Philip V. Wages War with Attalus, King of Pergamum, and the Rhodians.
See
supra 15, 20-24;
Livy, 31, 17,
sqq.
KING PHILIP having arrived at Pergamum, and believing
Philip's impious conduct in Asia, B. C. 201. |
that he had as good as made an end of Attalus,
gave the rein to every kind of outrage; and
by way of gratifying his almost insane fury he
vented his wrath even more against the gods than against
man. For his skirmishing attacks being easily repelled by the
garrison of Pergamum, owing to the strength of the place, and
being prevented by the precautions taken by Attalus from
getting booty from the country, he directed his anger against
the seats of the gods and the sacred enclosures; in which, as
it appears to me, he did not wrong Attalus so much as himself.
He threw down the temples and the altars, and even had their
stones broken to pieces that none of the buildings he had
destroyed might be rebuilt. After spoiling the Nicephorium,
cutting down its grove, and demolishing its ring wall, and
levelling with the ground many costly fanes, he first directed
his attack upon Thyatira, and thence marched into the plain
of Thebe, thinking that this district would supply him with the
richest spoil.
Zeuxis, Satrap of Antiochus, fails to help Philip substantially. |
But finding himself again disappointed in this respect, on arriving at the
"Holy Village" he sent a message to Zeuxis,
demanding that he would furnish him with corn,
and render the other services stipulated for in the treaty.
1
Zeuxis, however, though feigning to fulfil the obligations of
the treaty, was not minded to give Philip real and substantial help. . . .
Great Sea-fight Off Chios Between Philip and the Allied Fleets of Attalus and Rhodes, B. C. 201
As the siege was not going on favourably for him, and
Philip failing to take Chios sails off to Samos. |
the enemy were blockading him with an increasing number of decked vessels, he felt
uncertain and uneasy as to the result. But
as the state of affairs left him no choice, he suddenly put to
sea quite unexpectedly to the enemy; for Attalus expected that
he would persist in pushing on the mines he had commenced.
But Philip was especially keen to make his putting to sea a
surprise, because he thought that he would thus be able to outstrip the enemy, and complete the rest of his passage along
the coast to Samos in security.
Attalus and Theophiliscus follow him. |
But he was much
disappointed in his calculations; for Attalus and
Theophiliscus (of Rhodes), directly they saw him
putting to sea, lost no time in taking action. And although,
from their previous conviction that Philip meant to stay where
he was, they were not in a position to put to sea quite simultaneously, still by a vigorous use of their oars they managed to
overtake him, and attacked,—Attalus the enemy's right wing,
which was his leading squadron, and Theophiliscus his left. Thus
intercepted and surrounded, Philip gave the signal to the ships
of his right wing, ordering them to turn their prows towards
the enemy and engage them boldly; while he himself retreated
under cover of the smaller islands, which lay in the way, with
some light galleys, and thence watched the result of the battle.
The whole number of ships engaged were, on Philip's side, fiftythree decked, accompanied by some undecked vessels, and galleys
and beaked ships to the number of one hundred and fifty; for
he had not been able to fit out all his ships in Samos. On
the side of the enemy there were sixty-five decked vessels,
besides those which came from Byzantium, and along with
them nine
triemioliae (light-decked vessels), and three triremes.
Incidents of the Sea-Fight
The fight having been begun on the ship on which King
Attalus was sailing, all the others near began
charging each other without waiting for orders.
Attalus ran into an eight-banked ship, and
having struck it a well-directed blow below the water-line, after
a prolonged struggle between the combatants on the decks, at
length succeeded in sinking it.
Loss of Philip's flagship and admiral. |
Philip's tenbanked ship, which, moreover, was the admiral's, was captured by the enemy in an
extraordinary manner. For one of the
triemioliae, having run
close under her, she struck against her violently amidships, just
beneath the thole of the topmost bank of oars, and got fast
jammed on to her, the steersman being unable to check the way
of his ship. The result was that, by this craft hanging suspended to her, she became unmanageable and unable to turn
one way or another. While in this plight, two quinqueremes
charged her on both sides at once, and destroyed the vessel itself and the fighting men on her deck,
among whom fell Democrates, Philip's admiral. At the same time Dionysodorus and
Deinocrates, who were brothers and joint-admirals of the fleet of
Attalus, charged, the one upon a seven-banked, the other upon an
eight-banked ship of the enemy, and had a most extraordinary
adventure in the battle.
Deinocrates, in the
first place, came into collision with an eightbanked ship, and had his ship struck above the water-line; for
the enemy's ship had its prow built high; but he struck the
enemy's ship below the water-line,
2
and at first could not get himself clear, though he tried again and again to back water;
and, accordingly, when the Macedonian boarded him and fought
with great gallantry, he was brought into the most imminent
danger. Presently, upon Attalus coming to his aid, and by a
vigorous charge separating the two ships, Deinocrates unexpectedly found himself free, and the enemy's boarders were all
killed after a gallant resistance, while their own vessel being
left without men was captured by Attalus.
In
the next place, Dionysodorus, making a furious
charge, missed his blow; but running up alongside of the enemy
lost all the oars on his right side, and had the timbers supporting his towers smashed to pieces,
and was thereupon immediately surrounded by the enemy. In the midst of loud shouts
and great confusion, all the rest of his marines perished along
with the ship, but he himself with two others managed to
escape by swimming to the
triemiolia which was coming up to
the rescue.
The Sea-Battle Undecided
The fight between the rest of the fleet, however, was an
The skill of the Rhodian sailors. |
undecided one; for the superiority in the numbers of Philip's galleys was compensated for by
Attalus's superiority in the number of his decked
ships. Thus on the right wing of Philip's fleet the state of
things was that the ultimate result was doubtful, but that, of
the two, Attalus had the better hope of victory. As for the
Rhodians, they were, at first starting, as I have said, far behind
the enemy, but being much their superiors in speed they managed
to come up with the rear of the Macedonians. At first they
charged the vessels on the stern as they were retiring, and broke
off their oars; but upon Philip's ships swinging round and
beginning to bring help to those in danger, while those of the
Rhodians who had started later than the rest reached the
squadron of Theophiliscus, both parties turned their ships in line
prow to prow and charged gallantly, inciting each other to fresh
exertions by the sound of trumpets and loud cheers. Had
not the Macedonians placed their galleys between the opposing
lines of decked ships, the battle would have been quickly decided; but, as it was, these proved a hindrance to the Rhodians
in various ways. For as soon as the first charge had disturbed
the original order of the ships, they became all mixed up with
each other in complete confusion, which made it difficult to
sail through the enemy's line or to avail themselves of the
points in which they were superior, because the galleys kept
running sometimes against the blades of their oars so as to
hinder the rowing, and sometimes upon their prows, or again
upon their sterns, thus hampering the service of steerers and
rowers alike. In the direct charges, however, the Rhodians
employed a particular manœuvre. By depressing their bows
they received the blows of the enemy above the water-line,
while by staving in the enemy's ships below the water-line they
rendered the blows fatal. Still it was rarely that they succeeded
in doing this, for, as a rule, they avoided collisions, because the
Macedonians fought gallantly from their decks when they came
to close quarters. Their most frequent manœuvre was to row
through the Macedonian line, and disable the enemy's ships by
breaking off their oars, and then, rowing round into position,
again charge the enemy on the stern, or catch them broadside
as they were in the act of turning; and thus they either stove
them in or broke away some necessary part of their rigging.
By this manner of fighting they destroyed a great number of
the enemy's ships.
Attalus Barely Escapes Capture
But the most brilliant and hazardous exploits were those
Further incidents in the fight on the left wing. The Rhodian admiral Theophiliscus mortally wounded. |
of three quinqueremes: the flagship on which
Theophiliscus sailed, then that commanded by
Philostratus, and lastly the one steered by
Autolycus, and on board of which was Nicostratus. This last charged an enemy's ship,
and left its beak sticking in it. The ship thus
struck sank with all hands; but Autolycus and his comrades,
as the sea poured into his vessel through the prow, was surrounded by the enemy. For a time they defended themselves
gallantly, but at last Autolycus himself was wounded, and fell
overboard in his armour, while the rest of the marines were
killed fighting bravely. While this was going on, Theophiliscus
came to the rescue with three quinqueremes, and though he
could not save the ship, because it was now full of water, he
yet stove in three hostile vessels, and forced their marines
overboard. Being quickly surrounded by a number of galleys
and decked ships, he lost the greater number of his marines
after a gallant struggle on their part; and after receiving three
wounds himself, and performing prodigies of valour, just
managed to get his own ship safely off with the assistance
of Philostratus, who came to his aid and bravely took his share
of the danger. Having thus rejoined his own squadron, he
darted out once more and ran in upon the enemy, utterly
prostrated in body by his wounds, but more dashing and
vehement in spirit than before.
So that there were really two sea-fights going on at a considerable distance from each other. For the right wing of
Philip's fleet, continually making for land in accordance with
his original plan, was not far from the Asiatic coast; while
the left wing, having to veer round to support the ships on
the rear, were engaged with the Rhodians at no great distance
from Chios.
Attalus Abandons his Ship but Escapes
As the fleet of Attalus, however, was rapidly overpowering the right wing of Philip, and was now approaching the small islands, under cover of
Attalus intercepted by Philip, and forced to abandon his ship. |
which Philip was moored watching the result
of the battle, Attalus saw one of his quinqueremes staved in and in the act of being sunk by an
enemy's ship. He therefore hurried to its assistance with two
quadriremes. The enemy's ship turning to flight, and making
for the shore, he pursued it somewhat too eagerly in his
ardent desire to effect its capture. Thereupon Philip, observing that Attalus had become detached a considerable distance
from his own fleet, took four quinqueremes and three
hemioliae,
as well as all the galleys within reach, and darting out got between Attalus and his ships, and forced him in the utmost
terror to run his three ships ashore. After this mishap the
king himself and his crew made their way to Erythrae, while
Philip captured his vessels and the royal equipage on board
them. For in this emergency Attalus had employed an artifice. He caused the most splendid articles of the royal
equipage to be spread out on the deck of his ship; the consequence of which was that the first Macedonians who arrived on
the galleys, seeing a quantity of flagons and purple robes and
such like things, abandoned the pursuit, and turned their attention to plundering these. Thus it came about that Attalus
got safe away to Erythrae; while Philip, though he had distinctly got the worst of it in the general engagement, was so
elated at the unexpected reverse which had befallen Attalus,
that he put to sea again and exerted himself strenuously in
collecting his ships and restoring the spirits of his men by
assuring them that they were the victors. For when they
saw Philip put to sea towing off the royal ship, they very
naturally thought that Attalus had perished. But Dionysodorus, conjecturing what had really happened to the king, set
about collecting his own ships by raising a signal; and this
being speedily done, he sailed away unmolested
to their station in Asia.
Meanwhile those
Macedonians who were engaged with the
Rhodians, having been for some time past in evil case, were
gradually extricating themselves from the battle, one after the
other retiring on the pretence of being anxious to support their
comrades. So the Rhodians, taking in tow some of their
vessels, and having destroyed others by charging them, sailed
away to Chios.
Losses in the Battle
In the battle with Attalus Philip had had destroyed a
B. C. 201. The losses in the battle. |
ten-banked, a nine-banked, a seven-banked, and
a six-banked ship, ten other decked vessels, three
triemioliae, twenty-five galleys and their crews.
In the battle with the Rhodians ten decked vessels and
about forty galleys. While two quadriremes and seven
galleys with their crews were captured. In the fleet of Attalus
one
triemiolia and two quinqueremes were sunk, while two
quadriremes besides that of the king were captured. Of the
Rhodian fleet two quinqueremes and a trireme were destroyed,
but no ship was taken. Of men the Rhodians lost sixty,
Attalus seventy; while Philip lost three thousand Macedonians and six thousand rowers. And of the Macedonians
and their allies two thousand were taken prisoners, and of
their opponents six hundred.
Philip Vainly Claims the Victory At Chios
Such was the end of the battle of Chios; in which
Philip vainly pretends that he won the battle. |
Philip claimed the victory on two pretexts.
First, because he had driven Attalus ashore and
had captured his ship; and secondly, because,
as he had anchored at the promontory of Argennum, he had
the credit of having taken up his anchorage where the wrecks
were floating. He acted in accordance with this assertion
next day by collecting the wrecks, and causing the corpses
which could be recognised to be picked up for burial, all for
the sake of strengthening this pretence. For that he did not
himself believe that he had won was shortly afterwards proved
by the Rhodians and Dionysodorus. For on that very next
day, while he was actually engaged on these operations, after
communication with each other they sailed out to attack him,
but, on nobody putting out to meet them, they returned to
Chios. Philip indeed had never before lost so many men
either by land or sea at one time, and was extremely mortified
at what had happened and had lost much of his spirit for the
enterprise. To the outside world, however, he tried to conceal his real sentiments: though this was forbidden by facts.
Besides everything else, what happened after the battle impressed all who saw it too strongly. For the slaughter and
destruction was so great that, on the day of battle itself the
whole strait was filled with corpses, blood, arms, and
wrecks; while on the subsequent days the strands might be
seen piled up with all these together in wild confusion.
Hence the extreme consternation of the king could not be
confined to himself, but was shared by all his Macedonians.
Death of Theophiliscus
Theophiliscus survived for one day; and then having
written a despatch home with an account of the
battle, and appointed Cleonaeus to succeed him
in his command, died from his wounds. He had
shown great valour in the engagement, and his far-sighted policy
deserves to be remembered. If it had not been for his boldness in attacking Philip in time, all the allies would have let
the opportunity pass, in terror at Philip's audacity. But by
beginning the war as he did he forced his countrymen to seize
the opportunity, and compelled Attalus not to lose time in
mere preparatory measures for war, but to go to war energetically and grapple with the danger.
The Rhodians, therefore, were quite right to pay him, even after his death, such
honours as were incentives, not only to men living at the time,
but to future generations also, to prompt service in their
country's cause.
The Indecisive Battle of Chios Was Followed by Another Off Lade, in Which Philip Was Partly Successful3
After the battle of Lade, the Rhodians being out of
his way, and Attalus not having yet appeared on the scene, it
is clear that Philip might have accomplished his voyage to
Alexandria. And here we have evidence stronger than any
other of Philip's infatuation in acting as he did. What, then,
prevented his design? Nothing in the world but what always
occurs in the natural course of affairs. For at a distance
many men at times desire the impossible from the extravagant
prospects it holds out, their ambition over-mastering their reason;
but when they approach the moment of action they quite
as irrationally abandon their purpose, because their calculations are obscured and confused by the embarrassments and
difficulties which meet them.
Philip's Operations in Caria, B.C. 201
Having made some assaults which proved abortive
The stratagem by which Philip took Prinassus. |
owing to the strength of the place, Philip went
away again, plundering the forts and villages in
the country. Thence he marched to Prinassus
and pitched his camp under its wall. Having promptly got ready
his pent-houses and other siege artillery, he began to attempt the
town by mines. This plan proving impracticable, owing to
the rocky nature of the soil, he contrived the following stratagem. During the day he caused a noise to be made under
ground, as though the mines were being worked at; while
during the night he caused earth to be brought and piled up
at the mouth of the mine, in order that the men in the city,
by calculating the quantity of earth thrown up, might become
alarmed. At first the Prinassians held out bravely: but when
Philip sent them a message informing them that he had underpinned two plethra of their walls, and asking them whether
they preferred to march out with their lives, or one and all
to perish with their town when he set fire to the props, then
at last, believing that what he said was true, they surrendered
the city.
Description of Iassus
The town of Iassus is situated in Asia on the gulf
Legends of Iassus and Bargylia. |
between the temple of Poseidmen, the territory
of Miletus, and the city of Myndus, called the
gulf [of Iassus by some]. but by most the gulf of
Bargylia from the names of the cities built upon its inner coast.
The Iassians boast of being originally colonists from Argos,
and more recently from Miletus, their ancestors having invited
to their town the son of Neleus, the founder of Miletus, owing
to their losses in the war with the Carians. The size of the
town is ten stades. Among the people of Bargylia it is a
common report widely believed that the statue of the Kindyan
Artemis, though in the open air, is never touched by snow or
rain; and the same belief is held among the Iassians as to
the Artemis Astias.
4 All these stories have been repeated by
certain historians. But, for my part, I have in the whole
course of my work set myself against such statements of our
historiographers and have had no toleration for them. For it
appears to me that such tales are only fit to amuse children,
when they transgress not only the limits of probability but even
those of possibility. For instance, to say that certain bodies
when placed in full light cast no shadow argues a state of quite
deplorable folly. But Theopompus has done this; for he
says that those who enter the holy precinct of Zeus in Arcadia
cast no shadow, which is on a par with the statements to
which I have just referred. Now, in so far as such tales tend
to preserve the reverence of the vulgar for religion, a certain
allowance may be made for some historians when they record
these miraculous legends. But they must not be allowed to go
too far. Perhaps it is difficult to assign a limit in such a
matter; still it is not impossible. Therefore, in my judgment,
such displays of ignorance and delusion should be pardoned
if they do not go very far, but anything like extravagance in
them should be rejected.
Affairs in Greece
I have already described the deliberate policy of Nabis,
tyrant of the Lacedaemonians; how he drove
the citizens into exile, freed the slaves, and gave
them the wives and daughters of their masters.
How also, by opening his kingdom as a kind of inviolable
sanctuary for all who fled from their own countries, he collected a number of bad characters in Sparta.
I will now
proceed to tell how in the same period, being in alliance with
Aetolians, Eleans, and Messenians, and being bound by oaths
and treaties to support one and all of those
peoples in case of any one attacking them, he
yet in utter contempt of these obligations determined to make
a treacherous attack on Messene.
Digression on the Merits of the Historians Zeno and Antisthenes of Rhodes
As some episodical historians have written on the
The necessity of discussing the histories of Zeno and Antisthenes. |
period which embraces the affair at Messene and the sea-fights
already described, it is my intention to discuss them briefly.
I will not however speak of them all, but only those whom I
suppose to be worthy of commemoration and full discussion.
These are the Rhodian writers Zeno and Antisthenes, whom I judge to deserve this distinction,
for more than one reason. They were contemporary with the events, and were engaged in
practical politics; and, lastly, they composed their histories
with no view to gain, but for the sake of fame, and as part of
the business of politicians. Since then they write of the same
events as myself, I cannot omit mentioning them; lest, from
the reputation of their country, and the idea that naval affairs
are peculiarly the province of Rhodians, some students may
prefer their authority to mine where I differ from them.
Now both these writers, to begin with, describe the
battle of
Their description of the battle of Lade. See ch. 10. |
Lade as not less severe than that of Chios, but
more fiercely and daringly contested, both in
detail and as a whole, and finally assert that the
victory was with the Rhodians. For my part I should be
inclined to allow that historians must show some partiality to
their own countries; not however that they should state what
is exactly opposite to the facts regarding them. There are
quite enough mistakes which writers make from ignorance,
and which it is difficult for poor human nature to avoid: but
if we deliberately write what is false for the sake of country,
friends, or favour, how do we differ from those who do the
same to get a living? For as the latter, by measuring everything by the standard of private gain, ruin the credit of their
works, so your politicians often fall into the same discredit by
yielding to the influence of hatred or affection. Therefore
readers ought to be jealously watchful on this head; while
writers ought to be on their guard for their own sakes.
The Battle of Lade According to Zeno and Antisthenes
The present matter is an example. When coming to details
of the battle of Lade, these writers confess that in it "two
quinqueremes of Rhodes were captured by the enemy; and that
upon one ship raising its studding-sail to escape from the conflict,
owing to its having being staved in and shipping sea, many of
the vessels near it did the same and made for the open sea; and
that at last the admiral, being left with only a few vessels, was
forced to follow their example. That for the present they were
forced by unfavourable winds to drop anchor on the territory of
Myndus, but next day put to sea and crossed to Cos; while the
enemy, having secured the quinqueremes, landed at Lade and
took up their quarters in the Rhodian camp: that, moreover,
the Milesians, deeply impressed by what had taken place, presented not only Philip, but Heracleides also, with a garland
of victory on his entrance to their territory." And yet, though
they give all these particulars, which all evidently indicate the
losing side, they still declare the Rhodians to have been victorious both in particular combats and in the whole battle; and
that too in spite of the fact that the original despatch from the
admiral concerning the battle, sent to the Senate and Prytanies,
still exists in their Prytaneium, which testifies to the truth, not
of the statements of Antisthenes and Zeno, but of mine.
Zeno's Account of the Attack on Messene
Next as to their account of the treacherous attempt
Zeno's account of the attack of Nabis upon Messene. See ch. 13. |
upon Messene. Zeno says that "Nabis started
from Sparta, crossed the Eurotas near the tributary called the Hoplites, and advanced along
the narrow road past Poliasium until he arrived
at Sallasia, thence past Pharae to Thalamae, and
so to the river Pamisus." About which I do not know what to
say. It is just as if one were to say that a man started from
Corinth and marched through the Isthmus and arrived at the
Scironean way, and then came straight to the Contoporian road,
and journeyed past Mycenae to Argos. For such a statement
would not be merely slightly wrong but wholly contradictory.
For the Isthmus and the Scironian rocks are east of Corinth,
while the Contoporian road and Mycenae are nearly due
south-west; so that it is completely impossible to go by way
of the former to the latter. The same may be said about
Lacedaemon; for the Eurotas and Sallasia are to the northeast of Sparta, while Thalamae, Pharae, and the Pamisus are
to the south-west. Therefore it is not possible to go to
Sallasia, nor necessary to cross the Eurotas, if a man means to
go to Messenia by way of Thalamae.
Some of Zeno's Mistakes Due to Ignorance
Besides these mistakes, he says that Nabis started on
his return from Messenia by the gate on the road to Tegea.
This is another absurdity; for Megalopolis is between Tegea
and Messene, so that it is impossible that a gate at Messene
should be called the "Gate to Tegea." The fact is that there
is a gate there called the "Tegean Gate," by which Nabis
commenced his return; and this led Zeno into the mistake of
supposing that Tegea was near Messene, which is not the
fact: for the Laconian territory, as well as that of Megalopolis,
lies between that of Messene and Tegea. Lastly, he says
that the Alpheus flows underground from its source for a
considerable distance, and comes up near Lycoa, in Arcadia.
The truth is that this river does go down underground not far
from its source, and, after remaining hidden for about ten
stades, comes up again, and then flows through the territory
of Megalopolis, at first with a gentle stream, and then gaining
volume, and watering that whole district in a splendid manner
for two hundred stades, at length reaches Lycoa, swollen by
the tributary stream of the Lusius, and become unfordable
and deep. . . .
However, I think that the points I have mentioned,
though all of them blunders, admit of some palliation and
excuse; for the latter arose from mere ignorance, those connected with the sea-fight from patriotic affection. But is it
not then a fault in Zeno, that he does not bestow as much
pains on investigating the truth and thoroughly mastering his
subject, as upon the ornaments of style; and shows on many
occasions that he particularly plumes himself on this, as many
other famous writers do? To my mind it is quite right to take
great care and pay great attention to the presentation of one's
facts in correct and adequate language, for this contributes in
no small degree to the effectiveness of history; still I do not
think that serious writers should regard it as their primary
and most important object. Far from it. Quite other are the
parts of his history on which a practical politician should
rather pride himself.
Zeno's Account of the Battle of Panium
The best illustration of what I mean will be the
Zeno's account of the battle of Panium between Antiochus the Great and Scopas, B. C. 201. |
following. This same writer, in his account of the siege of
Gaza and Antiochus's pitched battle with Scopas
in Coele-Syria, at Mount Panium,
5 showed such
extreme anxiety about ornaments of style, that
he made it quite impossible even for professional
rhetoricians or mob-orators to outstrip him in
theatrical effect; while he showed such a contempt of facts,
as once more amounted to unsurpassable carelessness and inaccuracy. For, intending to describe the first
position in the field taken up by Scopas, he says that
"the right extremity of his line, together with a few cavalry,
rested on the slope of the mountain; while its left with
all the cavalry belonging to this wing, was in the plains
below. That Antiochus, just before the morning watch,
despatched his elder son Antiochus with a division of his army
to occupy the high ground which commanded the enemy;
and that at daybreak he led the rest of his army across the
river which flowed between the two camps, and drew them up
on the plain: arranging his heavy-armed infantry in one line,
facing the enemy's centre, and his cavalry, some on the right
and the rest on the left wing of the phalanx, among which
were the heavy-armed horsemen, under the sole command of
the younger of the king's sons Antiochus. That in advance
of this line he stationed the elephants at certain intervals, and
the Tarentines
6 commanded by Antipater; while he filled up
the spaces between the elephants with archers and slingers.
And finally, that he took up his own station on the rear of the
elephants with a squadron of household cavalry and bodyguards." After this preliminary description he continues: "The
younger Antiochus"—whom he had described as being on the
level ground with the heavy-armed cavalry—"charged down
from the high ground and put to flight and pursued the cavalry
under Ptolemy, son of Aeropus, who was in command of the
Aetolians in the plain on the left wing; but the two lines,
when they met, maintained a stubborn fight." But he fails to
observe that, as the elephants, cavalry, and light-armed infantry
were in front, the two lines could not possibly meet at all.
Zeno's Description Implausible
Next he says that "the phalanx, outmatched in
agility and forced backwards by the Aetolians, retired step
by step, while the elephants received the retreating line, and
did great service in charging the enemy." But how the
elephants got on the rear of the phalanx it is not easy to
understand, or how, if they had got there, they could have
done good service. For as soon as the two lines were once
at close quarters, the animals would no longer have been able
to distinguish friend from foe among those that came in their
way. Again, he says that "the Aetolian cavalry were thrown
into a panic during the engagement, because they were unaccustomed to the look of the elephants." But, by his own
account, the cavalry which was originally stationed on the
right wing remained unbroken; while the other division of
the cavalry, that on the right wing, had all fled before the
successful attack of Antiochus. What portion of the cavalry
was it, then, that was on the centre of the phalanx, and was
terrified by the elephants? And where was the king, or what
part did he take in the battle, seeing that he had with him
the very flower of the infantry and cavalry? For not a word
has been told us about these. And where was the elder
of the young Antiochi, who, with a division of the troops, occupied the high ground? For this prince is not represented even
as returning to his quarters after the battle. And very naturally so. For Zeno started by assuming two sons of the king
named Antiochus, whereas there was only one in the army
on that occasion. How comes it, again, that according to
him, Scopas returned first and also last from the field? For
he says: "when he saw the younger Antiochus, after returning from the pursuit, on the rear of his phalanx,
and accordingly gave up all hopes of victory, he retired." But afterwards
he says that "he sustained the most imminent peril when his
phalanx got surrounded by the elephants and cavalry, and
was the last man to retire from the field."
Zeno Acknowledges His Error
These and similar blunders appear to me to reflect
very great discredit upon writers. It is necessary, therefore,
to endeavour to make one's self master of all departments of
history alike. That is the ideal; but if that is impossible, one
ought at least to be excessively careful on the most essential
and important points in it. I have been induced to say this
because I have observed that in history, as in other arts and
sciences, there is a tendency to neglect the true and essential,
while the ostentatious and the showy secure praise and emulation as something great and admirable. The fact being that
in history, as in other departments of literature, these latter
qualities require less trouble and gain a cheaper reputation.
As to his ignorance of the topography of
Laconia, considering that his error was an important one, I did not hesitate to write to Zeno
personally.
Polybius wrote to Zeno on his geographical mistakes. |
For I thought it a point of honour
not to look upon the mistakes of others as personal triumphs,
as is the way with some writers; but to do the best I could to
secure correctness, not only of my own historical writings, but
of those of others also, for the benefit of the world at large.
When Zeno received my letter and found that it was impossible
to make the correction, because his history was already published,
he was much vexed, but could do nothing. He, however, put the
most friendly interpretation on my proceeding; and, in regard
to this point, I would beg my own readers, whether of my
own or future generations, if I am ever detected in making a
deliberate misstatement, and disregarding truth in any part of
my history, to criticise me unmercifully; but if I do so from
lack of information, to make allowances: and I ask it for
myself more than others, owing to the size of my history and
the extent of ground covered by its transactions. . . .
Egypt — Character of Tlepolemus
Tlepolemus,
7 the chief minister in the kingdom of
Character and extravagance of Tlepolemus. |
Egypt, was a young man, but one who had
spent all his life in the camp, and with reputation. By nature aspiring and ambitious, he had
done much that was glorious in the service of his country,
but much that was evil also. As a general in a campaign, and
as an administrator of military expeditions, he was a man of
great ability, high natural courage, and extremely well fitted to
deal personally with soldiers. But on the other hand, for the
management of complicated affairs, he was deficient in diligence
and sobriety, and had the least faculty in the world for the
keeping of money or the economical administration of finance.
And it was this that before long not only caused his own fall,
but seriously damaged the kingdom as well. For though he
had complete control of the exchequer, he spent the greater
part of the day in playing ball and in matches in martial
exercises with the young men; and directly he left these
sports he collected drinking parties, and spent the greater part
of his life in these amusements and with these associates.
But that part of his day which he devoted to business, he
employed in distributing, or, I might rather say, in throwing
away the royal treasures among the envoys from Greece
and the Dionysian actors, and, more than all, among
the officers and soldiers of the palace guard. He was utterly
incapable of saying no, and bestowed anything there was at
hand on any one who said anything to please him. The evil
which he himself thus began continually increased. For
every one who had received a favour expressed his gratitude
in extravagant language, both for the sake of what he had got
and of what he hoped to get in the future. And thus being
informed of the universal praise which was bestowed on him,
of the toasts proposed in his honour at banquets, of complimentary inscriptions, and songs sung in his praise by the
public singers all through the town, he became entirely befooled, and grew daily more and more puffed up with conceit,
and more reckless in squandering favours upon foreigners and
soldiers.
Intrigues At Alexandria
These proceedings were very offensive to the other
Tlepolemus suppresses a court intrigue against himself. |
members of the court; and, therefore, they
watched everything he did with a jealous eye,
and conceived a detestation for his insolence,
which they began to compare unfavourably with
the character of Sosibius. For the latter was considered to
show more wisdom in his guardianship of the king than his age
gave reason to expect; and, in his dealings with other persons,
to maintain the dignity proper to his high trust, which was the
royal seal and person. Just at this time, Ptolemy, the son of
Sosibius, returned from his mission to Philip. Before he left
Alexandria on his voyage, he had been full of foolish pride,
partly from his own natural disposition and partly from his
father's success. But upon landing in Macedonia, and mixing with the young men at court, he conceived the notion
that the virtue of the Macedonians consisted in the better
fashion of their boots and clothes; he therefore came home
got up in imitation of all these peculiarities, and fully persuaded that his foreign tour and association with Macedonians
had made a man of him. He therefore immediately began
showing jealousy of Tlepolemus, and inveighing against him;
and as all the courtiers joined him, on the ground that
Tlepolemus was treating the business and revenue of the
state as though he were its heir and not its guardian, the
quarrel quickly grew. Meanwhile Tlepolemus, being informed of certain unfriendly speeches, originating in the
jealous observation and malignity of the courtiers, at first
turned a deaf ear to them and affected to despise them; but
when at length they ventured to hold a meeting and openly
express their disapproval of him in his absence, on the ground
of his maladministration of the government of the kingdom,
he grew angry; and, summoning the council, came forward
and said that "they brought their accusations against him
secretly and in private, but he judged it right to accuse them
in public and face to face." . . .
After making his public speech, Tlepolemus deprived
Sosibius of the custody of the seal also, and having got that
into his hands, thenceforth conducted the administration exactly as he chose. . . .
The War in Coele-Syria
It seems to me to be at once just and proper to
B.C. 201. Valour of the people of Gaza. |
give the people of Gaza
8 the praise which
they deserve. For though they do not differ
as to bravery in war from the rest of the
inhabitants of Coele-Syria, yet as parties to an international
agreement, and in their fidelity to their promises, they
far surpass them, and show altogether a courage in such
matters that is irresistible. In the first place, when all the
other people were terrified at the invasion of the Persians,
9 in
view of the greatness of their power, and one and all submitted
themselves and their countries to the Medes, they alone faced the
danger and stood a siege.
Again, on the invasion
of Alexander, when not only did the other cities
surrender, but even Tyre was stormed and its inhabitants sold
into slavery; and when it seemed all but hopeless for any to
escape destruction, who resisted the fierce and violent attack
of Alexander, they alone of all the Syrians withstood him,
and tested their powers of defence to the uttermost. Following the same line of conduct on the present occasion, they
omitted nothing within their power in their determination to
keep faith with Ptolemy. Therefore, just as we distinguish by
special mention in our history individuals of eminent virtue,
so ought we, in regard to states as such, to mention with
commendation those which act nobly in any point from traditional principles and deliberate policy. . . .
Scipio's Triumph
Italy (Livy, 30, 45)
Publius Scipio returned from Libya soon after the
Scipio's return to Rome and triumph, B. C. 201, cp. 15. 19. |
events I have narrated. The expectation of the
people concerning him was proportionable to
the magnitude of his achievements: and the
splendour of his reception, and the signs of
popular favour which greeted him were extraordinary. Nor
was this otherwise than reasonable and proper. For after
despairing of ever driving Hannibal from Italy, or of averting
that danger from themselves and their kinsfolk, they now
looked on themselves as not only securely removed from every
fear and every menace of attack, but as having conquered their
enemies. Their joy therefore knew no bounds; and when
Scipio came into the city in triumph, and the actual sight of
the prisoners who formed the procession brought still more
clearly to their memories the dangers of the past, they became
almost wild in the expression of their thanks to the gods, and
their affection for the author of such a signal change. For
among the prisoners who were led in the triumphal procession
was Syphax, the king of the Masaesylii, who shortly afterwards
died in prison. The triumph concluded, the citizens celebrated games and festivals for several days running with great
splendour, Scipio, in his magnificent liberality, supplying the
cost. . . .
War Between Rome and Philip V
At the beginning of the winter in which Publius Sulpicius was elected consul at Rome, king Philip,
Winter of B.C. 201-200. Coss. P. Sulpicius, Galba, Maximus II., C. Aurelius. Cotta (for B.C. 200). |
who was staying at Bargylia, was rendered exceedingly uneasy and filled with many conflicting anxieties for the future, when he
observed that the Rhodians and Attalus, far
from dismissing their navy, were actually manning additional ships and paying more earnest
attention than ever to guarding the coasts.
He had a double
cause, indeed, for uneasiness: he was afraid of
sailing from Bargylia, and foresaw that he would
have to encounter danger at sea; and at the same time he
was not satisfied with the state of things in Macedonia, and
therefore was unwilling on any consideration to spend the
winter in Asia, being afraid both of the Aetolians and the
Romans; for he was fully aware of the embassies sent to
Rome to denounce him [as soon as it was known] that the
war in Libya was ended.
and the starving state of his army. |
These considerations caused him
overwhelming perplexity; but he was compelled for the
present to remain where he was, leading the life of a wolf, to
use the common expression: for he robbed and stole from
some, and used force to others, while he did
violence to his nature by fawning on others, because his army was suffering from famine; and
by these means managed sometimes to get meat to eat, sometimes figs, and sometimes nothing but a very short allowance
of corn. Some of these provisions were supplied to him by
Zeuxis, and some by the people of Mylae, Alabanda, and
Magnesia, whom he flattered whenever they gave him anything, and barked at and plotted against when they did not.
Finally, he made a plot to seize Mylae by the agency of
Philocles, but failed from the clumsiness with which the
scheme was contrived. The territory of Alabanda he harried
as though it were an enemy's, alleging that it was imperatively
necessary to get food for his troops. . . .
When this Philip, father of Perseus, was thus overrunning
Asia, being unable to get provisions for his army, he accepted
a present of figs from the Magnesians, as they had no corn.
For which reason, when he conquered Myus, he granted its
territory to the Magnesians in return for their figs. . . .
King Attalus At Athens
The Athenian people sent envoys to king Attalus, both
The visit of Attalus to Athens, B.C. 200. |
to thank him for the past, and to urge him to
come to Athens to consult with them on the
dangers that still threatened them.
10 The king
was informed a few days afterwards that Roman ambassadors
had arrived at the Peiraeus; and, believing that it was necessary to have an interview with them, he put to sea in haste.
The Athenian people, being informed of his coming, passed very
liberal votes as to the reception and general entertainment of the
king. Arrived at the Peiraeus, Attalus spent the first day in
transacting business with the Roman ambassadors, and was extremely delighted to find that they were fully mindful of their
ancient alliance with him, and quite prepared for the war with
Philip. Next morning, in company with the Romans and the
Athenian magistrates, he began his progress to the city in
great state. For he was met, not only by all the magistrates
and the knights, but by all the citizens with their children and
wives. And when the two processions met, the warmth of the
welcome given by the populace to the Romans, and still more
to Attalus, could not have been exceeded. At his entrance
into the city by the gate Dipylum the priests and priestesses
lined the street on both sides: all the temples were then
thrown open; victims were placed ready at all the altars; and
the king was requested to offer sacrifice. Finally they voted
him such high honours as they had never without great hesitation voted to any of their former benefactors: for, in addition
to other compliments, they named a tribe after Attalus, and
classed him among their eponymous heroes.
Athens Votes for War Against Philip
They next summoned an ecclesia and invited the king
The Athenians vote for war against Philip. |
to address them. But upon his excusing himself, on the plea that it would be ill-bred for him
to appear before the people and recount his
own good services in the presence of those on whom they had
been bestowed, they gave up asking for his personal appearance; but begged him to give them a written statement as to
what he thought was the best thing to do in view of the existing circumstances. On his consenting to do this, and writing
the document, the magistrates produced the despatch to the
ecclesia. The contents of this written communication were
briefly these: he recalled the good services he had done the
people in the past; enumerated the things he had accomplished in the existing war against Philip; and lastly exhorted
them to activity in this war, and protested that, if they did not
determine resolutely to adopt this policy of hostility to Philip
in common with the Rhodians, Romans, and himself, and yet
afterwards wished to share in the benefits which had been
secured by others, they would miss securing the true interests
of their country. As soon as this despatch had been read, the
people, influenced both by its contents and by their warm
feeling towards Attalus, were prepared to vote the war: and
when the Rhodians also entered and argued at great length
to the same effect, the Athenians at once decreed the
war against Philip. They gave the Rhodians also a magnificent reception, honoured their state with a crown of
valour, and voted all Rhodians equal rights of citizenship at
Athens, on the ground of their having, besides other things,
restored the Athenian ships which had been captured with
the men on board them. After concluding this arrangement,
the Rhodian ambassadors sailed to Ceos with their fleet to
visit the islands. . . .
The Romans Warn Philip Not to Attack Greece
While the Roman ambassadors were still at Athens,
The Romans warn Philip to abstain from attacking Greece, and to do justice to Attalus, on pain of war. |
Nicanor, by the command of Philip, made a
raid upon Attica, and came as far as the Academy.
Thereupon the Romans sent a herald
to him, and bade him announce to his master
Philip that "The Romans admonished him to
make no war upon any Greek State, and to
submit to an arbitration before a fair tribunal as to the injuries
he had inflicted upon Attalus: that, if he did this, he might
have peace with Rome, but, if he refused to obey, the opposite
would immediately follow." On the receipt of this message
Nicanor retired. Then the Romans sailed along the coast of
Epirus and delivered a similar announcement in regard to
Philip in the town of Phoenice; also to Amynandrus in the
district of Athamania; also to the Aetolians in Naupactus, and
the Achaeans in Aegium. And having thus by the mouth of
Nicanor given Philip this clear warning, the Roman envoys
themselves sailed away to visit Antiochus and Ptolemy with a
view to settle their controversies. . . .
Activity and Energy of Philip
It appears to me that to make a good beginning, and
The firmness and vigour of Philip in meeting the danger. |
even to maintain enthusiasm long enough to
secure a considerable measure of success, is an
achievement of which many have been found
capable; but to carry a purpose through to its
end, and, even though fortune be adverse, to make up by cool
reason for the deficiency of enthusiasm is within the power of
few. From this point of view one cannot but disparage the
inactivity of Attalus and the Rhodians, while regarding with
admiration the royal and lofty spirit displayed by Philip, and
his constancy to his purpose,—not meaning to speak in praise
of his character as a whole, but simply commending the
vigour with which he acted on this occasion. I make this
distinction to prevent any one supposing that I contradict
myself, because I recently praised Attalus and the Rhodians
and found fault with Philip, whereas I am now doing
the reverse.
This is just such a case as I
referred to at the beginning of my history, when
I said that it was necessary sometimes to praise, and sometimes to blame the same persons, since it frequently happens
that changes of circumstances for the worse and calamities alter
men's original dispositions, and frequently also changes for the
better; and sometimes too it is the case that from natural
temperament men are at one time inclined to what is right, at
another to the reverse. And it is a variation of this sort that
I think occurred to Philip in this instance. For, irritated by
his defeats, and influenced in a great degree by anger and
passion, he addressed himself with a kind of insane or inspired
eagerness to meet the dangers of the hour; and it was in this
spirit that he rose to the attack upon the Rhodians and king
Attalus, and gained the successes which followed. I was induced
to make these remarks, because I observe that some men, like
bad runners in the stadium, abandon their purposes when close
to the goal; while it is at that particular point, more than at any
other, that others secure the victory over their rivals. . . .
The Hellespont Compared with Gibraltar
Philip was anxious to anticipate the Romans in
seizing bases of operation and landing-places
in this country (Asia). . . .
In order that, if it should be his purpose again to cross to
Asia, he might have a landing-place at Abydos.
The position of Abydos and Sestos, and the advantages of
The Dardanelles compared with the Straits of Gibraltar. |
the situation of those towns it would, I think,
be waste of time for me to state in great detail,
because the singularity of those sites has made
them familiar to all persons of intelligence. Still
I imagine that it will not be otherwise than useful to remind
my readers briefly of the facts, by way of attracting their attention. A man would best realise the advantages of these cities,
not by regarding their sites by themselves, but by comparing
and contrasting them with those about to be mentioned. For
just as it is impossible to sail from the Ocean,—or as some
call it the Atlantic,—into our sea, except by passing between
the Pillars of Heracles, so is it impossible to sail from our sea
into the Propontis and the Pontus except through the channel
separating Sestos and Abydos. But as though Fortune had
designed these two straits to counterbalance each other, the
passage between the Pillars of Heracles is many times as broad
as that of the Hellespont,—the former being sixty, the latter two
stades; the reason being, as far as one may conjecture, the
great superiority in size of the external Ocean to our sea: while
the channel at Abydos is more convenient than that at the
Pillars of Heracles. For the former being lined on both sides
by human habitations is of the nature of a gate admitting
mutual intercourse, sometimes being bridged over by those
who determine to cross on foot, and at all times admitting a
passage by sea. But the channel at the Pillars of Heracles is
seldom used, and by very few persons, owing to the lack of
intercourse between the tribes inhabiting those remote parts of
Libya and Europe, and owing to the scantiness of our knowledge of the external Ocean. The city of Abydos itself is
enclosed on both sides by two European promontories, and
possesses a harbour capable of sheltering ships anchoring in it
from every wind; while there is no possibility of anchoring at
any point near the city outside the harbour mouth, owing to the
rapidity and violence of the current setting through the strait.
The Siege of Abydos
Having then invested Abydos partly by a palisade and
partly by an earthwork, Philip began blockading
it by land and sea together. This siege was not
at all remarkable for the extent of the machinery employed,
or the ingenuity displayed in those works on which besiegers
and besieged are wont to exhaust all their invention and skill
against each other; but still it deserves, if any ever did, to be
remembered and recorded for the noble spirit and extraordinary
gallantry exhibited by the besieged. At first, feeling full
confidence in themselves, the inhabitants of Abydos maintained
a courageous resistance to the attempts of Philip; struck and
dislodged some of his engines, which he brought against their
walls by sea, with stones from their catapults, and destroyed
others by fire, and with such fierceness, that the enemy were
barely able to drag their ships out of danger. Against the
siege operations on land, too, up to a certain point they offered
an undaunted resistance, not at all despairing of ultimately
overpowering the enemy. But when their outer wall was
undermined and fell, and when moreover the Macedonians by
means of these same mines were approaching the inner wall,
which had been erected by the besieged to cover the breach:
then at length they send Iphiades and Pantacnotus as ambassadors, with an offer to Philip that he should take over the
city, on condition of letting the soldiers from Rhodes and
Attalus depart under a truce; and of permitting all free persons
to depart as they could, and wherever each might choose, with
the clothes that each was wearing. But on Philip bidding
them "surrender at discretion or fight like men," the ambassadors returned to the town.
The People of Abydos Resolve to Conquer or Die
On being informed of the message the people of Abydos
Desperate resolution of the people of Abydos. |
met in public assembly, and with feelings of
utter despair deliberated upon their position.
They thereupon resolved, first to liberate the
slaves, that they might secure their sincere interest and
loyalty; next, to collect all the women into the temple
of Artemis, and the children with their nurses into the
gymnasium; and finally to bring together their silver and
gold into the market-place, as well as collect their clothes
which were of any value into the quadrireme of the
Rhodians and the trireme of the Cyzicenes. Having formed
these resolutions and acted on the decree with unanimity, they
again assembled in public meeting, and elected fifty of the
older and most trusted men, who at the same time were possessed of sufficient bodily vigour to enable them to carry out
what had been determined upon; and these they bound on
oath in the presence of the whole of the citizens, that "whenever they saw the inner wall being captured by the enemy, they
would kill the children and women, and would burn the abovementioned ships, and, in accordance with the curses that had
been invoked, would throw the silver and gold into the sea."
After this they brought the priests forward, and all the citizens
swore that they would conquer the enemy or die fighting for
their country. To crown all, they slew victims and compelled
the priests and priestesses to dictate the words of this imprecation over the burnt offerings. Having bound themselves
by this solemn agreement, they left off attempting to countermine the enemy, and resolved that, directly the interior wall fell,
they would fight to the last in the breach with the enemy's
storming party and there die.
Courage of the Abydenians
This would justify us in saying that the gallantry of the
Comparison of this resolution of the Abydenians with similar ones of the Phocians and Acarnanians. |
Abydenians outdid the proverbial Phocian
recklessness and Acarnanian courage.
11 For the
Phocians have the reputation of having adopted
a similar resolution as to their families, but not
because they despaired of victory, for they
were about to fight a pitched battle with the
Thessalians in the open field. So too the Acarnanians, upon
the mere prospect of an Aetolian invasion, adopted a like
resolution; the details of which I have already narrated. But
the Abydenians, at a time when they were closely invested and
in all but complete despair of being saved, elected by a
unanimous resolution to meet their fate along with their children and wives, rather than to live any longer with the knowledge
that their children and wives would fall into the power of the
enemy. Therefore one might justly complain of Fortune for
having, in the former cases, given victory and safety to those
who despaired of them, while she adopted the opposite decision
in regard to the Abydenians. For the men were killed, and the
city was taken, but the children with their mothers fell into
the hands of the enemy.
The Fall of Abydos
As soon as the interior wall had fallen, the men,
How the city was surrendered and the women and children saved after all. |
according to their oaths, sprang upon the ruins
and fought the enemy with such desperate
courage, that Philip, though he had kept sending
the Macedonians to the front in relays till
nightfall, at last abandoned the contest in despair of accomplishing the capture at all. For not only did
the Abydenian forlorn hope take their stand upon the dead
bodies of the fallen enemies, and maintain the battle with
fury; nor was it only that they fought gallantly with mere
swords and spears; but when any of these weapons had been
rendered useless, or had been knocked out of their hands, they
grappled with the Macedonians, and either hurled them to the
ground arms and all, or broke their sarissae, and stabbing their
faces and exposed parts of their bodies with the broken ends,
threw them into a complete panic. But the fight being interrupted by nightfall, most of the citizens having now fallen in
the breach, and the rest being utterly exhausted by fatigue and
wounds, Glaucides and Theognetus collected a few of the
older men together, and, instigated by hopes of personal safety,
lowered the special eminence and unique glory which their
fellow-citizens had acquired. For they resolved to save the
children and women alive, and at daybreak to send the priests
and priestesses with garlands to Philip, to entreat his mercy
and surrender the city to him.
The Abydenians Carry Out Their Resolution
While this was going on, king Attalus, having heard
A Roman envoy arrives to warn Philip to desist. |
that Abydos was being besieged, sailed through
the Aegean to Tenedos; and similarly the
youngest of the Roman ambassadors, Marcus
Aemilius, arrived on board ship at Abydos itself. For
the Roman ambassadors, having learnt at Rhodes the fact
of the siege of Abydos, and wishing in accordance with their
commission to deliver their message to Philip personally, put
off their purpose of visiting the two kings, and despatched
this man to him. Having found the king outside Abydos, he
explained to him that "The Senate had resolved to order him
not to wage war with any Greek state; nor to interfere in the
dominions of Ptolemy; and to submit the injuries inflicted on
Attalus and the Rhodians to arbitration; and that if he did
so he might have peace, but if he refused to obey he would
promptly have war with Rome." Upon Philip endeavouring
to show that the Rhodians had been the first to lay hands on
him, Marcus interrupted him by saying: "But what about the
Athenians? And what about the Cianians? And what
about the Abydenians at this moment? Did any one of them
also lay hands on you first?" The king, at a loss for a reply,
said: "I pardon the offensive haughtiness of your manners for
three reasons: first, because you are a young man and inexperienced in affairs; secondly, because you are the handsomest
man of your time" (this was true); "and thirdly, because you
are a Roman. But for my part, my first demand to the
Romans is that they should not break their treaties or go to
war with me; but if they do, I shall defend myself as
courageously as I can, appealing to the gods to defend my
cause." With these words they separated. On becoming
master of Abydos, Philip found all the property
of the citizens collected by themselves ready to
his hand.
The voluntary death of the Abydenians. |
But when he saw the numbers and
fury of those who were stabbing, burning, hanging, throwing into
wells, or precipitating themselves from housetops, and their
children and wives, he was overpowered with surprise; and
resenting these proceedings he published a proclamation,
announcing, that "he gave three days' grace to those who
wished to hang or stab themselves." The Abydenians, already
bent on executing their original decree, and looking upon
themselves as traitors to those who had fought and died for
their country, could not endure remaining alive on any terms;
and, accordingly, with the exception of those who had previously
been put in chains or some similar restraint, they all without
delay hastened to their death, each family by itself.
Rhodes Holds to its Friendship With Rome
After the capture of Abydos, envoys came from the
The Rhodians resolve to side with Rome. |
Achaean nation to Rhodes urging the Rhodians
to make terms with Philip. But upon these
being followed by the arrival of the ambassadors
from Rome, who argued that they should make no terms with
Philip without consulting the Romans, the Rhodian people
voted to listen to the latter and to hold to their friendship
with them. . . .
A Muster of Achaeans Against Nabis
Philopoemen calculated the distances of all the cities
Philopoemen's device for collecting all the Achaean levies at Tegea simultaneously, B. C. 200. |
of the Achaean league, and from which of
them men could arrive at Tegea along the same
roads. He then wrote despatches to each of
them, and sent them to the most distant cities,
so dividing them that each city that was
farthest on a particular road should get, not
only the one addressed to itself, but those also of the other
cities on the same road. The contents of these first despatches
addressed to the chief magistrate were as follows: "As soon
as ye receive this despatch, forthwith cause all the men of
military age, with arms, and provisions, and money for five
days, to assemble immediately in the market-place. And as
soon as they are thus collected, march them out and lead them
to the next city. As soon as ye have arrived there, deliver the
despatch addressed to its chief magistrate and follow the instructions therein contained." Now, this second despatch
contained exactly the same words as the former, except of
course that the name of the next town was changed to which
they were to march. By this arrangement being repeated
right along the road, in the first place no one knew for what
purpose or undertaking the expedition was directed; and in
the next place, every one was absolutely ignorant where he was
going, beyond the name of the next town, but all marched
forward in a state of complete mystification, taking on the successive contingents as they went. But as of course the most
remote towns were not equally distant from Tegea, the letters
were not delivered to them all at the same time, but to each
in proportion to its distance. By which arrangement, without
either the Tegeans or the new arrivals knowing what was going
to happen, all the Achaeans marched into Tegea under arms
by all the gates simultaneously.
A Raid Upon Laconia
What suggested to Philopoemen this stratagem was the
great number of the tyrant's eavesdroppers and
spies. On the day then on which the main body
of the Achaeans were to arrive at Tegea, he despatched a band of picked men, so timing their start, that they
might pass the night near Sellasia and at daybreak begin a raid
on Laconia. They had orders that, in case the mercenaries of
Nabis left their quarters and attacked them, they were to retire
on Scotita, and in other respects follow the directions of
Didascalondas of Crete; for Philopoemen had given his confidence to this officer,
and full directions as to the whole expedition. These men therefore set out in good spirits to the
task assigned to them. Philopoemen himself having issued
orders to the Achaeans to sup early, led out his army from
Tegea, and after a rapid night's march halted it about the time
of the morning watch in the neighbourhood of Scotita, which
is between Tegea and Lacedaemon. When day broke the
mercenaries in Pellene, being informed by their scouts of the
raid which the enemy were making, started at once to the
rescue, as was their custom, and bore down upon them; and
when the Achaeans, in accordance with their instructions, retired, they followed, harassing them with bold and daring
assaults. But as soon as they came to the place where
Philopoemen lay in ambush, the Achaeans sprang up and cut
some of them to pieces, and took others prisoners.
Philip Tries to Rouse the Achaeans Against Rome
Philip seeing that the Achaeans were disposed to hesitate
about undertaking the war with Rome, tried earnestly by
every means to rouse their feeling of hostility.
Coele-Syria
Ptolemy's general Scopas marched into the upper region
during the winter and subdued the Jewish nation.
The siege having been conducted in a desultory manner,
Scopas fell into bad repute and was attacked with all the
petulance of youth. . . .
Having conquered Scopas, Antiochus took Batanaea,
B. C. 200. Antiochus
conquers Coele-Syria and the Jews after beating Scopas at Panium. See supra, ch. 18. |
Samaria, Abila, and Gadara; and after a while
those of the Jews who inhabit the sacred town
called Jerusalem submitted to him also. On
the subject of this town I have a good deal
more to say, and especially on account of the
splendour of its temple, but I shall put it off to
another opportunity.