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[5]
When therefore the law lays down a general rule, and
thereafter a case arises which is an exception to the rule, it is then right, where the
Iawgiver's pronouncement because of its absoluteness is defective and erroneous, to
rectify the defect by deciding as the lawgiver would himself decide if he were present on
the occasion, and would have enacted if he had been cognizant of the case in question.
[6]
Hence, while the equitable is just, and is superior to
one sort of justice, it is not superior to absolute justice, but only to the error due to
its absolute statement. This is the essential nature of the equitable: it is a
rectification of law where law is defective because of its generality. In fact this is the
reason why things are not all determined by law: it is because there are some cases for
which it is impossible to lay down a law, so that a special ordinance becomes necessary.
[7]
For what is itself indefinite can only be measured by
an indefinite standard, like the leaden rule1 used by Lesbian builders; just as
that rule is not rigid but can be bent to the shape of the stone, so a special ordinance
is made to fit the circumstances of the case.
[8]
It is now plain what the equitable is, and that it is just, and that it is superior to
one sort of justice. And from this it is clear what the equitable man is: he is one who by
choice and habit does what is equitable, and