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[7]
Moreover the society of the good may
supply a sort of training in goodness, as Theognis1 remarks.
Again, if we examine the matter more fundamentally, it appears that a virtuous friend is
essentially desirable for a virtuous man. For as has been said above, that which is
essentially good is good and pleasing in itself to the virtuous man. And life is defined,
in the case of animals, by the capacity for sensation; in the case of man, by the capacity
for sensation and thought. But a capacity is referred to its activity, and in this its
full reality consists. It appears therefore that life in the full sense is sensation or
thought.But life is a thing good and pleasant in
itself, for it is definite, and definiteness is a part of the essence of goodness, and
what is essentially good is good for the good man, and hence appears to be pleasant to all
men.
Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vol. 19, translated by H. Rackham. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1934.
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