Views In Greece of Roman Policy
THERE was a great deal of talk of all sorts in Greece, first
The various views held in Greece as to the Roman policy. |
as to the Carthaginians when the Romans conquered them, and subsequently as to the question
of the pseudo-Philip. The opinions expressed in
regard to the Carthaginians were widely divided,
and indicated entirely opposite views. Some commended the
Romans for their wise and statesmanlike policy in regard to
that kingdom. For the removal of a perpetual menace, and the
utter destruction of a city which had disputed the supremacy
with them, and could even then if it got an opportunity have
still been disputing it,—thus securing the supremacy for their
own country,—were the actions of sensible and far-sighted men.
Others contradicted this, and asserted that the Romans had no
such policy in view when they obtained their supremacy; and
that they had gradually and insensibly become perverted to
the same ambition for power, which had once characterised
the Athenians and Lacedaemonians; and though they had
advanced more slowly than these last, that they would from
all appearances yet arrive at the same consummation. For
in old times they had only carried on war until their opponents
were beaten, and induced to acknowledge the obligation of
obedience and acceptance of their orders; but that nowadays
they had given a foretaste of their policy by their conduct to
Perseus, in utterly destroying the Macedonian dynasty root and
branch, and had given the finishing stroke to that policy by the
course adopted in regard to the Carthaginians; for though this
latter people had committed no act of irretrievable outrage,
they had taken measures of irretrievable severity against them,
in spite of their offering to accept any terms, and submitting to
any injunctions that might be placed upon them. Others
again said that the Romans were generally a truly civilised
people; and that they had this peculiarity, on which they
prided themselves, that they conducted their wars openly and
generously, not employing night surprises or ambuscades, but
scorning every advantage to be gained by stratagem and
deceit, and regarding open and face-to-face combats as
alone becoming to their character: but that in the present
instance their whole campaign against the Carthaginians had
been conducted by means of stratagem and deceit. Little by
little,—by holding out inducements here, and practising concealment there,—they had deprived them of all hopes of
assistance from their allies. This was a line of conduct more
appropriate by rights to the intriguing chicanery of a monarchy,
than to a republican and Roman policy. Again, there were
some who took the opposite line to these. They said that if
it were really true that, before the Carthaginians had made
the surrender, the Romans had behaved as alleged, holding
out inducements here, and making half revelations there, they
would be justly liable to such charges; but if, on the contrary, it was only after the Carthaginians had themselves made
the surrender,—acknowledging the right of the Romans to take
what measures they chose concerning them,—that the latter in
the exercise of their undoubted right had imposed and enjoined
what they determined upon, then this action must cease to be
looked on as partaking of the nature of impiety or treachery.
And some denied that it was an impiety at all: for there
were three ways in which such a thing could be defined, none
of which applied to the conduct of the Romans. An impiety
was something done against the gods, or one's parents, or the
dead; treachery was something done in violation of oaths or
written agreements; an injustice something done in violation
of law and custom. But the Romans could not be charged on
any one of these counts: they had offended neither the gods,
their parents, nor the dead; nor had they broken oaths or
treaties, but on the contrary charged the Carthaginians
with breaking them. Nor again had they violated laws, customs, or their own good faith; for having received a voluntary surrender, with the full power of doing what they pleased
in the event of the submitting party not obeying their injunctions,
they had, in view of that eventuality having arisen, applied force to them.
Pseudo-Philip
Such were the criticisms commonly made on the dealings
The pretended Philip, son of Perseus, B. C. 149. |
of the Romans with the Carthaginians. But as
to the Pseudo-Philip, the report at first appeared
quite beneath consideration. A Philip suddenly appears in Macedonia, as though he had dropped from
the skies, in contempt of Macedonians and Romans alike,
without having the least reasonable pretext for his claim, as
every one knew that the real Philip had died in Alba in Italy
two years after Perseus himself. But when, three or four
months afterwards, a report arrived that he had conquered the
Macedonians in a battle in the territory of the Odomanti
beyond the Strymon, some believed it, but the majority were
still incredulous. But presently, when news came that he had
conquered the Macedonians in a battle on this side of the
Strymon, and was master of all Macedonia; and when letters
and envoys came from the Thessalians to the Achaeans
imploring help, as though the danger were now affecting
Thessaly, it seemed an astonishing and inexplicable event; for
there was nothing to give it the air of probability, or to supply
a rational explanation of it.
Such was the view taken of these things in Greece. . . .
Polybius Goes to Lilybaeum to Negotiate
A despatch from Manius Manilius to the Achaeans
Polybius sent for to negotiate with Carthage, B. C. 149. |
having reached the Peloponnese, saying that
they would oblige him by sending Polybius of
Megalopolis with all speed to Lilybaeum, as
he was wanted on account of certain public
affairs, the Achaeans decided to send him in accordance with
the letter of the consul. And as I felt bound to obey the
Romans, I put everything else aside, and sailed at the beginning of summer. But when we arrived at Corcyra, we found
another despatch from the consul to the Corcyreans had
come, announcing that the Carthaginians had already surrendered all the hostages to them, and were prepared to obey
them.
1 Thinking, therefore, that the war was at an end, and
that there was no more occasion for our services, we sailed
back to the Peloponnese. . . .
Polybius's Self-References
It should not excite surprise that I sometimes designate
myself by my proper name, and at other times by the common
forms of expression—for instance, "when
I had said this," or
"we had agreed to this." For as I was much personally
involved in the transactions about to be related, it becomes
necessary to vary the methods of indicating myself; that I may
not weary by continual repetition of my own name, nor again
by introducing the words "of me," or "through me," at every
turn, fall insensibly into an appearance of egotism. I wished,
on the contrary, by an interchangeable use of these terms, and
by selecting from time to time the one which seemed most
in place, to avoid, as far as could be, the offensiveness of talk
about one's self; for such talk, though naturally unacceptable,
is frequently inevitable, when one cannot in any other way
give a clear exposition of the subjects. I am somewhat assisted
in this point by the accident that, as far as I know, no one up
to our own time has ever had the same name as myself.
2 . . .
Statues Replaced
The statues of Callicrates
3 were carried in under the
cover of darkness, while those of Lycortas were brought out
again by broad daylight, to occupy their original position: and
this coincidence drew the remark from every one, that we
ought never to use our opportunities against others in a spirit
of presumption, knowing that it is extremely characteristic of
Fortune to subject those who set a precedent to the operation
of their own ideas and principles in their turn. . . .
The mere love of novelty inherent in mankind is a sufficient
incentive to any kind of change. . . .
Attalus, Nicomedes, And Prusias
The Romans sent envoys to restrain the impetuosity of
Mission to Bithynia to investigate the quarrel between Nicomedes (II.) and his |
Nicomedes and to prevent Attalus from going
to war with Prusias. The men appointed were
Marcus Licinius, who was suffering from gout,
and was quite lamed by it, and with him Aulus
Mancinus, who, from a tile falling on his head,
had so many and such great scars on it,
that it was a matter of wonder that he escaped
with his life, and Lucius Malleolus who was reputed the
stupidest man in Rome.
As the business required speed
and boldness, these men seemed the least suitable possible
for the purpose that could be conceived; and accordingly
they say that Marcus. Porcius Cato remarked in the Senate
that "Not only would Prusias perish before they got there,
but that Nicomedes would grow old in his kingdom. For
how could a mission make haste, or if it did, how could it
accomplish anything, when it had neither feet, head, nor intelligence?" . . .
Character of Prusias II
King Prusias was exceedingly repulsive in personal appearance, though his reasoning powers were somewhat superior: but externally he seemed only
half a man, and was cowardly and effeminate in
all matters pertaining to war. For not only was he timid, but
he was averse to all hardships, and in a word was utterly unmanned in mind and body throughout his whole life; qualities
which all the world object to in kings, but the Bithynians
above all people. Moreover, he was also exceedingly dissolute in regard to sensual pleasures; was completely without
education or philosophy, or any of the knowledge which they
embrace; and had not the remotest idea of what virtue is.
He lived the barbaric life of a Sardanapallus day and night.
Accordingly, directly his subjects got the least hope of being
able to do so, they conceived an implacable resolution not
only to throw off allegiance to the king, but to press for vengeance upon him.
4 . . .
Museium in Macedonia
Museium is a place near Olympus in Macedonia. . . .
Depopulation of Greece
As I blame those who assign fortune and destiny as the
Limits to the belief of the direct interference of Providence in human affairs. |
moving causes in common events and catastrophes, I wish now to enter as minutely on
the discussion of this subject as the nature of
an historical work will admit. Those things of
which it is impossible or difficult for a mere
man to ascertain the causes, such as a continuous fall of rains
and unseasonable wet, or, on the contrary, droughts and frosts,
one may reasonably impute to God and Fortune, in default of
any other explanation; and from them come destruction of
fruits, as well as long-continued epidemics, and other similar
things, of which it is not easy to find the cause. On such
matters then, we, in default of a better, follow the prevailing
opinions of the multitude, attempting by supplications and
sacrifices to appease the wrath of heaven, and sending to
ask the gods by what words or actions on our part a change
for the better may be brought about, and a respite be obtained for the evils which are afflicting us. But those things,
of which it is possible to find the origin and cause of their
occurrence, I do not think we should refer to the gods. I
mean such a thing as the following. In our time all Greece
was visited by a dearth of children and generally a decay of
population, owing to which the cities were denuded of inhabitants, and a failure of productiveness resulted, though
there were no long-continued wars or serious pestilences
among us. If, then, any one had advised our sending to ask the
gods in regard to this, what we were to do or say in order to
become more numerous and better fill our cities,—would he
not have seemed a futile person, when the cause was manifest
and the cure in our own hands? For this evil grew upon us
rapidly, and without attracting attention, by our men becoming
perverted to a passion for show and money and the pleasures
of an idle life, and accordingly either not marrying at all, or, if
they did marry, refusing to rear the children that were born, or
at most one or two out of a great number, for the sake of
leaving them well off or bringing them up in extravagant
luxury. For when there are only one or two sons, it is evident that, if war or pestilence carries off one, the houses must
be left heirless: and, like swarms of bees, little by little the
cities become sparsely inhabited and weak. On this subject
there is no need to ask the gods how we are to be relieved
from such a curse: for any one in the world will tell you that
it is by the men themselves if possible changing their objects
of ambition; or, if that cannot be done, by passing laws for the
preservation of infants. On this subject there is no need of
seers or prodigies. And the same holds good of all similar
things. But in regard to events of which the causes are impossible or difficult to discover, it is reasonable to feel a
difficulty. And in this class may be reckoned the course of
Macedonian history. For the Macedonians had enjoyed
many important favours at the hands of the Romans, having
been as a nation liberated from arbitrary government and
imports, and having obtained undisputed freedom in the place
of slavery; and having been individually relieved to a great
extent from intestine factions and civil bloodshed.
5 . . .
The inexplicable conduct of the Macedonians. |
They
had been worsted by the Romans formerly
when fighting on the side of Demetrius
6 and
again on that of Perseus; yet when engaged on
the side of a man of odious character,
7 and in support of his
claims to the throne, they displayed great courage and conquered a Roman army. These facts may well seem a puzzle
to us, for it is difficult to discover their cause. And accordingly one would be inclined to say in such matters that what
had happened was a heaven-sent infatuation, and that the
wrath of God had fallen upon the Macedonians. And this
will be rendered evident from what remains to be told. . . .
Death of Massanissa
Massanissa, king of the Numidians in Africa, was the
Death of Massanissa B. C. 148. His fortunate career and physical vigour. |
best man of all the kings of our time, and the
most completely fortunate; for he reigned more
than sixty years in the soundest health and
to extreme old age,—for he was ninety when
he died. He was, besides, the most powerful
man physically of all his contemporaries: for instance, when
it was necessary to stand, he would do so without moving a
foot all day long; and again, when he had once sat down to
business he remained there the whole day; nor did it
distress him the least to remain in the saddle day and night
continuously; and at ninety years old, at which age he died,
he left a son only four years old, called Sthembanus, who was
afterwards adopted by Micipses, and four sons besides.
Owing, again, to the affection existing between these sons,
he kept his whole life free from any treasonable plot and his
kingdom unpolluted by any family tragedy. But his greatest
and most divine achievement was this: Numidia had been
before his time universally unproductive, and was looked
upon as incapable of producing any cultivated fruits. He was
the first and only man who showed that it could produce
cultivated fruits just as well as any other country whatever, by
cultivating farms to the extent of ten thousand plethra for each
of his sons in different parts of it. On this man's death,
then, so much may reasonably and justly be said. Scipio
arrived at Cirta on the third day after his departure, and
settled everything properly and fairly.
8 . . .
A little while before his death he was seen, on the day
following a great victory over the Carthaginians, sitting outside
his tent eating a piece of dirty bread, and on those who saw
it expressing surprise at his doing so, he said.
9 . . .