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The difficulties that may be raised are the following. （c） How can a
man fail in self-restraint when believing correctly that what he does is wrong? Some
people say that he cannot do so when he knows the act to be wrong; since, as
Socrates held, it would be strange if, when a man
possessed Knowledge, some other thing should overpower it, and ‘drag it about
like a slave.’1 In fact
Socrates used to combat the view2 altogether,
implying that there is no such thing as Unrestraint, since no one, he held, acts contrary
to what is best, believing what he does to be bad, but only through ignorance.
1 A quotation from Plat. Prot. 352b
2 Viz., that a man may know the right and do the wrong.
Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vol. 19, translated by H. Rackham. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1934.
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