[
1087b]
[1]
Therefore all
contraries are predicated of a subject, and none of them exists
separately. But there is no contrary to substance; not only is this
apparent, but it is borne out by reasoned consideration.
1 Thus none of the
contraries is strictly a first principle; the first principle is
something different.
But the Platonists treat one of the
contraries as matter, some opposing "the unequal" to Unity (on the
ground that the former is of the nature of plurality) and others
plurality.For
according to some,
2 numbers
are generated from the unequal dyad of the Great and Small; and
according to another,
3 from plurality; but in both cases they are
generated by the essence of unity. For he who speaks of "the unequal"
and Unity as elements, and describes the unequal as a dyad composed of
Great and Small, speaks of the unequal, i.e. the Great and Small, as
being one; and does not draw the distinction that they are one in
formula but not in number.
4
Again, they state the first principles, which they call elements,
badly; some say that the Great and the Small, together with Unity
(making 3
5 in all), are the elements of numbers; the two former as
matter, and Unity as form. Others speak of the Many and Few, because
the Great and the Small are in their nature more suited to be the
principles of magnitude; and others use the more general term which
covers these—"the exceeding" and "the exceeded."But none of these variations
makes any appreciable difference with respect to some of the
consequences of the theory;
[20]
they only affect the abstract difficulties, which these thinkers
escape because the proofs which they themselves employ are
abstract.There is,
however, this exception: if "the exceeding" and "the exceeded" are the
first principles, and not the Great and the Small, on the same
principle number should be derived from the elements before 2 is
derived; for as "the exceeding and the exceeded" is more universal
than the Great and Small, so number is more universal than 2. But in
point of fact they assert the one and not the other.
Others oppose "the different" or "other" to Unity;
and others contrast Plurality and Unity.Now if, as they maintain, existing things are
derived from contraries, and if there is either no contrary to unity,
or if there is to be any contrary it is plurality; and if the unequal
is contrary to the equal, and the different to the same, and the other
to the thing itself then those who oppose unity to plurality have the
best claim to credibility—but even their theory is
inadequate, because then unity will be few. For plurality is opposed
to paucity, and many to few.
That "unity" denotes a
measure
6 is obvious. And in every case
there is something else which underlies it; e.g., in the scale there
is the quarter-tone; in spatial magnitude the inch or foot or some
similar thing; and in rhythms the foot or syllable. Similarly in the
case of gravity there is some definite weight. Unity is predicated of
all things in the same way;