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[1043a]
[1]
and the opposite state not-being.From this it is evident that if substance is the
cause of the existence of each thing, we must look among these
"differences" for the cause of the being of each thing.No one of them, nor the
combination of any two of them, is substance, but nevertheless each
one of them contains something analogous to substance. And just as in
the case of substances that which is predicated of the matter is the
actuality itself, so in the other kinds of definition it is the
nearest approximation to actuality. E.g., if we have to define a
threshold, we shall call it "a piece of wood or stone placed in
such-and-such a way"; and we should define a house as "bricks and
timber arranged in such-and-such a way";or again in some cases there is the final
cause as well. And if we are defining ice, we shall describe it as
"water congealed or condensed in such-and-such a way"; and a harmony
is "such-and-such a combination of high and low"; and similarly in the
other cases.From this it is evident
that the actuality or formula is different in the case of different
matter; for in some cases it is a combination, in others a mixture,
and in others some other of the modes which we have
described.Hence in
defining the nature of a house, those who describe it as stones,
bricks and wood, describe the potential house, since these things are
its matter; those who describe it as "a receptacle for containing
goods and bodies," or something else to the same effect, describe its
actuality; but those who combine these two definitions describe the
third kind of substance, that which is composed of matter and
form.For it would
seem that the formula which involves the differentiae is that of the
form and the actuality,
[20]
while that which involves the constituent parts is rather that of
the matter. The same is true of the kind of definitions which
Archytas1 used to accept; for
they are definitions of the combined matter and form. E.g., what is
"windlessness?" Stillness in a large extent of air; for the air is the
matter, and the stillness is the actuality and substance.What is a calm? Levelness of
sea. The sea is the material substrate, and the levelness is the
actuality or form.From the foregoing
account it is clear what sensible substance is, and in what sense it
exists; either as matter, or as form and actuality, or thirdly as the
combination of the two.We must not fail to realize
that sometimes it is doubtful whether a name denotes the composite
substance or the actuality and the form—e.g. whether "house"
denotes the composite thing, "a covering made of bricks and stones
arranged in such-and-such a way," or the actuality and form, "a
covering"; and whether "line" means "duality in length" or
"duality"2; and whether "animal"
means "a soul in a body" or "a soul"; for the soul is the substance
and actuality of some body.The term "animal" would be applicable to both cases; not as being
defined by one formula, but as relating to one concept. These
distinctions are of importance from another point of view, but
unimportant for the investigation of sensible substance;
1 A celebrated Pythagorean, contemporary with Plato.
2 Cf. Aristot. Met. 7.11.6.
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