[1007a]
[1]
because "being man" and "being not-man" have different meanings if
"being white" and "being man" have different meanings (for the
opposition is much stronger in the former case so as to produce
different meanings).And
if we are told that "white" too means one and the same thing,1
we shall say again just what we said before,2 that in that case all things, and not merely
the opposites, will be one. But if this is impossible, what we have
stated follows; that is, if our opponent answers our question; but if
when asked the simple question he includes in his answer the
negations, he is not answering our question.There is nothing to prevent the same thing
from being "man" and "white" and a multitude of other things; but
nevertheless when asked whether it is true to say that X is man, or
not, one should return an answer that means one thing, and not add
that X is white and large. It is indeed impossible to enumerate all
the infinity of accidents; and so let him enumerate either all or
none.Similarly
therefore, even if the same thing is ten thousand times "man" and
"not-man," one should not include in one's answer to the question
whether it is "man" that it is at the same time also "not-man," unless
one is also bound to include in one's answer all the other accidental
things that the subject is or is not.
[20]
And if one does this, he is not arguing
properly.In general those who
talk like this do away with substance and essence,for they are compelled to assert that
all things are accidents, and that there is no such thing as "being
essentially man" or "animal." For if there is to be such a thing as
"being essentially man," this will not be "being not-man" nor
"not-being man" (and yet these are negations of it); for it was
intended to have one meaning, i.e. the substance of
something.But to
denote a substance means that the essence is that and nothing else;
and if for it "being essentially man" is the same as either "being
essentially not-man" or "essentially not-being man," the essence will
be something else.Thus
they are compelled to say that nothing can have such a definition as
this, but that all things are accidental; for this is the distinction
between substance and accident: "white" is an accident of "man,"
because although he is white, he is not white in essence.And since the accidental
always implies a predication about some subject, if all statements are
accidental, there will be nothing primary about which they are made;
1 i.e. the same as "man."
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