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[6]
These considerations therefore show that it is not possible to be good in the true sense
without Prudence, nor to be prudent without Moral Virtue.
(Moreover, this might supply an answer to the dialectical argument that might be
put forward to prove that the virtues can exist in isolation from each other, on the
ground that the same man does not possess the greatest natural capacity for all of them,
so that he may have already attained one when he has not yet attained another. In regard
to the natural virtues this is possible; but it is not possible in regard to those virtues
which entitle a man to be called good without qualification. For if a man have the one
virtue of Prudence he will also have all the Moral Virtues together with
it.)
Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vol. 19, translated by H. Rackham. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1934.
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