[
1001b]
[1]
In either case there is a difficulty;
for whether Unity is not a substance or whether there is absolute
Unity, number cannot be a substance.It has already been stated why this is so if
Unity is not a substance; and if it is, there is the same difficulty
as about Being. For whence, if not from the absolute One or Unity, can
there be another one? It must be not-one; but all things are either
one, or many of which each is one. Further, if absolute Unity is
indivisible, by Zeno's axiom
it will be nothing.For
that which neither when added makes a thing greater nor when
subtracted makes it smaller is not an existent thing, he says
1; clearly assuming
that what exists is spatial magnitude. And if it is a spatial
magnitude it is corporeal, since the corporeal exists in all
dimensions, whereas the other magnitudes, the plane or line, when
added to a thing in one way will increase it, but when added in
another will not; and the point or unit will not increase a thing in
any way whatever.But
since Zeno's view is unsound, and it is possible for a thing to be
indivisible in such a way that it can be defended even against his
argument (for such a thing
2 when added will
increase a thing in number though not in size)—still how can
a
magnitude be composed of one or more such indivisible
things? It is like saying that the line is composed of
points.Moreover,
even if one supposes the case to be
[20]
such that number is generated, as some say, from
the One itself and from something else which is not one, we must none
the less inquire why and how it is that the thing generated will be at
one time number and at another magnitude, if the not-one was
inequality and the same principle in both cases.
3 For it is
not clear how magnitude can be generated either from One and this
principle, or from a number and this principle.
4(13.) Out of this arises the
question whether numbers, bodies, planes and points are substances or
not. If not, the question of what Being is, what the substances of
things are, baffles us; for modifications and motions and relations
and dispositions and ratios do not seem to indicate the substance of
anything; they are all predicated of a substrate, and none of them is
a definite thing.As for
those things which might be especially supposed to indicate
substance—water, earth, fire and air, of which composite
bodies are composed—