[
1040b]
[1]
but the sun was supposed to be an
individual, like Cleon or
Socrates.Why does not one of the exponents of the Ideas
produce a definition of them? If they were to try, it would become
obvious that what we have just said is true.
It is
obvious that even of those things which are thought to be substances
the majority are potentialities; both the parts of living things (for
none of them has a separate substantial existence; and when they are
separated, although they still exist, they exist as matter), and
earth, fire and air; for none of these is one
thing
—they are a mere aggregate before they are digested and some
one thing is generated from them.It might be supposed very reasonably that the
parts of living things and the corresponding parts of their vital
principle are both, i.e. exist both actually and potentially, because
they contain principles of motion derived from something in their
joints; and hence some animals
1 live even when they are
divided. Nevertheless it is only potentially that all of them will
exist when they are one and continuous by nature and not by force or
concretion; for this sort of thing is malformation.
2And since "unity" has the same
variety of senses as "being," and the substance of Unity is one, and
things whose substance is numerically one are numerically one,
evidently neither Unity nor Being can be the substance of things, just
as neither "being an element" or "principle" can be the
substance;
[20]
but we ask
what the principle is so that we may refer to something more
intelligible.
3Now of these concepts Being
and Unity are more nearly substance than are principle, element and
cause; but not even the former are quite substance, since nothing else
that is common is substance; for substance belongs to nothing except
itself and that which contains it and of which it is the
substance.Again,
Unity cannot exist in many places at the same time, but that which is
common is present in many things at the same time. Hence it is clear
that no universal exists in separation apart from its particulars. The
exponents of the Forms are partly right in their account when they
make the Forms separate; that is, if the Forms are substances, but
they are also partly wrong, since by "Form" they mean the
"one-over-many."
4The reason for this is that they cannot explain what are the
imperishable substances of this kind which exist besides particular
sensible substances; so they make them the same in kind as perishable
things (for these we know); i.e., they make "Ideal Man" and "Ideal
Horse," adding the word "Ideal" to the names of sensible
things.However, I
presume that even if we had never seen the stars,