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[10]
In all such instances the
question at issue is to know whether the supposed offender is a wrongdoer and a
worthless person, or not; for vice and wrongdoing consist in the moral purpose,
and such terms as outrage and theft further indicate purpose; for if a man has
struck, it does not in all cases follow that he has committed an outrage, but
only if he has struck with a certain object, for instance, to bring disrepute
upon the other or to please himself. Again, if a man has taken something by
stealth, it is by no means certain that he has committed theft, but only if he
has taken it to injure another1 or to get something for himself. It is the same in all
other cases as in these.
Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vol. 22, translated by J. H. Freese. Aristotle. Cambridge and London. Harvard University Press; William Heinemann Ltd. 1926.
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