river is the reverse of that of others. For in
other rivers the volume of water is increased in proportion to
the greater distance traversed, and they are at their highest in
winter and lowest in midsummer; but this river is fullest of
water at the rising of the dog-star, and has the
largest volume of water in
Syria, which continually decreases as it advances.
The reason of this is that the
increase is not caused by the collection of winter rains, but by
the melting of the snows; and its decrease by the diversion of
its stream into the land, and its subdivision
for the purposes of irrigation.
The transport of the army
of Antiochus in his eastern campaigns. See supra, 8, 25. |
It was this
which on this occasion made the transport
of the army slow, because as the boats were
heavily laden, and the stream very low, the
forces of the current did exceedingly little to help them
down. . . .
Embassy from Rome to Ptolemy
The Romans sent ambassadors to Ptolemy, wishing
M. Atilius and Manius Glabrio sent to Alexandria with presents
to Ptolemy Philopator and Queen Cleopatra. Livy, 27, 4, B. C. 210. |
to be supplied with corn, as they were suffering
from a great scarcity of it at home; and, moreover, when all
Italy had been laid waste by the
enemy's troops up to the gates of
Rome, and
when all supplies from abroad were stopped by
the fact that war was raging, and armies encamped, in all parts of the world except in
Egypt. In fact the scarcity at
Rome had come to such a
pitch, that a Sicilian medimnus was sold for fifteen drachmae.
13
But in spite of this distress the Romans did not relax in
their attention to the war.