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[2]
Let pity then be a kind of pain excited by the sight
of evil, deadly or painful, which befalls one who does not deserve it; an evil
which one might expect to come upon himself or one of his friends, and when it
seems near. For it is evident that one who is likely to feel pity must be such
as to think that he, or one of his friends, is liable to suffer some evil, and
such an evil as has been stated in the definition, or one similar, or nearly
similar.
Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vol. 22, translated by J. H. Freese. Aristotle. Cambridge and London. Harvard University Press; William Heinemann Ltd. 1926.
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