[1011a]
[1]
because that which
moves is by nature prior to that which is moved, and this is no less
true if the terms are correlative.But there are
some, both of those who really hold these convictions and of those who
merely profess these views, who raise a difficulty; they inquire who
is to judge of the healthy man, and in general who is to judge rightly
in each particular case. But such questions are like wondering whether
we are at any given moment asleep or awake;and all problems of this kind amount to the
same thing. These people demand a reason for everything. They want a
starting-point, and want to grasp it by demonstration; while it is
obvious from their actions that they have no conviction. But their
case is just what we have stated before1;
for they require a reason for things which have no reason, since the
starting-point of a demonstration is not a matter of
demonstration.The
first class, then, may be readily convinced of this, because it is not
hard to grasp. But those who look only for cogency in argument look
for an impossibility, for they claim the right to contradict
themselves, and lose no time in doing so.Yet if not everything is relative, but some
things are self-existent, not every appearance will be true; for an
appearance is an appearance to someone. And so he who says that
all
[20]
appearances are
true makes everything relative.Hence those who demand something cogent in
argument, and at the same time claim to make out a case, must guard
themselves by saying that the appearance is true; not in itself, but
for him to whom it appears, and at, the time when
it appears, and in the way and manner in which it
appears. And if they make out a case without this
qualification, as a result they will soon contradict
themselves;for it is
possible in the case of the same man for a thing to appear honey to
the sight, but not to the taste, and for things to appear different to
the sight of each of his two eyes, if their sight is unequal. For to
those who assert (for the reasons previously stated2) that appearances are true, and that all things are therefore
equally false and true, because they do not appear the same to all,
nor always the same to the same person, but often have contrary
appearances at the same time(since if one crosses the fingers touch says that an object is two,
while sight says that it is only one3), we shall say "but not to the
same sense or to the same part of it in the same way and at the same
time"; so that with this qualification the appearance will be true.
This work is licensed under a
Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 United States License.
An XML version of this text is available for download, with the additional restriction that you offer Perseus any modifications you make. Perseus provides credit for all accepted changes, storing new additions in a versioning system.