Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics
H. Rackham, Ed.

though it very closely resembles friendship¹; for he who exemplifies this middle disposition is the sort of man we mean by the expression ‘a good friend,’ only that includes an element of affection. [5] It differs from friendship in not possessing the emotional factor of affection for one's associates; since a man of this character takes everything in the right way not from personal liking or dislike, but from natural amiability. He will behave with the same propriety towards strangers and acquaintances alike, towards people with whom he is familiar and those with whom he is not—though preserving the shades of distinction proper to each class, since it is not appropriate to show the same regard or disregard for the feelings of friends and of strangers. [6]

We have said then in general terms that he will behave in the right manner in society. We mean that in designing either to give pain or to contribute pleasure he will be guided by considerations of honor and of expediency. [7] For he seems to be concerned with pleasure and pain in social intercourse. He will disapprove of pleasures in which it is dishonorable or harmful to himself for him to join, preferring to give pain²; and he will also disapprove of and refuse to acquiesce in a pleasure that brings any considerable discredit or harm to the agent, if his opposition will not cause much pain. [8] And he will comport himself differently with men of high position and with ordinary people,