[1058a]
[1]
and which is not accidentally
differentiated, whether regarded as matter or otherwise.For not only must the common
quality belong to both, e.g., that they are both animals, but the very
animality of each must be different; e.g., in one case it must be
equinity and in the other humanity. Hence the common quality must for
one be other in species than that which it is for the other. They must
be, then, of their very nature, the one this kind of
animal, and the other that ; e.g., the one a horse and
the other a man.Therefore
this difference must be "otherness of genus" (I say "otherness of
genus" because by "difference of genus" I mean an otherness which
makes the genus itself other); this, then, will be a form of
contrariety. This is obvious by induction.1 For all
differentiation is by opposites, and we have shown2 that
contraries are in the same genus, because contrariety was shown to be
complete difference. But difference in species is always difference
from something in respect of something; therefore this is the same
thing, i.e. the genus, for both.(Hence too all contraries which differ in
species but not in genus are in the same line of predication,3 and are
other than each other in the highest degree; for their difference is
complete, and they cannot come into existence simultaneously.) Hence
the difference is a form of contrariety.To be "other in species," then, means this: to be in the same genus
and involve contrariety, while being indivisible(and "the same in species" applies to
all things which do not involve contrariety, while being
indivisible);
[20]
for it
is in the course of differentiation and in the intermediate terms that
contrariety appears, before we come to the indivisibles.4
Thus it is evident that in relation to what is called genus no species
is either the same or other in species (and this is as it should be,
for the matter is disclosed by negation, and the genus is the matter
of that of which it is predicated as genus; not in the sense in which
we speak of the genus or clan of the Heraclidae,5 but as we speak of a genus in
nature); nor yet in relation to things which are not in the same
genus. From the latter it will differ in genus, but in species from
things which are in the same genus. For the difference of things which
differ in species must be a contrariety; and this belongs only to
things which are in the same genus. The question
might be raised as to why woman does not differ in species from man,
seeing that female is contrary to male, and difference is contrariety;
and why a female and a male animal are not other in species, although
this difference belongs to "animal" per se, and not as whiteness or
blackness does; "male" and "female" belong to it qua animal.This
problem is practically the same as "why does one kind of contrariety
(e.g. "footed" and "winged") make things other in species, while
another (e.g. whiteness and blackness) does not?" The answer may be
that in the one case the attributes are peculiar to the genus, and in
the other they are less so;
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