[1266a]
[1]
In Plato's Laws on the other hand it is
stated that the best constitution must consist of a combination of democracy and
tyranny,1 which one might
refuse to count as constitutional governments at all, or else rank as the worst
of all constitutions. A better theory therefore is put forward by those who
intermingle a larger number of forms, for the constitution composed of a
combination of a larger number of forms is better. In the next place, the
constitution in the Laws proves as a matter of fact not to
contain any element of monarchy at all, but its factors are taken from oligarchy
and democracy, and for the most part it tends to incline towards oligarchy. This
appears from the regulations for the appointment of the magistrates; for their
selection by lot from a list previously elected by vote is a feature common to
both oligarchy and democracy, but the compulsion put upon the richer citizens to
attend the assembly and vote for magistrates or perform any other political
function, while the others are allowed to do as they like, is oligarchical, as
is the endeavor to secure that a majority of the magistrates shall be drawn from
the wealthy and that the highest offices shall be filled from the highest of the
classes assessed by wealth. But the
writer also makes the election of the council oligarchical for everybody is
compelled to elect, but from the first property-class, and then again an equal
number from the second class, and then from the members of the third class,
except that it was not to be compulsory for all to vote for those to be elected
from the members of the third or the fourth class, and to elect from the fourth
class was only compulsory for the members of the first and second classes; and
afterwards from those thus selected he says that they are to appoint
[20]
an equal number from each class. Thus those
who elect the members from the highest property classes will be more numerous
and better,2 because some of the lower
orders will abstain from voting3 as
it is not compulsory. Accordingly
that it is not proper to establish a constitution of this character from a blend
of democracy and monarchy appears clearly from these considerations, and from
what will be said later when our inquiry comes to deal with this class of
constitution; also the provision for the election of the rulers from among
candidates chosen at a preliminary election is dangerous, for if even a moderate
number of people choose to combine into a party, the elections will always go
according to their wish.Such are the points as to
the constitution in the Laws.
There
are also certain other constitutional schemes, some drawn up by amateurs and
others by philosophers and statesmen, but all of them are nearer to those which
have been actually established and by which states are governed at present than
are both of those which have been considered; for nobody else has introduced the
innovation of community of children and women, nor that of public meals for the
women, but they start rather with the necessary reforms. For some persons think
that the right regulation of property is the most important; for the question of
property, they say, is universally the cause of party strife. Therefore the
Chalcedonian Phaleas4 was the first who introduced this expedient; for he says that the citizens' estates
ought to be equal
1 Plato wrote ‘monarchy,’ Plat. Laws 693d (cf. here 3.13).
2 i.e. a better ellective body because representative of all classes.
3 i.e. from voting for the preliminary list from the third and fourth classes.
4 Otherwise unknown.
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