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and similarly with
pleasant friends and with those who are friends for the sake of utility, who may be equal
or may differ in the amount of the benefits1 which they confer. Those who are equals
must make matters equal by loving each other, etc.,2 equally;
those who are unequal by making a return3
proportionate to the superiority of whatever kind on the one side.
[2]
Complaints and recriminations occur solely or chiefly in friendships of utility, as is to
be expected. In a friendship based on virtue each party is eager to benefit the other, for
this is characteristic of virtue and of friendship; and as they vie with each other in
giving and not in getting benefit, no complaints nor quarrels can arise, since nobody is
angry with one who loves him and benefits him, but on the contrary, if a person of good
feeling, requites him with service in return; and the one who outdoes the other in
beneficence will not have any complaint against his friend, since he gets what he desires,
and what each man desires is the good.4
[3]
Nor again are complaints likely to occur between friends
whose motive is pleasure either; for if they enjoy each other's company, both alike get
what they wish for; and indeed it would seem ridiculous to find fault with somebody for
not being agreeable to you, when you need not associate with him if you do not want to do
so.
[4]
But a friendship whose motive is utility is liable to
give rise to complaints. For here the friends associate with each other for profit, and so
each always wants more, and thinks he is getting less than his due; and they make it a
grievance that they do not get as much as they want and deserve; and the one who is doing a service can never supply all that the
one receiving it wants.
[5]
It appears that, as justice is of two kinds, one unwritten and the other defined by law,
so the friendship based on utility may be either moral5 or legal. Hence occasions for complaint chiefly occur when the type
of friendship in view at the conclusion of the transaction is not the same as when the a
relationship was formed.
[6]
Such a connection when on stated
terms is one of the legal type, whether it be a purely business matter of exchange on the
spot, or a more liberal accommodation for future repayment,6 though
still with an agreement as to the quid pro quo; and in the
latter case the obligation is clear and cannot cause dispute, though there is an element
of friendliness in the delay allowed, for which reason in some states there is no action
at law in these cases, it being held that the party to a contract involving credit must
abide by the consequences.
[7]
The moral type on the other
hand is not based on stated terms, but the gift or other service is given as to a friend,
although the giver expects to receive an equivalent or greater return, as though it had
not been a free gift but a loan; and as he ends the relationship in a different spirit
from that in which he began it, he will complain.7
[8]
The reason of this is that all men, or most men, wish
what is noble but choose what is profitable; and while it is noble to render a service not
with an eye to receiving one in return,
1 i.e., the pleasure or utility as the case may be.
2 i.e., ‘and by being good or pleasant and useful.’
3 The one who is less good or pleasant or useful must give more affection: see 6.6, note, 7.2.
4 The last clause is suspected as an interpolation.
5 i.e., either a ‘moral obligation’ or a contract enforceable by law. It is noteworthy that the term ‘friendship’ is stretched to include the latter.
6 Or ‘more liberal in point of time.’
7 Sc., if disappointed of the return he expects.