[988b]
[1]
but the inventors of the Forms express it most
nearly. For they do not conceive of the Forms as the
matter of sensible things (and the One as the matter of
the Forms), nor as producing the source of motion (for
they hold that they are rather the cause of immobility and
tranquillity); but they adduce the Forms as the essential
nature of all other things, and the One as that of the
Forms.The
end towards which actions, changes and motions tend they
do in a way treat as a cause, but not in this sense, i.e. not in the
sense in which it is naturally a cause. Those who speak of Mind or
Love assume these causes as being something good; but nevertheless
they do not profess that anything exists or is generated for the
sake of them, but only that motions originate from
them.1Similarly also those who hold that Unity or Being is an entity of
this kind state that it is the cause of existence, but not that things
exist or are generated for the sake of it. So it follows that in a
sense they both assert and deny that the Good is a cause; for they
treat it as such not absolutely, but incidentally.It appears, then, that all these
thinkers too (being unable to arrive at any other cause) testify that
we have classified the causes rightly, as regards both number and
nature. Further, it is clear that all the principles must be sought
either along these lines or in some similar way.
[20]
Let us
next examine the possible difficulties arising out of the statements
of each of these thinkers, and out of his attitude to the first
principles.All those who regard the universe as a
unity, and assume as its matter some one nature, and that corporeal
and extended, are clearly mistaken in many respects. They only assume
elements of corporeal things, and not of incorporeal ones, which also
exist. They attempt to state the causes of generation and destruction,
and investigate the nature of everything; and at the same time do away
with the cause of motion.Then there is their failure to regard the essence or
formula as a cause of anything; and further their readiness to call
any one of the simple bodies—except earth—a first
principle, without inquiring how their reciprocal generation is
effected. I refer to fire, water, earth and air. Of these some are
generated from each other by combination and others by
differentiation;and
this difference is of the greatest importance in deciding their
relative priority. In one way it might seem that the most elementary
body is that from which first other bodies are produced by
combination;
1 Cf. Aristot. Met. 3.17.
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