(for the possibility of this is also a debated question).
[5]
Moreover, lack of self-restraint may make a person voluntarily
submit to being harmed by another; which again would prove that it is possible to suffer
injustice voluntarily. But perhaps this definition of acting unjustly is incorrect, and we
should add to the words ‘to do harm knowing the person affected, the instrument
and the manner’ the further qualification ‘against that person's
wish.’
[6]
If so, though a man can be harmed and
can have an unjust thing done to him voluntarily, no one can suffer injustice voluntarily,
because no one can wish to be harmed: even the unrestrained man does not, but acts
contrary to his wish, since no one wishes for a thing that he does not think to be good,
and the unrestrained man does what he thinks he ought not to do.
[7]
One who gives away what is his own—as Homer1
says that Glaucus gave to Diomede “
golden arms for bronze,
An hundred beeves' worth for the worth of nine—
” cannot be said to suffer injustice; for giving rests with oneself, suffering
injustice does not—there has to be another person who acts unjustly.
[8]
It is clear then that it is not possible to suffer injustice voluntarily.
There still remain two of the questions that we proposed to discuss:
(1) Is it ever he who gives the unduly large share, or is it always he
who receives it, that is guilty of the injustice? and (2) Can one act
unjustly towards oneself?
[9]
If the former alternative is possible, that is, if it may be the giver and not the
receiver of too large a share who acts unjustly, then when a man knowingly and voluntarily
assigns a larger share to another than to himself—
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