Preface
PERHAPS a resumé of events in each Olympiad may arrest the
attention of my readers both by their number and importance,
the transactions in every part of the world being
brought under one view.
144th Olympiad, B. C. 204-200. |
However, I think the
events of this Olympiad especially will do so;
because in it the wars in Italy and Libya came to an end; and
I cannot imagine any one not caring to inquire what sort of
catastrophe and conclusion they had. For everybody, though
extremely interested in details and particulars, naturally longs
to be told the end of a story. I may add that it was in this
period also that the kings gave the clearest indication of their
character and policy. For what was only rumour in regard to
them before was now become a matter of clear and universal
knowledge, even to those who did not care to take part in
public business. Therefore, as I wished to make my narrative
worthy of its subject, I have not, as in former instances, included the history of two years in one book. . . .
Elected Consul for B.C. 205 (see 11, 33) Scipio had Sicily
assigned as his provincia, with leave to cross to Africa if necessary
(Livy, 28, 45). He sent Laelius to Africa in B.C. 205, but remained himself in Sicily. Next spring (B.C. 204) he crossed to
Africa with a year's additional imperium. In the course of this
year he ravaged the Carthaginian territory and besieged Utica
(Livy, 29, 35), and at the beginning of B.C. 203 his imperium
was prolonged till he should have finished the war (id. 30, 1).
Scipio Plans To Attack the Punic Camp
While the Consuls were thus engaged,
1 Scipio in Libya
learnt during the winter that the Carthaginians were fitting
out a fleet; he therefore devoted himself to
similar preparations as well as to pressing on
the siege of Utica.
B. C. 203. Cn. Servilius Caepio, C. Servilius Geminus Coss. Livy, 30, 1. |
He did not, however, give
up all hopes of Syphax; but as their forces
were not far apart he kept sending messages to
him, convinced that he would be able to detach him from the
Carthaginians. He still cherished the belief that Syphax was
getting tired of the girl
2 for whose sake he had joined the
Carthaginians, and of his alliance with the Punic people
generally; for the Numidians, he knew, were naturally quick
to feel satiety, and constant neither to gods nor men. Scipio's
mind, however, was distracted with various anxieties, and his
prospects were far from seeming secure to him; for he shrank
from an engagement in the open field on account of the
enemy's great superiority in numbers. He therefore seized an
opportunity which now presented itself. Some of his messengers to Syphax reported to him that the Carthaginians had
constructed their huts in their winter camp of various kinds of
wood and boughs without any earth; while the old army of the
Numidians made theirs of reeds, and the reinforcements which
were now coming in from the neighbouring townships constructed
theirs of boughs only, some of them inside the trench and palisade, but the greater number outside. Scipio therefore made up
his mind that the manner of attacking them, which would be
most unexpected by the enemy and most successful for himself,
would be by fire. He therefore turned his attention to
organising such an attack.
Now, in his communications with
Scipio, Syphax was continually harping upon his
proposal that the Carthaginians should evacuate
Italy and the Romans Libya; and that the possessions held by either between these two countries should
remain in
statu quo. Hitherto Scipio had refused to listen to
this suggestion, but he now gave Syphax a hint by the mouth
of his messengers that the course he wished to see followed
was not impossible. Greatly elated at this, Syphax became
much bolder than before in his communications with Scipio;
the numbers of the messengers sent backwards and forwards,
and the frequency of their visits, were redoubled; and they
sometimes even stayed several days in each other's camps
without any thought of precaution. On these occasions
Scipio always took care to send, with the envoys, some men of
tried experience or of military knowledge, dressed up as slaves
in rough and common clothes, that they might examine and
investigate in security the approaches and entrances to both
the entrenchments. For there were two camps, one that of
Hasdrubal, containing thirty thousand infantry and three thousand cavalry; and another about ten stades distant from it of the
Numidians, containing ten thousand cavalry and about fifty thousand infantry. The latter was the easier of approach, and its
huts were well calculated for being set on fire, because, as I
said before, the Numidians had not made theirs of timber and
earth, but used simply reeds and thatch in their construction.
Scipio Prepares to Attack Utica by Sea
By the beginning of spring Scipio had completed the
reconnaissances necessary for this attempt upon
the enemy; and he began launching his ships,
and getting the engines on them into working
order, as though with the purpose of assaulting Utica by sea.
With his land forces he once more occupied the high ground
overlooking the town, and carefully fortified it and secured it
by trenches. He wished the enemy to believe that he was
doing this for the sake of carrying on the siege; but he really
meant it as a cover for his men, who were to be engaged in the
undertaking described above, to prevent the garrison sallying
out, when the legions were separated from their lines,
assaulting the palisade which was so near to them, and attacking the division left in charge of it. Whilst in the midst of
these preparations, he sent to Syphax inquiring whether, "in
case he agreed to his proposals, the Carthaginians would
assent, and not say again that they would deliberate on the
terms?" He ordered these legates at the same time not to
return to him, until they had received an answer on these
points. When the envoys arrived, the Numidian king was
convinced that Scipio was on the point of concluding the
agreement, partly from the fact that the ambassadors said that
they would not go away until they got his answer, and partly
because of the anxiety expressed as to the disposition of the
Carthaginians. He therefore sent immediately to Hasdrubal,
stating the facts and urging him to accept the peace. Meanwhile he neglected all precautions himself, and allowed the
Numidians, who were now joining, to pitch their tents where
they were, outside the lines. Scipio in appearance acted in
the same way, while in reality he was pushing on his preparations with the utmost care. When a message was returned
from the Carthaginians bidding Syphax complete the treaty of
peace, the Numidian king, in a state of great exaltation, communicated the news to the envoys; who immediately departed
to their own camp to inform Scipio from the king of what
had been done. As soon as he heard it, the Roman general
at once sent fresh envoys to inform Syphax that Scipio was
quite satisfied and was anxious for the peace; but that the
members of his council differed from him, and held that they
should remain as they were. The ambassadors duly arrived
and informed the Numidians of this.
Scipio's ruse to deceive Syphax. |
Scipio sent this mission to
avoid the appearance of a breach of truce, if he
should perform any act of hostility while negotiations for peace were still going on between
the parties. He considered that, by making this statement, he
would be free to act in whatever way he chose without laying
himself open to blame.
Syphax and Hasdrubal Are Deluded
Syphax's annoyance at this message was great, in proportion to the hopes he had previously entertained of making
the peace. He had an interview with Hasdrubal, and told
him of the message he had received from the Romans; but
though they deliberated long and earnestly as to what they
ought to do, they neither had any idea or conjecture as to
what was really going to happen. For they had no anticipation whatever as to the need of taking precautions, or of any
danger threatening them, but were all eagerness and excitement to strike some blow, and thus provoke the enemy to
descend into the level ground.
Scipio discloses his project. |
Meanwhile Scipio allowed his
army generally, by the preparations he was making
and the orders he was issuing, to imagine that
his aim was the capture of Utica; but summoning the most able and trusty Tribunes at noon, he imparted
to them his design, and ordered them to cause their
men to get their supper early, and then to lead the legions
outside the camp as soon as the buglers gave the usual signal
by a simultaneous blast of their bugles. For it is a custom in
the Roman army for the trumpeters and buglers to sound a
call near the commander's tent at supper time, that the night
pickets may then take up their proper positions. Scipio next
summoned the spies whom he had sent at different times to
reconnoitre the enemy's quarters, and carefully compared and
studied the accounts they gave about the roads leading to the
hostile camps and the entrances to them, employing Massanissa
to criticise their words and assist him with his advice, because
he was acquainted with the locality.
The Romans Burn the Enemy Camp
Everything being prepared for his expedition, Scipio
left a sufficiently strong guard in the camp, and got the rest of
the men on the march towards the end of the first watch, the
enemy being about sixty stades distant. Arrived in the neighbourhood of the enemy, about the end of the third watch, he
assigned to Gaius Laelius and Massanissa half his Roman
soldiers and all his Numidians, with orders to attack the camp
of Syphax, urging them to quit themselves like brave men and
do nothing carelessly; with the clear understanding that, as the
darkness hindered and prevented the use of the eyes, a night
attack required all the more the assistance of a cool head and
a firm heart. The rest of the army he took the command of
in person, and led against Hasdrubal. He had calculated on
not beginning his assault until Laelius's division had set fire to
the enemy's huts; he therefore proceeded slowly.
Destruction of the camp of Syphax by C. Laelius and Massanissa, |
The latter meanwhile advanced in two divisions,
which attacked the enemy simultaneously. The
construction of the huts being as though purposely contrived to be susceptible of a conflagration, as I have
already explained, as soon as the front rank men began to set
light to them, the fire caught all the first row of huts fiercely,
and soon got beyond all control, from the closeness of the huts
to each other, and the amount of combustible material which
they contained. Laelius remained in the rear as a reserve;
but Massanissa, knowing the localities through which those
who fled from the fire would be sure to retreat, stationed his
own soldiers at those spots. Not a single Numidian had any
suspicion of the true state of the case, not even Syphax
himself; but thinking that it was a mere accidental conflagration of the rampart, some of them started unsuspiciously
out of bed, others sprang out of their tents in the midst of a
carouse and with the cup actually at their lips. The result
was that numbers of them got trampled to death by their own
friends at the exits from the camp; many were caught by the
flames and burnt to death; while all those who escaped the
flame fell into the hands of the enemy, and were killed,
without knowing what was happening to them or what they
were doing.
Dreadful Scene In the Burning Camps
At the same time the Carthaginians, observing the
proportions of the conflagration and the hugeness of the flame that was rising, imagined that
the Numidian camp had been accidentally
set on fire. Some of them therefore started at once to
render assistance, and all the rest hurried outside their own
camp unarmed, and stood there gazing in astonishment at
the spectacle. Everything having thus succeeded to his best
wishes, Scipio fell upon these men outside their camp, and
either put them to the sword, or, driving them back into
the camp, set fire to their huts. The disaster of the Punic
army was thus very like that which had just befallen the
Numidians, fire and sword in both cases combining to destroy
them. Hasdrubal immediately gave up all idea of combating
the fire, for he knew from the coincidence of the two that the
fire in the Numidian camp was not accidental, as he had
supposed, but had originated from some desperate design of
the enemy. He therefore turned his attention to saving his
own life, although there was now little hope left of doing so.
For the fire was spreading rapidly and was catching everywhere; while the camp gangways were full of horses, beasts of
burden, and men, some of them half dead and devoured by
the fire, and others in a state of such frantic terror and mad
excitement that they prevented any attempts at making a
defence, and by the utter tumult and confusion which they
created rendered all chance of escape hopeless. The case of
Syphax was the same as that of Hasdrubal, as it was also that
of the other officers. The two former, however, did manage
to escape, accompanied by a few horsemen: but all those
myriads of men, horses, and beasts of burden, either met a
miserable and pitiable death from the fire, or, if they escaped
the violence of that, some of the men perished ignominiously
at the hands of the enemy, cut down naked and defenceless, not
only without their arms, but without so much as their clothes
to cover them. The whole place was filled with yells of pain,
confused cries, terror, and unspeakable din, mingled with a
conflagration which spread rapidly and blazed with the utmost
fierceness. It was the combination and suddenness of these
horrors that made them so awful, any one of which by itself
would have been sufficient to strike terror into the hearts of
men. It is accordingly impossible for the imagination to
exaggerate the dreadful scene, so completely did it surpass
in horror everything hitherto recorded. Of all the brilliant
achievements of Scipio this appears to me to have been the
most brilliant and the most daring. . . .
Anda Surrenders to Rome
When day broke, and he found the enemy either killed
or in headlong flight, Scipio exhorted his
Tribunes to activity, and at once started in pursuit. At first the Carthaginian general seemed
inclined to stand his ground, though told of Scipio's approach,
trusting in the strength of the town [of Anda]; but when he
saw that the inhabitants were in a mutinous state, he shrank
from meeting the attack of Scipio, and fled with the relics of his
army, which consisted of as many as five hundred cavalry and
about two thousand infantry. The inhabitants of the town
thereupon submitted unconditionally to the Romans, and were
spared by Scipio, who, however, gave up two neighbouring towns
to the legions to plunder. This being done he returned to his
original entrenchment. Baffled in the hopes which they had
entertained of the course which the campaign
would take, the Carthaginians were deeply depressed.
They had expected to shut up the
Romans on the promontory near Utica, which had been
the site of their winter quarters, and besiege them there
with their army and fleet both by sea and land. With this
view all their preparations had been made; and when they
saw, quite contrary to their calculations, that they were not
only driven from the open country by the enemy, but were
in hourly expectation of an attack upon themselves and their
city, they became completely disheartened and panic-stricken.
Their circumstances, however, admitted of no delay. They
were compelled at once to take precautions and adopt some
measures for the future. But the senate was filled with doubt
and varied and confused suggestions. Some said that they
ought to send for Hannibal and recall him from Italy, their
one hope of safety being now centred in that general and his
forces. Others were for an embassy to Scipio to obtain a truce
and discuss with him the terms of a pacification and treaty.
The Senate, however, resolves to continue their resistance. |
Others again were for keeping up their courage
and collecting their forces, and sending a message to Syphax; who, they said, was at the neighbouring town of Abba, engaged in collecting
the remnants of his army. This last suggestion was the one
which ultimately prevailed. The Government of Carthage
accordingly set about collecting troops, and sent a despatch to
Syphax begging him to support them and abide by his original
policy, as a general with an army would presently join him.
Carthaginians Reinforced and Resolute
Meanwhile the Roman commander was pressing on the
seige of Utica. But when he heard that Syphax was still in
position, and that the Carthaginians were once more collecting
an army, he led out his forces and pitched his camp close
under the walls of Utica. At the same time he divided the
booty among the soldiers. . . .
3 The merchants who purchased them from the soldiers went away with very profitable
bargains; for the recent victory inspired the soldiers with
high hopes of a successful conclusion of the campaign, and
they therefore thought little of the spoils already obtained,
and made no difficulties in selling them to the merchants.
Syphax is persuaded by Sophanisba to stand by the Carthaginians still. |
The Numidian king and his friends were at
first minded to continue their retreat to their own
land. But while deliberating on this, certain
Celtiberes, over four thousand in number, who
had been hired as soldiers by the Carthaginians,
arrived in the vicinity of Abba. Encouraged by this additional
strength the Numidians stopped on their retreat. And
when the young lady, who was daughter of Hasdrubal and
wife of Syphax, added her earnest entreaties that he would
remain and not abandon the Carthaginians at such a crisis, the
Numidian king gave way and consented to her prayer. The
approach of these Celtiberes did a great deal also to encourage
the hopes of the Carthaginians: for instead of four thousand,
it was reported at Carthage that they were ten thousand, and
that their bravery and the excellency of their arms made them
irresistible in the field. Excited by this rumour, and by the
boastful talk which was current among the common people,
the Carthaginians felt their resolution to once
more take the field redoubled.
The Carthaginians again take the field. |
And finally,
within thirty days, they pitched a camp in conjunction with the Numidians and Celtiberes on what are
called the Great Plains, with an army amounting to no less
than thirty thousand.
Scipio Determines to Attack
When news of these proceedings reached the Roman
camp Scipio immediately determined to attack. Leaving
orders, therefore, to the army and navy, which were besieging Utica, as to what they were to do, he started with all his
army in light marching order. On the fifth day he reached
the Great Plains, and during the first day after his arrival
encamped on a piece of rising ground about thirty stades from
the enemy. Next day he descended into the plain and drew up
his army
4 at a distance of seven stades from the enemy, with
his cavalry forming an advanced guard. After skirmishing
attacks carried on by both sides during the next two days, on
the fourth both armies were deliberately brought out into
position and drawn up in order of battle.
The battle on the Great Plains. 24th June, B. C. 203. |
Scipio followed exactly the Roman system,
stationing the maniples of hastati in the front,
behind them the principes, and lastly the triarii in the rear.
Of his cavalry he stationed the Italians on the right wing, the
Numidians and Massanissa on the left. Syphax and Hasdrubal
stationed the Celtiberes in the centre opposite the Roman
cohorts, the Numidians on the left, and the Carthaginians on
the right.
The Roman wings are both victorious. |
At the very first charge the Numidians reeled
before the Italian cavalry, and the Carthaginians
before those under Massanissa; for their many
previous defeats had completely demoralised
them. But the Celtiberes fought gallantly, for they had no
hope of saving themselves by flight, being entirely unacquainted
with the country; nor any expectation of being spared if they
were taken prisoners on account of their perfidy to Scipio: for
they were regarded as having acted in defiance of justice and
of their treaty in coming to aid the Carthaginians against the
Romans, though they had never suffered any act of hostility at
Scipio's hands during the campaigns in Iberia.
The Celtiberes, on the centre, are cut to pieces after a gallant resistance. |
When, however, the two wings gave way these men were surrounded by the principes and
triarii, and cut to pieces on the field almost to
a man. Thus perished the Celtiberes, who yet did very
effective service to the Carthaginians, not only during the
whole battle, but during the retreat also; for, if it had not
been for the hindrance caused by them, the Romans would
have pressed the fugitives closely, and very few of the enemy
would have escaped.
Syphax and Hasdrubal escape. |
As it was, owing to the delay caused
by these men, Syphax and his cavalry effected
their retreat to his own kingdom in safety;
while Hasdrubal with the survivors of his army
did the same to Carthage.
Scipio's Victory On the Great Plains
After making the necessary arrangements as to the booty
Scipio receives the submission of the country, while Laelius goes in pursuit of Syphax. |
and prisoners, Scipio summoned a council of
war to consult as to what to do next. It was
resolved that Scipio himself and one part of the
army should stay in the country and visit the
various towns; while Laelius and Massanissa,
with the Numidians and the rest of the Roman legions,
should pursue Syphax and give him no time to deliberate or
make any preparations. This being settled the commanders
separated; the two latter going with their division in pursuit
of Syphax, Scipio on a round of the townships. Some of
these were terrified into a voluntary submission to the Romans,
others he promptly took by assault. The whole country was
ripe for a change, owing to the constant series of miseries and
contributions, under which it had been groaning from the protracted wars in Iberia.
In Carthage meanwhile, where the panic had been great
enough before, a still wilder state of excitement
prevailed, after this second disaster, and the disappointment of the hopes of success which they
had entertained. However, those of the counsellors who
claimed the highest character for courage urged that they
should go on board their ships and attack the besiegers of
Utica, try to raise the blockade, and engage the enemy at sea,
who were not in a forward state of preparation in that department; that they should recall Hannibal, and without delay
test to the utmost this one more chance: for both these
measures offered great and reasonable opportunities of securing their safety. Others declared that their circumstances no
longer admitted of these measures: what they had to do was
to fortify their town and prepare to stand a siege; for chance
would give them many occasions of striking a successful blow
if they only held together. At the same time they advised
that they should deliberate on coming to terms and making a
treaty, and see on what conditions and by what means they
might extricate themselves from the danger. After a long
debate, all these proposals were adopted together.
Scipio Fears a Carthaginian Attack on the Fleet
Upon this decision being come to, those who were to
sail to Italy went straight from the council chamber to the sea,
while the Navarch went to prepare the ships. The rest began
to take measures for securing the city, and remained in constant consultation on the measures necessary for the purpose.
Meanwhile Scipio's camp was getting gorged with booty;
for he found no one to resist him, and everybody yielded to
his attacks. He therefore determined to despatch the greater
part of the booty to his original camp; while he advanced with
his army in light marching order to seize the entrenchment
near Tunes, and pitched his camp within the view of the inhabitants of Carthage, thinking that this would do more than
anything else to strike terror into their hearts and lower their
courage.
The Carthaginians had in a few days manned and provisioned their ships, and were engaged in getting under
sail and carrying out their plan of operations, when Scipio
arrived at Tunes, and, the garrison flying at his approach,
occupied the town, which is about a hundred stades from Carthage, of remarkable strength both natural and artificial, and
visible from nearly every point of Carthage.
Just as the Romans pitched their camp there, the Carthaginians were putting out to sea
on board their
Scipio recalled to Utica by the fear of an attack upon his fleet. |
ships to sail to Utica. Seeing the enemy thus
putting out, and fearing some misfortune to his
own fleet, Scipio was rendered exceedingly
anxious, because no one there was prepared for such an attack,
or had anything in readiness to meet the danger. He therefore broke up his camp and marched back in haste to support
his men. There he found his decked ships thoroughly well
fitted out for raising siege-engines and applying them to walls,
and generally for all purposes of an assault upon a town, but
not in the least in the trim for a sea-fight; while the enemy's
fleet had been under process of rigging for this purpose the
whole winter. He therefore gave up all idea of putting to sea
to meet the enemy and accepting battle there; but anchoring
his decked ships side by side he moored the transports round
them, three or four deep; and then, taking down the masts and
yard-arms, he lashed the vessels together firmly by means of
these, keeping a space between each sufficient to enable the
light craft to sail in and out. . . .
Women at Alexandria
Philo was a parasite of Agathocles, the son of Oenanthe,
The extraordinary influence of women of low character at Alexandria. |
and the friend of king Philopator.
Many statues of Cleino, the girl who acted as cupbearer
to Ptolemy Philadelphus, were set up at Alexandria, draped in a single tunic and holding a
cup in the hands. And are not the most splendid houses there those which go by the names
of Murtium, Mnesis, and Pothine? And yet
Mnesis was a flute-girl, as was Pothine, and Murtium was a
public prostitute. And was not Agathocleia, the mistress of
king Ptolemy Philopator, an influential personage,—she who
was the ruin of the whole kingdom? . . .
Ptolemy Philopator, B.C. 222-205
The question may be asked, perhaps, why I have
The feeble character of Ptolemy Philopator. |
chosen to give a sketch of Egyptian history
here, going back a considerable period; whereas,
in the case of the rest of my history, I have
recorded the events of each year in the several countries side
by side? I have done so for the following reasons: Ptolemy
Philopator, of whom I am now speaking, after the conclusion
of the war for the possession of Coele-Syria,
5 abandoned all
noble pursuits and gave himself up to the life of debauchery
which I have just described. But late in life he was compelled by circumstances to engage in the war
I have mentioned,
6 which, over and above the mutual cruelty
and lawlessness with which it was conducted, witnessed neither pitched
battle, sea fight, siege, or anything else worth recording. I
thought, therefore, that it would be easier for me as a writer,
and more intelligible to my readers, if I did not touch upon
everything year by year as it occurred, or give a full account
of transactions which were insignificant and undeserving of
serious attention; but should once for all sum up and describe
the character and policy of this king.