[
1025b]
[3]
It is the principles and causes of the
things which are that we are seeking; and clearly
of the things which are qua being. There is a
cause of health and physical fitness; and mathematics has principles
and elements and causes; and in general every intellectual science or
science which involves intellect deals with causes and principles,
more or less exactly or simply considered.But all these sciences single out some
existent thing or class, and concern themselves with that; not with
Being unqualified, nor qua Being, nor do they
give any account of the essence; but starting from it, some making it
clear to perception, and others assuming it as a hypothesis, they
demonstrate, more or less cogently, the essential attributes of the
class with which they are dealing.Hence obviously there is no demonstration of
substance or essence from this method of approach, but some other
means of exhibiting it. And similarly they say nothing as to whether
the class of objects with which they are concerned exists or not;
because the demonstration of its essence and that of its existence
belong to the same intellectual process.And since physical science also happens to
deal with a genus of Being
[20]
(for it deals with the sort of substance which contains in itself
the principle of motion and rest), obviously it is neither a practical
nor a productive science.For in the case of things produced the principle of motion (either
mind or art or some kind of potency) is in the producer; and in the
case of things done the will is the agent—for the thing done
and the thing willed are the same. Thus if every intellectual activity
is either practical or productive or speculative, physics will be a
speculative science; but speculative about that kind of Being which
can be moved, and about formulated substance for the most part only
qua inseparable from matter.But we must not fail to observe
how the essence and the formula exist, since
without this our inquiry is ineffectual.
Now of things defined, i.e. of essences, some apply in the sense
that "snub" does, and some in the sense that "concave" does. The
difference is that "snub" is a combination of form with matter;
because the "snub" is a concave
nose , whereas concavity
is independent of sensible matter.
[
1026a]
[1]
Now if all physical terms are used in
the same sense as "snub"—e.g. nose, eye, face, flesh, bone,
and in general animal; leaf, root, bark, and in general vegetable (for
not one of these has a definition without motion; the definition
invariably includes matter)—it is clear how we should look
for and define the essence in physical things, and why it is the
province of the physicist to study even some aspects of the soul, so
far as it is not independent of matter.
It is obvious,
then, from these considerations, that physics is a form of speculative
science. And mathematics is also speculative; but it is not clear at
present whether its objects are immutable and separable from matter;
it is clear, however, that some branches of mathematics study their
objects qua immutable and qua separable from matter. Obviously it is the province of a
speculative science to discover whether a thing is eternal and
immutable and separable from matter;not, however, of physics (since physics deals
with mutable objects) nor of mathematics, but of a science prior to
both. For physics deals with things which exist separately but are not
immutable; and some branches of mathematics deal with things which are
immutable, but presumably not separable, but present in matter; but
the primary science treats of things which are both separable and
immutable.Now all
causes must be eternal, but these especially; since they are the
causes of what is visible of things divine. Hence there will be three
speculative philosophies: mathematics, physics, and
theology—
[20]
since it is obvious that if the divine is present anywhere, it is
present in this kind of entity; and also the most honorable science
must deal with the most honorable class of subject.
The
speculative sciences, then, are to be preferred to the other sciences,
and "theology" to the other speculative sciences. One might indeed
raise the question whether the primary philosophy is universal or
deals with some one genus or entity; because even the mathematical
sciences differ in this respect—geometry and astronomy deal
with a particular kind of entity, whereas universal mathematics
applies to all kinds alike.Then if there is not some other substance besides those which are
naturally composed, physics will be the primary science; but if there
is a substance which is immutable, the science which studies this will
be prior to physics, and will be primary philosophy, and universal in
this sense, that it is primary. And it will be the province of this
science to study Being qua Being; what it is,
and what the attributes are which belong to it qua Being.
But since the simple term "being" is
used in various senses, of which we saw that one was
accidental , and another
true (not-being
being used in the sense of "false"); and since besides these there are
the categories, e.g. the "what," quality, quantity, place, time, and
any other similar meanings;
[
1026b]
[1]
and further besides
all these the
potential and
actual : since
the term "being" has various senses, it must first be said of what
"is" accidentally, that there can be no speculation about
it.This is shown by
the fact that no science, whether practical, productive or
speculative, concerns itself with it. The man who produces a house
does not produce all the attributes which are accidental to the house
in its construction; for they are infinite in number. There is no
reason why the house so produced should not be agreeable to some,
injurious to others, and beneficial to others, and different perhaps
from every other existing thing; but the act of building is productive
of none of these results.In the same way the geometrician does not study the accidental
attributes of his figures, nor whether a triangle is different from a
triangle the sum of whose angles is equal to two right angles. And
this accords with what we should reasonably expect, because "accident"
is only, as it were, a sort of name. Hence in a way Plato
1 was not far wrong in making sophistry
deal with what is nonexistent;because the sophists discuss the accident
more, perhaps, than any other people—whether "cultured" and
"grammatical,"
2 and
"cultured Coriscus" and "Coriscus,"
3 are
the same or different; and whether everything that is, but has not
always been, has come into being, so that if a man who is cultured has
become grammatical,
[20]
he has
also, being grammatical, become cultured
4; and all other
such discussions. Indeed it seems that the accidental is something
closely akin to the nonexistent.This is clear too from such considerations as
the following: of things which
are in other senses there
is generation and destruction, but of things which
are
accidentally there is not.
5 Nevertheless we must
state further, so far as it is possible, with regard to the
accidental, what its nature is and through what cause it exists. At
the same time it will doubtless also appear why there is no science of
it.
Since, then, there are among existing things
some which are invariable and of necessity (not necessity in the sense
of compulsion,
6 but that by which we
mean that it cannot be otherwise
7), and some which are not necessarily so, nor always, but
usually: this is the principle and this the cause of the accidental.
For whatever is neither always nor usually so, we call an
accident.E.g., if in
the dog-days
8 we have storm and cold, we call it an
accident; but not if we have stifling and intense heat, because the
latter always or usually comes at this time, but not the former. It is
accidental for a man to be white (since this is neither always nor
usually so), but it is not accidental for him to be an animal.
[
1027a]
[1]
It is by accident that a builder restores to
health, because it is not a builder but a doctor who naturally does
this; but the builder happened accidentally to be a doctor. A
confectioner, aiming at producing enjoyment, may produce something
health-giving; but not in virtue of his confectioner's art. Hence, we
say, it was accidental; and he produces it in a sense, but not in an
unqualified sense.For
there are potencies which produce other things, but there is no art or
determinate potency of accidents, since the cause of things which
exist or come to be by accident is also accidental.Hence, since not everything is or comes
to be of necessity and always, but most things happen usually, the
accidental must exist. E.g., the white man is neither always nor
usually cultured; but since this sometimes happens, it must be
regarded as accidental. Otherwise, everything must be regarded as of
necessity.Therefore
the cause of the accidental is the matter, which admits of variation
from the usual.
We must take this as our
starting-point: Is everything either "always" or "usually"? This is
surely impossible. Then besides these alternatives there is something
else: the fortuitous and accidental. But again, are things
usually so, but nothing
always , or
are there things which are eternal? These questions must be inquired
into later
9;
[20]
but it is clear that there is no
science of the accidental—because all scientific knowledge
is of that which is
always or
usually so.
How else indeed can one learn it or teach it to another? For a fact
must be defined by being so always or usually; e.g., honey-water is
usually beneficial in case of fever.But science will not be able to state the
exception to the rule: when it is not beneficial—e.g. at the
new moon; because that which happens at the new moon also happens
either always or usually; but the accidental is contrary to this. We
have now explained the nature and cause of the accidental, and that
there is no science of it.
It is obvious that there are
principles and causes which are generable and destructible apart from
the actual processes of generation and destruction
10; for if this is not true, everything
will be of necessity: that is, if there must necessarily be some
cause, other than accidental, of that which is generated and
destroyed. Will A be, or not? Yes, if B happens; otherwise not. And B
will happen if C does.It
is clear that in this way, as time is continually subtracted from a
limited period, we shall come to the present.
[
1027b]
[1]
Accordingly So-and-so will die by disease or violence if he goes
out; and this if he gets thirsty; and this if something else happens;
and thus we shall come to what is the case now, or to something which
has already happened. E.g. "if he is thirsty"; this will happen if he
is eating pungent food, and this is either the case or not.Thus of necessity he will
either die or not die. And similarly if one jumps over to the past,
the principle is the same; for this—I mean that which has
just happened—is already present in something. Everything,
then, which is to be, will be of necessity; e.g., he who is alive must
die—for some stage of the process has been reached already;
e.g., the contraries are present in the same body—but
whether by disease or violence is not yet determined; it depends upon
whether so-and-so happens.Clearly, then, the series goes back to some starting-point, which
does not go back to something else. This, therefore, will be the
starting-point of the fortuitous, and nothing else is the cause of its
generation. But to what sort of starting-point and cause this process
of tracing back leads, whether to a material or final or moving cause,
is a question for careful consideration.
So much, then, for
the accidental sense of "being"; we have defined it sufficiently. As
for "being" qua truth, and "not-being" qua falsity, since they depend upon
combination and separation,
[20]
and taken together are concerned with the arrangement of the parts
of a contradiction (since the true has affirmation when the subject
and predicate are combined, and negation where they are divided; but
the false has the contrary arrangement.How it happens that we combine or separate in
thought is another question. By "combining or separating in thought" I
mean thinking them not as a succession but as a unity
11); for "falsity" and "truth" are not in
things —the good, for example, being true, and
the bad false—but in
thought ; and with regard
to simple concepts and essences there is no truth or falsity even in
thought;—what points we must study in connection with being and
not-being in this sense, we must consider later. But since the
combination and separation exists in thought and not in things, and
this sense of "being" is different from the proper senses (since
thought attaches or detaches essence or quality or quantity or some
other category), we may dismiss the accidental and real senses
12 of "being."For the cause of the one is indeterminate and
of the other an affection of thought;
[
1028a]
[1]
and
both are connected with the remaining genus of "being," and do not
indicate any objective reality. Let us therefore dismiss them, and
consider the causes and principles of Being itself qua Being. [We have made it clear in our distinction of
the number of senses in which each term is used that "being" has
several senses.]
13