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1318a]
[1]
and if any life-office has been left after an ancient
revolution, at all events to deprive it of its power and to substitute election
by lot for election by vote.
These
1 then are the features common to democracies. But what is
thought to be the extreme form of democracy and of popular government comes
about as a result of the principle of justice that is admitted to be democratic,
and this is for all to have equality according to number. For it is equality for
the poor to have no larger share of power than the rich, and not for the poor
alone to be supreme but for all to govern equally; for in this way they would
feel that the constitution possessed both equality and liberty. But the question follows, how will they
have equality? are the property-assessments of five hundred citizens to be
divided among a thousand and the thousand to have equal power to the five
hundred
2? or is equality on this principle
3 not to be arranged in this manner, but the
division into classes to be on this system, but then an equal number to be taken
from the five hundred and from the thousand and these to control the elections
and the law-courts? Is this then the justest form of constitution in accordance
with popular justice, or is it rather one that goes by counting heads?
4 For democrats say that justice is whatever seems
good to the larger number,
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but
advocates of oligarchy think that it is whatever seems good to the owners of the
larger amount of property, for they say that the decision ought to go by amount
of property. But both views involve
inequality and injustice; for if the will of the few is to prevail, this means a
tyranny, since if one man owns more than the other rich men,
5 according to the oligarchic principle of justice it is just
for him to rule alone; whereas if the will of the numerical majority is to
prevail, they will do injustice by confiscating the property of the rich
minority, as has been said before.
6 What form of equality therefore would be one on which both
parties will agree must be considered in the light of the principles of justice
as defined by both sets. For they say that whatever seems good to the majority
of the citizens ought to be sovereign. Let us then accept this principle, yet not wholly without
qualification, but inasmuch as fortune has brought into existence two component
parts of the state, rich and poor, let any resolution passed by both classes, or
by a majority of each, be sovereign, but if the two classes carry opposite
resolutions, let the decision of the majority, in the sense of the group whose
total property assessment is the larger, prevail: for instance, if there are ten
rich citizens and twenty poor ones, and opposite votes have been cast by six of
the rich on one side and by fifteen of the less wealthy on the other, four of
the rich have sided with the poor and five of the poor with the rich; then the
side that has the larger total property when the assessments of both classes on
either side are added together carries the voting.
7
But if the totals fall out exactly
equal, this is to be deemed an impasse common to both sides, as it is at present
if the assembly or law-court is exactly divided;