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trace our conduct back to many other origins than those within ourselves, then actions of
which the origins are within us, themselves depend upon us, and are voluntary.
[7]
This conclusion seems to be attested both by men's behavior in private life and by the
practice of lawgivers; for they punish and exact redress from those who do evil
(except when it is done under compulsion, or through ignorance for which the
agent himself is not responsible), and honor those who do noble deeds, in order
to encourage the one sort and to repress the other; but nobody tries to encourage us to do
things that do not depend upon ourselves and are not voluntary, since it is no good our
being persuaded not to feel heat or pain or hunger or the like, because we shall feel them
all the same.
[8]
Indeed the fact that an offence was committed in ignorance is itself made a ground for
punishment, in cases where the offender is held to be responsible for his ignorance; for
instance, the penalty is doubled if the offender was drunk,1 because the origin of the offence was in the man himself, as he might
have avoided getting drunk, which was the cause of his not knowing what he was doing. Also
men are punished for offences committed through ignorance of some provision of the law
which they ought to have known,
1 An enactment of Pittacus, tyrant of Mitylene, Aristot. Pol. 1274b 19.