[
1012b]
[34]
"Beginning"
1 means:
(a) That part of a thing from which one may first move; eg., a line or
a journey has one beginning
here , and another at the
opposite extremity.
[
1013a]
[1]
(b) The point from which each
thing may best come into being; e.g., a course of study should
sometimes be begun not from what is primary or from the starting-point
of the subject, but from the point from which it is easiest to learn.
(c) That thing as a result of whose presence something first comes
into being; e.g., as the keel is the beginning of a ship, and the
foundation that of a house, and as in the case of animals some
thinkers suppose the heart
2 to be the "beginning," others the
brain,
3 and others something
similar, whatever it may be. (d) That from which, although not present
in it, a thing first comes into being, and that from which motion and
change naturally first begin, as the child comes from the father and
mother, and fighting from abuse. (e) That in accordance with whose
deliberate choice that which is moved is moved, and that which is
changed is changed; such as magistracies, authorities, monarchies and
despotisms.(f) Arts
are also called "beginnings,"
4 especially the architectonic arts.
(g) Again, "beginning" means the point from which a thing is first
comprehensible, this too is called the "beginning" of the thing; e.g.
the hypotheses of demonstrations. ("Cause" can have a similar number
of different senses, for all causes are "beginnings.")
It is a common property, then, of all "beginnings" to be the first
thing from which something either exists or comes into being or
becomes known; and some beginnings are originally inherent in things,
while others are not.
[20]
Hence
"nature" is a beginning, and so is "element" and "understanding" and
"choice" and "essence" and "final cause"—for in many cases
the Good and the Beautiful are the beginning both of knowledge and of
motion.
"Cause" means: (a) in one sense, that as the
result of whose presence something comes into being—e.g. the
bronze of a statue and the silver of a cup, and the classes
5 which contain these;
(b) in another sense, the
form or pattern; that is, the
essential formula and the classes which contain it—e.g. the
ratio 2:1 and number in general is the cause of the
octave—and the parts of the formula.(c) The source of the first beginning
of change or rest; e.g. the man who plans is a cause, and the father
is the cause of the child, and in general that which produces is the
cause of that which is produced, and that which changes of that which
is changed. (d) The same as "end"; i.e. the final cause; e.g., as the
"end" of walking is health.For why does a man walk? "To be healthy," we say, and by saying this
we consider that we have supplied the cause. (e) All those means
towards the end which arise at the instigation of something else, as,
e.g. fat-reducing, purging, drugs and instruments are causes of
health;
[
1013b]
[1]
for they all have the
end
as their object, although they differ from each other as being some
instruments, others actions.
These are roughly all the
meanings of "cause," but since causes are spoken of with various
meanings, it follows that there are several causes (and that not in an
accidental sense) of the same thing. E.g., both
statuary
and
bronze are causes of the statue; not in different
connections, but qua statue. However, they are
not causes in the same way, but the one as
material and
the other as the
source of motion. And things are causes
of each other; as e.g. labor of vigor, and vigor of
labor—but not in the same way; the one as an
end , and the other as
source of
motion .And again the same thing is sometimes the cause of contrary results;
because that which by its presence is the cause of so-and-so we
sometimes accuse of being, by its absence, the cause of the
contrary—as, e.g., we say that the absence of the pilot is
the cause of a capsize, whereas his presence was the cause of
safety.And both,
presence and privation, are
moving causes.
Now there are four senses which are most
obvious under which all the causes just described may be
classed.The
components of syllables; the material of manufactured articles; fire,
earth and all such bodies; the parts of a whole;
[20]
and the premisses of a syllogistic
conclusion; are causes in the
material sense. Of these
some are causes as substrate: e.g. the parts; and others as
essence : the whole, and the composition, and the
form.The seed and
the physician and the contriver and in general that which produces,
all these are the source of change or stationariness. The remainder
represent the
end and
good of the others;
for the final cause tends to be the greatest good and
end
of the rest.Let it be
assumed that it makes no difference whether we call it "good" or
"apparent good." In
kind , then, there are these four
classes of cause.
The
modes
of cause are numerically many, although these too are fewer when
summarized.For
causes are spoken of in many senses, and even of those which are of
the same kind, some are causes in a prior and some in a posterior
sense; e.g., the physician and the expert are both causes of health;
and the ratio 2:1 and number are both causes of the octave; and the
universals which include a given cause are causes of its particular
effects.Again, a
thing may be a cause in the sense of an accident, and the classes
which contain accidents; e.g., the cause of a statue is in one sense
Polyclitus and in another a sculptor, because it is an accident of the
sculptor to be Polyclitus.
[
1014a]
[1]
And the universal
terms which include accidents are causes; e.g., the cause of a statue
is a man, or even, generally, an animal; because Polyclitus is a man,
and man is an animal.And
even of accidental causes some are remoter or more proximate than
others; e.g., the cause of the statue might be said to be "white man"
or "cultured man," and not merely "Polyclitus" or "man."
And besides the distinction of causes as
proper and
accidental , some are
termed causes in a
potential and others in an
actual sense; e.g., the cause of building is either
the builder or the builder who builds.And the same distinctions in meaning as we
have already described will apply to the
effects of the
causes; e.g. to
this statue, or
a statue, or
generally an image; and to
this bronze, or bronze, or
generally material.
6 And it is the same with accidental effects. Again, the
proper and accidental senses will be combined; e.g., the cause is
neither "Polyclitus" nor "a sculptor" but "the sculptor
Polyclitus."
However, these classes of cause are in
all six in number, each used in two senses. Causes are (1.)
particular, (2.) generic, (3.) accidental, (4.) generically
accidental; and these may be either stated singly or (5, 6) in
combination
7;
[20]
and
further they are all either actual or potential.And there is this difference between
them, that actual and particular causes coexist or do not coexist with
their effects (e.g.
this man giving medical treatment
with
this man recovering his health, and
this builder with
this building in course of
erection); but potential causes do not always do so; for the house and
the builder do not perish together.
"Element" means
(a) the primary immanent thing, formally indivisible into another
form, of which something is composed. E.g., the elements of a sound
are the parts of which that sound is composed and into which it is
ultimately divisible, and which are not further divisible into other
sounds formally different from themselves. If an element be divided,
the parts are formally the same as the whole: e.g., a part of water is
water; but it is not so with the syllable.(b) Those who speak of the elements of
bodies similarly mean the parts into which bodies
are ultimately divisible, and which are not further divisible into
other parts different in form. And whether they speak of one such
element or of more than one, this is what they mean.(c) The term is applied with a very
similar meaning to the "elements" of geometrical figures, and
generally to the "elements" of demonstrations; for the primary
demonstrations which are contained in a number of other demonstrations
[
1014b]
[1]
are called "elements" of
demonstrations.
8 Such are the
primary syllogisms consisting of three terms and with one middle
term.(d) The term
"element" is also applied metaphorically to any small unity which is
useful for various purposes; and so that which is small or simple or
indivisible is called an "element."(e) Hence it comes that the most universal
things are elements; because each of them, being a simple unity, is
present in many things—either in all or in as many as
possible. Some too think that unity and the point are first
principles.(f)
Therefore since what are called genera
9 are universal and indivisible (because they
have no formula), some people call the genera elements, and these
rather than the differentia, because the genus is more universal. For
where the differentia is present, the genus also follows; but the
differentia is not always present where the genus is. And it is common
to all cases that the element of each thing is that which is primarily
inherent in each thing.
"Nature"
10
means: (a) in one sense, the genesis of growing things—as
would be suggested by pronouncing the
υ of
φύσις
long—and (b) in another, that immanent thing
11 from which a growing thing first begins to grow. (c)
The source from which the primary motion in every natural object is
induced in that object as such.
[20]
All things are said to grow which gain increase
through something else by contact and organic unity (or adhesion, as
in the case of embryos).Organic unity differs from contact; for in the latter case there
need be nothing except contact, but in both the things which form an
organic unity there is some one and the same thing which produces,
instead of mere contact, a unity which is organic, continuous and
quantitative (but not qualitative).Again, "nature" means (d) the primary stuff,
shapeless and unchangeable from its own potency, of which any natural
object consists or from which it is produced; e.g., bronze is called
the "nature" of a statue and of bronze articles, and wood that of
wooden ones, and similarly in all other cases.For each article consists of these
"natures," the primary material persisting. It is in this sense that
men call the elements of natural objects the "nature," some calling it
fire, others earth or air or water, others something else similar,
others some of these, and others all of them.Again in another sense "nature" means (e) the
substance of natural objects; as in the case of those who say that the
"nature" is the primary composition of a thing, or as Empedocles says:
[
1015a]
[1]
Of nothing that exists is there nature,
but only mixture and separation of what has been mixed; nature is but
a name given to these by men.
12Hence as regards those things
which exist or are produced by nature, although that from which they
naturally are produced or exist is already present, we say that they
have not their nature yet unless they have their form and
shape.That which
comprises both of these exists by nature; e.g. animals and their
parts. And nature is both the primary matter (and this in two senses:
either primary in relation to the thing, or primary in general; e.g.,
in bronze articles the primary matter in relation to those articles is
bronze, but in general it is perhaps water—that is if all
things which can be melted are water) and the form or essence, i.e.
the end of the process, of generation. Indeed from this sense of
"nature," by an extension of meaning, every essence in general is
called "nature," because the nature of anything is a kind of
essence.
From what has been said, then, the primary and
proper sense of "nature" is the essence of those things which contain
in themselves as such a source of motion; for the matter is called
"nature" because it is capable of receiving the nature, and the
processes of generation and growth are called "nature" because they
are motions derived from it. And nature in this sense is the source of
motion in natural objects, which is somehow inherent in them, either
potentially or actually.
[20]
"Necessary" means: (a) That without which, as
a concomitant condition, life is impossible; e.g. respiration and food
are necessary for an animal, because it cannot exist without them. (b)
The conditions without which good cannot be or come to be, or without
which one cannot get rid or keep free of evil—e.g., drinking
medicine is necessary to escape from ill-health, and sailing to
Aegina is necessary to
recover one's money.(c)
The compulsory and compulsion; i.e. that which hinders and prevents,
in opposition to impulse and purpose. For the compulsory is called
necessary, and hence the necessary is disagreeable; as indeed
Evenus
13 says: "For every necessary
thing is by nature grievous."
14And compulsion is a kind of
necessity, as Sophocles says: "Compulsion makes me do this of
necessity."
15And necessity
is held, rightly, to be something inexorable; for it is opposed to
motion which is in accordance with purpose and calculation. (d) Again,
what cannot be otherwise we say is necessarily so.It is from this sense of "necessary"
that all others are somehow derived; for the term "compulsory" is used
of something which it is necessary for one to do or suffer
[
1015b]
[1]
only when it is impossible to act according to
impulse, because of the compulsion: which shows that necessity is that
because of which a thing cannot be otherwise; and the same is true of
the concomitant conditions of living and of the good. For when in the
one case good, and in the other life or existence, is impossible
without certain conditions, these conditions are necessary, and the
cause is a kind of necessity.
(e) Again, demonstration is a
"necessary" thing, because a thing cannot be otherwise if the
demonstration has been absolute. And this is the result of the first
premisses, when it is impossible for the assumptions upon which the
syllogism depends to be otherwise.
Thus
of necessary things, some have an external cause of their necessity,
and others have not, but it is through them that other things are of
necessity what they are.Hence the "necessary" in the primary and proper sense is the
simple , for it cannot be in more than one
condition. Hence it cannot be in one state and in another; for if so
it would ipso facto be in more than one condition. Therefore if there
are certain things which are eternal and immutable, there is nothing
in them which is compulsory or which violates their nature.
The term "one" is used (1.) in an accidental, (2.) in an absolute
sense. (1.) In the accidental sense it is used as in the case of
"Coriscus"
16 and "cultured" and "cultured Coriscus" (for
"Coriscus" and "cultured" and "cultured Coriscus" mean the
same);and "cultured"
and "upright"
[20]
and "cultured
upright Coriscus." For all these terms refer accidentally to one
thing; "upright" and "cultured" because they are accidental to one
substance, and "cultured" and "Coriscus" because the one is accidental
to the other.And similarly
in one sense "cultured Coriscus" is one with "Coriscus," because one
part of the expression is accidental to the other, e.g. "cultured" to
"Coriscus"; and "cultured Coriscus" is one with "upright Coriscus,"
becauseone part of
each expression is one accident of one and the same thing. It is the
same even if the accident is applied to a genus or a general term;
e.g., "man" and "cultured man" are the same, either because "cultured"
is an accident of "man," which is one substance, or because both are
accidents of some individual, e.g. Coriscus.But they do not both belong to it in the same
way; the one belongs presumably as
genus in the
substance, and the other as
condition or
affection of the substance. Thus all things which are
said to be "one" in an accidental sense are said to be so in this
way.
(2.) Of those things which are said to be in
themselves one, (a) some are said to be so in virtue of their
continuity; e.g., a faggot is made continuous by its string, and
pieces of wood by glue;
[
1016a]
[1]
and a continuous
line, even if it is bent, is said to be one, just like each of the
limbs; e.g. the leg or arm. And of these things themselves those which
are naturally continuous are one in a truer sense than those which are
artificially continuous."Continuous" means that whose motion is essentially one, and cannot
be otherwise; and motion is one when it is indivisible, i.e.
indivisible in
time . Things are essentially continuous
which are one not by contact only; for if you put pieces of wood
touching one another you will not say that they are
one
piece of wood, or body, or any other continuous thing.And things which are completely
continuous are said to be "one" even if they contain a joint, and
still more those things which contain no joint; e.g., the shin or the
thigh is more truly one than the leg, because the motion of the leg
may not be one.And the
straight line is more truly one than the bent. We call the line which
is bent and contains an angle both one and not one, because it may or
may not move all at once; but the straight line always moves all at
once, and no part of it which has magnitude is at rest while another
moves, as in the bent line.
(b) Another
sense of "one" is that the substrate is uniform in kind.Things are uniform whose form
is indistinguishable to sensation;
[20]
and the substrate is either that which is primary,
or that which is final in relation to the end. For wine is said to be
one, and water one, as being something formally indistinguishable. And
all liquids are said to be one (e.g. oil and wine), and melted things;
because the ultimate substrate of all of them is the same, for all
these things are water or vapor.
(c) Things are
said to be "one" whose genus is one and differs in its opposite
differentiae. All these things too are said to be "one" because the
genus, which is the substrate of the differentiae, is one (e.g.,
"horse," "man" and "dog" are in a sense one, because they are all
animals); and that in a way very similar to that in which the matter
is one.Sometimes these
things are said to be "one" in this sense, and sometimes their higher
genus is said to be one and the same (if they are final species of
their genus)—the genus, that is, which is above the genera
of which their proximate genus is one; e.g., the isosceles and
equilateral triangles are one and the same figure (because they are
both triangles), but not the same triangles.
(d)
Again, things are said to be "one" when the definition stating the
essence of one is indistinguishable from a definition explaining the
other; for in itself every definition is distinguishable <into
genus and differentiae>. In this way that which increases and
decreases is one, because its definition is one; just as in the case
of planes the definition of the form is one.
[
1016b]
[1]
And in general
those things whose concept, which conceives the essence, is
indistinguishable and cannot be separated either in time or in place
or in definition, are in the truest sense one; and of these such as
are substances are most truly one. For universally such things as do
not admit of distinction are called "one" in so far as they do not
admit of it; e.g., if "man" qua "man" does not
admit of distinction, he is one man; and similarly if qua animal, he is one animal; and if qua magnitude, he is one magnitude.
Most things, then, are said to be "one" because they produce, or
possess, or are affected by, or are related to, some other one thing;
but some are called "one" in a primary sense, and one of these is
substance. It is one either in continuity or in form or in definition;
for we reckon as more than one things which are not continuous, or
whose form is not one, or whose definition is not one.Again, in one sense we call
anything whatever "one" if it is quantitative and continuous; and in
another sense we say that it is not "one" unless it is a
whole of some kind, i.e. unless it is one in form (e.g.,
if we saw the parts of a shoe put together anyhow, we should not say
that they were one — except in virtue of their continuity;
but only if they were so put together as to be a shoe, and to possess
already some one form).Hence the circumference of a circle is of all lines the most truly
one, because it is whole and complete.
The essence of "one" is to be a kind of starting point of number;
for the first measure is a starting point, because that by which first
we gain knowledge of a thing is the first measure of each class of
objects.
[20]
"The one,"
then, is the starting-point of what is knowable in respect of each
particular thing. But the unit is not the same in all
classes,for in one
it is the quarter-tone, and in another the vowel or consonant; gravity
has another unit, and motion another. But in all cases the unit is
indivisible, either quantitatively or formally.Thus that which is quantitatively and
qua quantitative wholly indivisible and
has no position is called a unit; and that which is wholly indivisible
and has position, a point; that which is divisible in one sense, a
line; in two senses, a plane; and that which is quantitatively
divisible in all three senses, a body.And reversely that which is divisible in two
senses is a plane, and in one sense a line; and that which is in no
sense quantitatively divisible is a point or a unit; if it has no
position, a unit, and if it has position, a point.
Again,
some things are one numerically, others formally, others generically,
and others analogically; numerically, those whose matter is one;
formally, those whose definition is one; generically, those which
belong to the same category; and analogically, those which have the
same relation as something else to some third object.In every case the latter types
of unity are implied in the former: e.g., all things which are one
numerically are also one formally, but not all which are one formally
are one numerically;
[
1017a]
[1]
and all are one generically which
are one formally, but such as are one generically are not all one
formally, although they are one analogically; and such as are one
analogically are not all one generically.
It is obvious
also that "many" will have the opposite meanings to "one." Some things
are called "many" because they are not continuous; others because
their matter (either primary or ultimate) is formally divisible;
others because the definitions of their essence are more than
one.
"Being" means (1.) accidental being, (2.)
absolute being. (1.) E.g., we say that the upright person "is"
cultured, and that the man "is" cultured, and that the cultured person
"is" a man; very much as we say that the cultured person builds,
because the builder happens to be cultured, or the cultured person a
builder; for in this sense "X is Y" means that Y is an accident of
X.And so it is with
the examples cited above; for when we say that "the man is cultured"
and "the cultured person is a man" or "the white is cultured" or "the
cultured is white," in the last two cases it is because both
predicates are accidental to the same subject, and in the first case
because the predicate is accidental to what
is ; and we
say that "the cultured is a man" because "the cultured" is accidental
to a man.(Similarly
"not-white" is said to "be," because the subject of which "not-white"
is an accident,
is .)
[20]
These, then, are the senses in which things are
said to "be" accidentally: either because both predicates belong to
the same subject, which
is ; or because the predicate
belongs to the subject, which
is ; or because the subject
to which belongs that of which it is itself predicated itself
is .
(2.) The senses of essential being are
those which are indicated by the figures of predication
17; for "being" has as many senses as there
are ways of predication. Now since some predicates indicate (a) what a
thing is, and others its (b) quality, (c) quantity, (d) relation, (e)
activity or passivity, (f) place, (g) time, to each of these
corresponds a sense of "being."There is no difference between "the man is
recovering" and "the man recovers"; or between "the man is walking" or
"cutting" and "the man walks" or "cuts"; and similarly in the other
cases.
(3.) Again, "to be" and
"is" mean that a thing is true, and "not to be" that it is
false.Similarly too
in affirmation and negation; e.g., in "
Socrates is cultured" "is" means that this is true;
or in "Socrates is not-white"
that this is true; but in "the diagonal is not commensurable"
18"is not" means that the statement is
false.
[
1017b]
[1]
(4.) Again, "to be" <or
"is"> means that some of these statements can be made in virtue
of a potentiality and others in virtue of an actuality.For we say that both that which
sees potentially and that which sees actually
is "a
seeing thing." And in the same way we call "understanding" both that
which
can use the understanding, and that which
does ; and we call "tranquil" both that in which
tranquillity is already present, and that which is potentially
tranquil.Similarly
too in the case of substances. For we say that Hermes is in the
stone,
19
and the half of the line in the whole; and we call "corn" what is not
yet ripe. But when a thing is potentially existent and when not, must
be defined elsewhere.
20"Substance" means (a) simple
bodies, e.g. earth, fire, water and the like; and in general bodies,
and the things, animal or divine, including their parts, which are
composed of bodies. All these are called substances because they are
not predicated of any substrate, but other things are predicated of
them.(b) In another
sense, whatever, being immanent in such things as are not predicated
of a substrate, is the cause of their being; as, e.g., the soul is the
cause of being for the animal.(c) All parts immanent in things which define
and indicate their individuality, and whose destruction causes the
destruction of the whole; as, e.g., the plane is essential to the body
(as some
21 hold) and the line to the plane.
[20]
And number in general is thought
by some
22 to be of this nature, on the ground that if
it is abolished nothing exists, and that it determines
everything.(d)
Again, the
essence , whose formula is the definition, is
also called the substance of each particular thing.
Thus it follows that "substance" has two senses:
the ultimate subject, which cannot be further predicated of something
else; and whatever has an individual and separate existence. The shape
and form of each particular thing is of this nature.
"The
same" means (a) accidentally the same. E.g., "white" and "cultured"
are the same because they are accidents of the same subject; and "man"
is the same as "cultured," because one is an accident of the other;
and "cultured" is the same as "man" because it is an accident of
"man"; and "cultured man" is the same as each of the terms "cultured"
and "man," and vice versa; for both "man" and "cultured" are used in
the same way as "cultured man," and the latter in the same way as the
former.Hence none of
these predications can be made universally. For it is not true to say
that every man is the same as "the cultured"; because universal
predications are essential to things,
[
1018a]
[1]
but
accidental predications are not so, but are made of individuals and
with a single application. "
Socrates" and "cultured
Socrates" seem to be the same; but "
Socrates" is not a class-name, and
hence we do not say "every
Socrates" as we say "every man."Some things are said to be "the same" in this
sense, but (b) others in an essential sense, in the same number of
senses as "the one" is essentially one; for things whose matter is
formally or numerically one, and things whose substance is one, are
said to be the same. Thus "sameness" is clearly a kind of unity in the
being, either of two or more things, or of one thing treated as more
than one; as, e.g., when a thing is consistent with itself; for it is
then treated as two.
Things are called "other" of which
either the forms or the matter or the definition of essence is more
than one; and in general "other" is used in the opposite senses to
"same."
Things are called
"different" which, while being in a sense the same, are "other" not
only numerically, but formally or generically or analogically; also
things whose genus is not the same; and contraries; and all things
which contain "otherness" in their essence.
Things
are called "like" which have the same attributes in all respects; or
more of those attributes the same than different; or whose quality is
one. Also that which has a majority or the more important of those
attributes of something else in respect of which change is possible
(i.e. the contraries) is like that thing. And "unlike" is used in the
opposite senses to "like."
[20]
The term "opposite" is applied to (a)
contradiction; (b) contraries; (c) relative terms; (d) privation; (e)
state; (f) extremes; e.g. in the process of generation and
destruction. And (g) all things which cannot be present at the same
time in that which admits of them both are called opposites; either
themselves or their constituents. "Grey" and "white" do not apply at
the same time to the same thing, and hence their constituents are
opposite.
"Contrary" means: (a) attributes,
generically different, which cannot apply at the same time to the same
thing. (b) The most different attributes in the same genus; or (c) in
the same subject; or (d) falling under the same faculty. (e) Things
whose difference is greatest absolutely, or in genus, or in
species.Other
things are called "contrary" either because they possess attributes of
this kind, or because they are receptive of them, or because they are
productive of or liable to them, or actually produce or incur them, or
are rejections or acquisitions or possessions or privations of such
attributes.And
since "one" and "being" have various meanings, all other terms which
are used in relation to "one" and "being" must vary in meaning with
them; and so "same," "other" and "contrary" must so vary, and so must
have a separate meaning in accordance with each category.
Things are called "other in species" (a)
which belong to the same genus and are not subordinate one to the
other;
[
1018b]
[1]
or (b) which are in the same genus and
contain a differentia; or (c) which contain a contrariety in their
essence.(d)
Contraries, too (either all of them or those which are called so in a
primary sense), are "other in species" than one another; and (e) so
are all things of which the formulae are different in the final
species of the genus (e.g., "man" and "horse" are generically
indivisible, but their formulae are different); and (f) attributes of
the same substance which contain a difference. "The same in species"
has the opposite meanings to these.
"Prior" and
"posterior" mean: (1.) (a) In one sense (assuming that there is in
each genus some primary thing or starting-point) that which is nearer
to some starting-point, determined either absolutely and naturally, or
relatively, or locally, or by some agency; e.g., things are prior in
space because they are nearer either to some place naturally
determined, such as the middle or the extreme, or to some chance
relation; and that which is further is posterior.(b) In another sense, prior or
posterior in
time . Some things are prior as being
further from the present, as in the case of past events (for the
Trojan is prior to the Persian war, because it is further distant from
the present); and others as being nearer the present, as in the case
of future events (for the Nemean are prior to the Pythian games
because they are nearer to the present, regarded as a starting-point
and as primary).
[20]
(c) In another sense, in
respect of motion (for that which is nearer to the prime mover is
prior; e.g., the boy is prior to the man). This too is a kind of
starting point in an absolute sense. (d) In respect of potency; for
that which is superior in potency, or more potent, is prior. Such is
that in accordance with whose will the other, or posterior, thing must
follow, so that according as the former moves or does not move, the
latter is or is not moved. And the
will is a
"starting-point."(e) In respect of order; such are all things which are
systematically arranged in relation to some one determinate object.
E.g., he who is next to the leader of the chorus is prior to him who
is next but one, and the seventh string is prior to the eighth
23; for in one case the leader is
the starting-point, and in the other the middle
24
string.
In these examples "prior" has this sense; but
(2.) in another sense that which is prior in knowledge is treated as
absolutely prior; and of things which are prior in this sense the
prior in
formula are different from the prior in
perception . Universals are prior in formula, but
particulars in perception. And in formula the attribute is prior to
the concrete whole: e.g. "cultured" to "the cultured man"; for the
formula will not be a whole without the part.Yet "cultured" cannot exist apart from
some cultured person.
Again, (3.)
attributes of prior subjects are called prior; e.g., straightness is
prior to smoothness,
[
1019a]
[1]
because the former is an
attribute of the line in itself, and the latter of a
surface.
Some things, then, are called prior and
posterior in this sense; but others (iv.) in virtue of their nature
and substance, namely all things which can exist apart from other
things, whereas other things cannot exist without them. This
distinction was used by Plato.
25(And since "being" has
various meanings, (a) the substrate, and therefore substance, is
prior; (b) potential priority is different from actual
priority.Some
things are prior potentially, and some actually; e.g., potentially the
half-line is prior to the whole, or the part to the whole, or the
matter to the substance; but actually it is posterior, because it is
only upon dissolution that it will actually exist.)Indeed, in a sense all things which are
called "prior" or "posterior" are so called in this connection; for
some things can exist apart from others in generation (e.g. the whole
without the parts), and others in destruction (e.g. the parts without
the whole). And similarly with the other examples.
"Potency"
26 means: (a) the source of motion or
change which is in something other than the thing changed, or in it
qua other. E.g., the science of building
is a potency which is not present in the thing built; but the science
of medicine, which is a potency, may be present in the patient,
although not qua patient.Thus "potency" means the source in
general of change or motion in another thing, or in the same thing qua other;
[20]
or the source of a thing's being moved or changed
by another thing, or by itself qua other (for
in virtue of that principle by which the passive thing is affected in
any way we call it capable of being affected; sometimes if it is
affected at all, and sometimes not in respect of every affection, but
only if it is changed for the better).(b) The power of performing this well or
according to intention; because sometimes we say that those who can
merely take a walk, or speak, without doing it as well as they
intended, cannot speak or walk. And similarly in the case of
passivity.(c) All
states in virtue of which things are unaffected generally, or are
unchangeable, or cannot readily deteriorate, are called "potencies."
For things are broken and worn out and bent and in general destroyed
not through potency but through impotence and deficiency of some sort;
and things are unaffected by such processes which are scarcely or
slightly affected because they have a potency and are potent and are
in a definite state.
Since "potency" has all these meanings,
"potent" (or "capable") will mean (a) that which contains a source of
motion or change (for even what is static is "potent" in a sense)
which takes place in another thing, or in itself qua other.
[
1019b]
[1]
(b) That over which something else has
a potency of this kind. (c) That which has the potency of changing
things, either for the worse or for the better (for it seems that even
that which perishes is "capable" of perishing; otherwise, if it had
been incapable, it would not have perished. As it is, it has a kind of
disposition or cause or principle which induces such an
affection.Sometimes
it seems to be such as it is because it
has something,
and sometimes because it is
deprived of something; but if
privation is in a sense a state or "habit," everything will be
"potent" through
having something; and so a thing is
"potent" in virtue of having a certain "habit" or principle, and also
in virtue of having the privation of that "habit," if it can
have privation; and if privation is not in a sense
"habit," the term "potent" is equivocal).(d) A thing is "potent" if neither any other
thing nor itself qua other contains a potency
or principle destructive of it. (e) All these things are "potent"
either because they merely might chance to happen or not to happen, or
because they might do so
well . Even in inanimate things
this kind of potency is found; e.g. in instruments; for they say that
one lyre "can" be played, and another not at all, if it has not a good
tone.
"Impotence" is a privation of
potency—a kind of abolition of the principle which has been
described—either in general or in something which would
naturally possess that principle, or even at a time when it would
naturally already possess it (for we should not use
"impotence"—in respect of begetting—in the same
sense of a boy, a man and a eunuch).
[20]
Again, there is an "impotence" corresponding to
each kind of potency; both to the kinetic and to the successfully
kinetic.
Some things are said to be "impotent"
in accordance with this meaning of "impotence," but others in a
different sense, namely "possible" and "impossible." "Impossible"
means: (a) that whose contrary is necessarily true; e.g., it is
impossible that the diagonal of a square should be commensurable with
the sides, because such a thing is a lie, whose contrary is not only
true but inevitable. Hence that it is commensurable is not only a lie
but necessarily a lie.And the contrary of the impossible, i.e. the possible, is when the
contrary is not necessarily a lie; e.g., it is possible that a man
should be seated, for it is not necessarily a lie that he should not
be seated. "Possible," then, means in one sense, as we have said, that
which is not necessarily a lie; in another, that which is true; and in
another, that which may be true.
(The "power" in
geometry
27 is so called by an extension of meaning.)
These are the senses of "potent" which do
not correspond to "potency." Those which do correspond to it all refer
to the first meaning,
[
1020a]
[1]
i.e. "a source of change which
exists in something other than that in which the change takes place,
or in the same thing qua other."Other things are said to be
"potent"
28 because something else has such
a
potency over them; others
because it does not possess it; others because it possesses it in a
particular way. The term "impotent" is similarly used. Thus the
authoritative definition of "potency" in the primary sense will be "a
principle producing change, which is in something other than that in
which the change takes place, or in the same thing qua other."
"Quantity" means that which is
divisible into constituent parts, each
29 or every one
of which is by nature some one individual thing. Thus plurality, if it
is numerically calculable, is a kind of quantity; and so is magnitude,
if it is measurable. "Plurality" means that which is potentially
divisible into non-continuous parts; and "magnitude" that which is
potentially divisible into continuous parts. Of kinds of magnitude,
that which is continuous in one direction is length; in two
directions, breadth; in three, depth.And of these, plurality, when limited, is a
number; length, a line; breadth, a plane; depth, a body. Again, some
things are essentially quantitative, but others only accidentally;
e.g. the line is essentially, but "cultured" accidentally
quantitative.And of
the former class some are quantitative in virtue of their substance,
e.g. the fine (because the definition which describes it is
quantitative in some form);
[20]
and others are attributes and conditions of a substance of this
kind— e.g., "much" and "little," "long" and "short," "broad"
and "narrow," "deep" and "shallow," "heavy" and "light,"
etc.Moreover,
"great" and "small," and "greater" and "smaller," whether used
absolutely or relatively to one another, are essential attributes of
quantity; by an extension of meaning, however, these terms are also
applied to other things.Of things called quantitative in an accidental sense, one kind is so
called in the sense in which we said above that "cultured" or "white"
is quantitative—because the subject to which they belong is
quantitative; and others in the sense that motion and time are so
called—for these too are said in a sense to be quantitative
and continuous, since the subjects of which they are attributes are
divisible. I mean, not the thing moved, but that through or along
which the motion has taken place; for it is because the latter is
quantitative that the motion is quantitative, and because the motion
is quantitative that the time is also.
"Quality" means
(a) in one sense, the differentia of essence; e.g., a man is an animal
of a certain quality because he is two-footed; and so is a horse,
because it is four-footed. Also a circle is a geometrical figure of a
certain quality, because it has no angles;
[
1020b]
[1]
which
shows that the essential differentia is quality.In this one sense, then, "quality"
means differentia of essence; but (b) in another it is used as of
immovable and mathematical objects, in the sense that numbers are in a
way qualitative—e.g. such as are composite and are
represented geometrically not by a line but by a plane or solid (these
are products respectively of two and of three factors)—and
in general means that which is present besides quantity in the
essence. For the essence of each number is that which goes into it
once; e.g. that of 6 is not what goes twice or three times, but what
goes once; for 6 is once 6.(c) All affections of substance in motion in respect of which bodies
become different when they (the affections) change—e.g. heat
and cold, whiteness and blackness, heaviness and lightness, etc. (d)
The term is used with reference to goodness and badness, and in
general to good and bad.
Thus there are, roughly
speaking, two meanings which the term "quality" can bear, and of these
one is more fundamental than the other. Quality in the primary sense
is the differentia of the essence; and quality in numbers falls under
this sense, because it is a kind of differentia of essences, but of
things either not in motion or not qua in
motion. Secondly, there are the affections of things in motion qua in motion, and the differentiae of
motions.Goodness
and badness fall under these affections,
[20]
because they denote differentiae of the motion or
functioning in respect of which things in motion act or are acted upon
well or badly. For that which can function or be moved in
such-and-such a way is good, and that which can function in
such-and-such a way and in the contrary way is bad. Quality refers
especially to "good" and "bad" in the case of living things, and of
these especially in the case of such as possess choice.
Things are called "relative" (a) In the sense that "the double" is
relative to the half, and "the triple" to the third; and in general
the "many times greater" to the "many times smaller," and that which
exceeds to the thing exceeded. (b) In the sense that the thing which
heats or cuts is relative to the thing heated or cut; and in general
the active to the passive. (c) In the sense that the measurable is
relative to the measure, and the knowable to knowledge, and the
sensible to sensation.
(a) In the first sense they
are said to be numerically relative; either simply, or in a definite
relation to numbers or to 1. E.g., "the double" in relation to 1 is a
definite number; the "many times as great" is in a numerical relation
to 1, but not in a definite relation such as
this or
that ;
[
1021a]
[1]
the relation of that which is 1.5 times
something else to that something is a definite numerical relation to a
number; and that which is (n+1)/n times something else is in an
indefinite relation to a number, just as "the many times as great" is
in an indefinite relation to 1.The relation of that which exceeds to that
which is exceeded is numerically quite indefinite, for number is
commensurate, and is not predicated of the incommensurate; whereas
that which exceeds, in relation to that which is exceeded, is "so
much" plus something more; and this something more is indefinite, for
it is indifferently equal or not equal to the "so much."Thus not only are all these
things said to be relative in respect of number, but also the "equal"
and "like" and "same," though in another way: for all these terms are
used in respect of "one". Things are "the same" whose essence is one;
"like" whose quality is one; "equal" whose quantity is one. Now "one"
is the starting-point and standard of number; and so all these
relations involve number, though not all in the same way.
(b) Active and passive things are called relative in virtue of an
active or passive potentiality or actualization of the potentialities;
e.g., that which can heat is called relative to that which can be
heated, because it can heat; and again the thing heating is called
relative to the thing heated, and the thing cutting to the thing cut,
because their potentialities are actualized. Numerical relations, on
the other hand, are not actualized
[20]
(except as has been described elsewhere)
30; they
have no actualizations in respect of motion.Of things potentially relative, some are
further relative in respect of particular times; as, e.g., that which
has made or will make is relative to that which has been or will be
made. It is in this way that a father is called father of a son; the
one has acted, and the other has been acted upon, in a particular way.
Again, some things are relative in virtue of a privation of their
potentiality; such is "the impossible" and all similar terms, e.g.
"the invisible."
Thus relative terms which involve
number and potentiality are all relative because their very essence
contains a reference to something else; but not because something else
is related to their essence. But (c) that which is measurable or
knowable or thinkable is called relative because something else is
related to its essence.For "thinkable" signifies that there is a thought which thinks it;
but thought is not relative to that of which it is the thought (for
then the same thing would have been said twice). And similarly sight
is the sight of something; not of that of which it is the sight,
although this is of course true—it is relative to some color
or other similar thing.To describe it in the other way—"the sight of the object
of sight"—would be to say the same thing twice.
[
1021b]
[1]
Things, then, which are called relative of their
own nature are so called, some in these senses, and others because the
classes which contain them are of this kind. E.g., medicine is
reckoned as relative because its genus, science, is thought to be a
relative thing.Further,
there are the properties in virtue of which the things which possess
them are called relative; e.g., "equality" is relative because "the
equal" is relative, and "similarity" because "the similar" is
relative. Other things are accidentally relative; e.g., a man is
relative because he happens to be "double" something else, and
"double" is a relative term; or "white" is relative if the same thing
happens to be white as well as double.
"Perfect"
<or "complete"> means: (a) That outside which it is
impossible to find even a single one of its parts; e.g., the complete
time of each thing is that outside which it is impossible to find any
time which is a part of it. (b) That which, in respect of goodness or
excellence, cannot be surpassed in its kind; e.g., a doctor and a
musician are "perfect" when they have no deficiency in respect of the
form of their peculiar excellence.And thus by an extension of the meaning we use
the term in a bad connection, and speak of a "perfect" humbug and a
"perfect" thief; since indeed we call them "good"—
[20]
e.g. a "good" thief and a "good"
humbug.(c) And
goodness is a kind of perfection. For each thing, and every substance,
is perfect when, and only when, in respect of the form of its peculiar
excellence, it lacks no particle of its natural magnitude. (d) Things
which have attained their end, if their end is good, are called
"perfect"; for they are perfect in virtue of having attained the
end.Hence, since
the end is an ultimate thing, we extend the meaning of the term to bad
senses, and speak of perishing "perfectly" or being "perfectly"
destroyed, when the destruction or calamity falls short in no respect
but reaches its extremity. Hence, by an extension of the meaning,
death is called an "end," because they are both ultimate things. And
the ultimate object of action is also an end.
Things, then, which are called "perfect" in themselves are so called
in all these senses; either because in respect of excellence they have
no deficiency and cannot be surpassed, and because no part of them can
be found outside them; or because, in general, they are unsurpassed in
each particular class, and have no part outside.
[
1022a]
[1]
All
other things are so called in virtue of these, because they either
produce or possess something of this kind, or conform to it, or are
referred in some way or other to things which are perfect in the
primary sense.
"Limit" means: (a) The furthest part of
each thing, and the first point outside which no part of a thing can
be found, and the first point within which all parts are contained.
(b) Any form of magnitude or of something possessing
magnitude.(c) The
end of each thing. (This end is that
to which motion and
action proceed, and not the end
from which. But sometimes
it is both the end from which and the end to which, i.e. the final
cause.) (d) The reality or essence of each thing; for this is the
limit of our knowledge of it, and if it is a limit of the knowledge,
it is also a limit of the thing. Thus it is obvious that "limit" has
not only as many senses as "beginning" but even more; because the
beginning is a kind of limit, but not every limit is a
beginning.
"That in virtue of which" has various
meanings. (a) The form or essence of each individual thing; e.g., that
in virtue of which a man is good is "goodness itself." (b) The
immediate substrate in which a thing is naturally produced; as, e.g.,
color is produced in the surface of things. Thus "that in virtue of
which" in the primary sense is the
form , and in the
secondary sense, as it were, the
matter of each thing,
and the immediate substrate.And in general "that in virtue of which" will
exist in the same number of senses as "cause."
[20]
For we say indifferently "in virtue of
what has he come?" or "for what reason has he come?" and "in virtue of
what has he inferred or inferred falsely?" or "what is the cause of
his inference or false inference?" (And further, there is the
positional sense of
καθ᾽ ὅ, "in
which he stands," or "in which he walks"; all these examples denote
place or position.)
Hence "in virtue of itself" must also
have various meanings. It denotes (a) The essence of each particular;
e.g., Callias is in virtue of himself Callias and the essence of
Callias. (b) Everything contained in the definition; e.g., Callias is
in virtue of himself an animal, because "animal" is present in the
definition, since Callias is a kind of animal.(c) Any attribute which a thing has
received directly in itself or in any of its parts; e.g., the surface
is white in virtue of itself; and man lives in virtue of himself,
because the soul is a part of the man, and life is directly contained
in it. (d) That which has no other cause. Man has many causes:
"animal," "twofooted," etc.; but nevertheless man is in virtue of
himself man. (e) All things which belong to a thing alone and qua alone; and hence that which is separate
is "in virtue of itself."
31
[
1022b]
[1]
"Disposition" means arrangement of that
which has parts, either in space or in potentiality or in form. It
must be a kind of position, as indeed is clear from the word,
"disposition."
"Having"
32
means (a) In one sense an activity, as it were, of the haver and the
thing had, or as in the case of an action or motion; for when one
thing makes and another is made, there is between them an act of
making. In this way between the man who has a garment and the garment
which is had, there is a "having." Clearly, then, it is impossible to
have a "having" in this sense; for there will be an
infinite series if we can have the having of what we have.But (b) there is another sense
of "having" which means a disposition, in virtue of which the thing
which is disposed is disposed well or badly, and either independently
or in relation to something else. E.g., health is a state, since it is
a disposition of the kind described. Further, any part of such a
disposition is called a state; and hence the excellence of the parts
is a kind of state.
"Affection" means (a) In one sense, a
quality in virtue of which alteration is possible; e.g., whiteness and
blackness, sweetness and bitterness, heaviness and lightness, etc. (b)
The actualizations of these qualities; i.e. the alterations already
realized. (c) More particularly, hurtful alterations and
motions,
[20]
and
especially hurts which cause suffering. (d) Extreme cases of
misfortune and suffering are called "affections."
33We speak of
"privation": (a) In one sense, if a thing does not possess an
attribute which is a natural possession, even if the thing itself
would not naturally possess it
34; e.g., we
say that a vegetable is "deprived" of eyes. (b) If a thing does not
possess an attribute which it or its genus would naturally possess.
E.g., a blind man is not "deprived" of sight in the same sense that a
mole is; the latter is "deprived" in virtue of its genus, but the
former in virtue of himself.
35(c) If
a thing has not an attribute which it would naturally possess, and
when it would naturally possess it (for blindness is a form of
privation; but a man is not blind at
any age, but only if
he lacks sight at the age when he would naturally possess it
36), and similarly if it
37 lacks an attribute in the medium and organ
and relation and manner in which it would naturally possess
it.(d) The forcible
removal of anything is called privation. (e) Privation has as many
senses as there are senses of negation derived from the negative affix
(
ἀ-). For we call a thing
"unequal" because it does not possess equality (though it would
naturally do so); and "invisible" either because it has no color at
all or because it has only a faint one; and "footless" either because
it has no feet at all or because it has rudimentary feet.Again, a negative affix may
mean "having something in a small degree"—e.g.
"stoneless"—
[
1023a]
[1]
that is, having it in some
rudimentary manner. Again, it may mean having it "not easily" or "not
well"; e.g., "uncutable" means not only that which cannot be cut, but
that which cannot be cut easily or well. And again, it may mean not
having a thing at all; for it is not the one-eyed man, but the man who
lacks sight in both eyes, who is called blind. Hence not every man is
good or bad, moral or immoral; there is also the intermediate
state.
"To have" <or "possess"> is used
in various senses. (a) To direct in accordance with one's own nature
or impulse; whence we say that fever "possesses" a man, and despots
"possess" cities, and people who wear clothes "possess" them. (b) We
speak of anything as "having" in which, as receptive material,
something is present. E.g., the bronze "has" the shape of the statue,
and the body "has" the disease.(c) In the sense that the container holds the
contained; for when A is contained in B, we say that A is held by B.
E.g., we say that the vessel holds the liquid, and the city holds men,
and the ship holds sailors, and so too that the whole "holds" the
parts.(d) The same
term is applied to that which prevents anything from moving or acting
in accordance with its own impulse; as pillars hold <up>
the weights which are imposed upon them,
[20]
and as the poets make Atlas
38 hold up the heaven, because otherwise it
would fall upon the earth (as some of the physicists
39 maintain also). It is in this sense that
we say that "that which holds together" holds what it holds together;
because otherwise the latter would disperse, each part in accordance
with its own impulse.
"To be in a thing"
is used similarly in senses corresponding to those of "to
have."
"To come from something" means: (a) In one
sense, to come from something as matter, and this in two ways: in
respect either of the primary genus or of the ultimate species. E.g.,
in the one sense everything liquefiable comes from water, and in the
other the statue comes from bronze.(b) To come from something as the first moving
principle; e.g., "from what comes fighting?" From abuse; because this
is the beginning of a fight. (c) To come from the combination of
matter and form (as the parts come from the whole, and the verse from
the
Iliad
, and the stones from the house); for the shape is an end, and
that is a complete thing which has attained its end.(d) In the sense that the form
is made out of the part of its definition; as, e.g., "man" is made out
of "two-footed " and the syllable out of its element
40(this is a different way
from that in which the statue is made out of the bronze;
[
1023b]
[1]
for the composite entity is made out of perceptible
material, but the form is also made out of the material of the
form).These, then,
are some of the meanings of "from" <or "out of">, but
(e) sometimes one of these senses only partially applies; e.g., the
child comes from the father and mother, and plants from the earth,
because they come from some part of those things. (f) It means "after"
in time; e.g., we say that night comes from day, and storm from fine
weather, because one comes after the other.And we speak thus of some of these things in
view of their alternation with each other, as in the examples just
mentioned, and of others in view merely of their succession in time;
e.g., "the voyage was made from the equinox," meaning that it was made
after it; and "the Thargelia are from the Dionysia," meaning after the
Dionysia.
41"Part" means: (a) That into which a quantity can be in any way
divided; for that which is taken from a quantity qua quantity is always called a part of that
quantity—e.g., we call 2 part (in a sense) of 3. (b) In
another sense the term is only applied to those "parts" in sense (a)
which measure the whole; hence in one sense we call 2 part of 3, and
in another not.Again, (c)
those divisions into which the form, apart from quantity, can be
divided, are also called parts of the form. Hence species are called
parts of their genus. (d) That into which the whole
[20]
(either the form or that which contains
the form) is divided, or of which it is composed. E.g., of a bronze
sphere or cube not only is the bronze(i.e. the material which contains the form) a
part, but also the angle. (e) The elements in the definition of each
thing are also called parts of the whole. Hence the genus is even
called a part of the species, whereas in another sense the species is
part of the genus.
"Whole" means: (a) That from which no
part is lacking of those things as composed of which it is called a
natural whole. (b) That which so contains its contents that they form
a unity; and this in two ways, either in the sense that each of them
is a unity, or in the sense that the unity is composed of
them.For (i) the
universal, or term generally applied as being some whole thing, is
universal in the sense that it contains many particulars; because it
is predicated of each of them, and each and all of them (e.g. man,
horse, god) are one; because they are all living things. And (2) that
which is continuous and limited is a whole when it is a unity composed
of several parts (especially if the parts are only potentially present
in it; but otherwise even if they are present actually).And of these things
themselves, those which are so naturally are more truly wholes than
those which are so artificially; just as we said of "the one," because
"wholeness" is a kind of "oneness."
[
1024a]
[1]
Again,
since a quantity has a beginning, middle and end, those to which
position makes no difference we describe as "all," and those to which
position makes a difference we describe as "whole," and those to which
both descriptions can be applied, as both "all" and "whole."These are all things whose
nature remains the same in transposition, but whose shape does not;
e.g. wax or a coat. They are described as both "whole" and "all"; for
they have both characteristics. Water, however, and all liquids, and
number, are described as "all"; we do not speak of a "whole number" or
"whole water" except by an extension of meaning. Things are described
as "all" in the plural qua differentiated which
are described as "all" in the singular qua one;
all this number, all these units.
We do not
describe any chance quantity as "mutilated"; it must have parts, and
must be a whole. The number 2 is not mutilated if one of its 1's is
taken away—because the part lost by mutilation is never
equal to the remainder—nor in general is any number
mutilated; because the essence must persist. If a cup is mutilated, it
must still be a cup; but the number is no longer the same.Moreover, not even all things
which have dissimilar parts are mutilated; for a number has in a sense
dissimilar as well as similar parts—e.g. 2, 3. But in
general of things whose position makes no difference, e.g. water or
fire, none is mutilated;—
[20]
to be mutilated, things must be such as have their
position according to their essence.Further, they must be continuous; for a
musical scale is composed of dissimilar parts, and has position; but
it does not become mutilated. Moreover, even things which are wholes
are not mutilated by the removal of
any of their parts;
the parts removed must be neither proper to their essence nor in any
chance location. E.g., a cup is not mutilated if a hole is made in it,
but only if the handle or some projection is broken;and a man is not mutilated if
he loses flesh or his spleen, but if he loses some extremity; and not
every extremity, but only such as cannot grow again when completely
removed. Hence bald people are not mutilated.
The
term "genus" <or "race"> is used: (a) When there is a
continuous generation of things of the same type; e.g., "as long as
the human
race exists" means "as long as the generation
of human beings is continuous." (b) Of anything from which things
derive their being as the prime mover of them into being. Thus some
are called Hellenes by race, and others Ionians, because some have
Hellen and others Ion
as their first ancestor.(Races are called after the male ancestor rather than after the
material.
42
Some derive their race from the female as well; e.g. "the descendants
of Pyrrha
43.")
[
1024b]
[1]
(c) In the sense
that the plane is the "genus" of plane figures, and the solid of
solids (for each one of the figures is either a particular plane or a
particular solid); i.e., that which underlies the
differentiae.(d) In
the sense that in formulae the first component, which is stated as
part of the essence, is the genus, and the qualities are said to be
its differentiae. The term "genus," then, is used in all these
senses—(a) in respect of continuous generation of the same
type; (b) in respect of the first mover of the same type as the things
which it moves; (c) in the sense of material. For that to which the
differentia or quality belongs is the substrate, which we call
material.
Things are called "generically
different" whose immediate substrates are different and cannot be
resolved one into the other or both into the same thing. E.g., form
and matter are generically different, and all things which belong to
different categories of being; for some of the things of which being
is predicated denote the essence, others a quality, and others the
various other things which have already been distinguished. For these
also cannot be resolved either into each other or into any one
thing.
"False" means: (i) false as a
thing ; (a) because it is not or cannot be substantiated;
such are the statements that the diagonal of a square is
commensurable,
[20]
or that
you are sitting. Of these one is false always, and the other
sometimes; it is in these senses that these things are not
facts.(b) Such
things as really exist, but whose nature it is to seem either such as
they are not, or like things which are unreal; e.g. chiaroscuro and
dreams. For these are really something, but not that of which they
create the impression. Things, then, are called false in these senses:
either because they themselves are unreal, or because the impression
derived from them is that of something unreal.
(2.) A
false statement is the statement of
what is not, in so
far as the statement is false. Hence every definition is untrue of
anything other than that of which it is true; e.g., the definition of
a circle is untrue of a triangle. Now in one sense there is only one
definition of each thing, namely that of its essence; but in another
sense there are many definitions,
44 since the thing itself, and the thing itself
qualified (e.g. "Socrates"
and "cultured Socrates") are
in a sense the same.But
the false definition is not strictly a definition of anything. Hence
it was foolish of Antisthenes
45 to insist that nothing can be
described except by its proper definition: one predicate for one
subject; from which it followed that contradiction is impossible, and
falsehood
46 nearly
so. But it is possible to describe everything not only by its own
definition but by that of something else; quite falsely, and yet also
in a sense truly—e.g., 8 may be described as "double" by the
definition of 2.
[
1025a]
[1]
Such are the
meanings of "false" in these cases. (3.) A false man is one who
readily and deliberately makes such statements, for the sake of doing
so and for no other reason; and one who induces such statements in
others—just as we call things false which induce a false
impression. Hence the proof in the
Hippias47 that the same man is false and true
is misleading;for it
assumes (a) that the false man is he who is
able to
deceive, i.e. the man who knows and is intelligent; (b) that the man
who is willingly bad is better. This false assumption is due to the
induction; for when he says that the man who limps willingly is better
than he who does so unwillingly, he means by limping
pretending to limp. For if he is willingly lame, he is
presumably worse in this case just as he is in the case of moral
character.
"Accident" <or
"attribute"> means that which applies to something and is truly
stated, but neither necessarily nor usually; as if, for example, while
digging a hole for a plant one found a treasure. Then the finding of
treasure is an accident to the man who is digging the hole; for the
one thing is not a necessary consequence or sequel of the other, nor
does one usually find treasure while planting.
[20]
And a cultured man might be white; but since
this does not happen necessarily or usually, we call it an accident.
Thus since there are attributes and subjects, and some attributes
apply to their subjects only at a certain place and time, any
attribute which applies to a subject, but not because it was a
particular subject or time or place, will be an accident.Nor is there any definite
cause for an accident, but only a chance, i.e. indefinite, cause. It
was by accident that X went to
Aegina if he arrived there, not because he intended to go
there but because he was carried out of his course by a storm, or
captured by pirates.The
accident has happened or exists, but in virtue not of itself but of
something else; for it was the storm which was the cause of his coming
to a place for which he was not sailing—i.e.
Aegina.
"Accident" has also another sense,
48 namely,
whatever belongs to each thing in virtue of itself, but is not in its
essence; e.g. as having the sum of its angles equal to two right
angles belongs to the triangle. Accidents of this kind may be eternal,
but none of the former kind can be. There is an account of this
elsewhere.
49