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and the one who is doing a service can never supply all that the
one receiving it wants.
[5]
It appears that, as justice is of two kinds, one unwritten and the other defined by law,
so the friendship based on utility may be either moral1 or legal. Hence occasions for complaint chiefly occur when the type
of friendship in view at the conclusion of the transaction is not the same as when the a
relationship was formed.
[6]
Such a connection when on stated
terms is one of the legal type, whether it be a purely business matter of exchange on the
spot, or a more liberal accommodation for future repayment,2 though
still with an agreement as to the quid pro quo; and in the
latter case the obligation is clear and cannot cause dispute, though there is an element
of friendliness in the delay allowed, for which reason in some states there is no action
at law in these cases, it being held that the party to a contract involving credit must
abide by the consequences.
[7]
The moral type on the other
hand is not based on stated terms, but the gift or other service is given as to a friend,
although the giver expects to receive an equivalent or greater return, as though it had
not been a free gift but a loan; and as he ends the relationship in a different spirit
from that in which he began it, he will complain.3
[8]
The reason of this is that all men, or most men, wish
what is noble but choose what is profitable; and while it is noble to render a service not
with an eye to receiving one in return,