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productive of some good or of pleasure, so
that the class of things lovable as ends is reduced to the good and the pleasant.
2.
[2]
Then, do men like
what is really good, or what is good for them? for sometimes the two may be at variance;
and the same with what is pleasant. Now it appears that each person loves what is good for
himself, and that while what is really good is lovable absolutely, what is good for a
particular person is lovable for that person. Further, each person loves not what is
really good for himself, but what appears to him to be so; however, this will not affect
our argument, for ‘lovable’ will mean ‘what appears
lovable.’ 2.
[3]
There being then three motives of love, the term Friendship is not applied to love for
inanimate objects, since here there is no return of affection, and also no wish for the
good of the object—for instance, it would be ridiculous to wish well to a bottle
of wine: at the most one wishes that it may keep well in order that one may have it
oneself; whereas we are told that we ought to wish our friend well for his own sake. But
persons who wish another good for his own sake, if the feeling is not reciprocated, are
merely said to feel goodwill for him: only when mutual is such goodwill termed friendship.
2.
[4]
And perhaps we should
also add the qualification that the feeling of goodwill must be known to its object. For a
man often feels goodwill towards persons whom he has never seen, but whom he believes to
be good or useful,