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for instance, Is this object a
loaf? or, Is this loaf properly baked? for these are matters of direct perception.
Deliberation must stop at the particular fact, or it will embark on a process ad infinitum.3.
[17]
The object of deliberation and the object of choice are the same, except that when a
thing is chosen it has already been determined, since it is the thing already selected as
the result of our deliberation that is chosen. For a man stops enquiring how he shall act
as soon as he has carried back the origin of action to himself, and to the dominant
part1 of himself, for it is this part that chooses. 3.
[18]
This maybe illustrated by the ancient
constitutions represented in Homer: the kings used to proclaim to the people the measures
they had chosen to adopt.3.
[19]
As then the object of choice is something within our power which after deliberation we
desire, Choice will be a deliberate desire of things in our power; for we first
deliberate, then select, and finally fix our desire according to the result of our
deliberation.3.
[20]
Let this serve as a description in outline of Choice, and of the nature of its objects,
and the fact that it deals with means to ends.4.
Wishes, on the contrary, as was said above,2 are for ends. But while some hold that what is wished for3 is the good, others think it is what appears to be good.
[2]
Those however who say that what is wished for is the
really good, are faced by the conclusion, that what a man who chooses his end wrongly
wishes for is not really wished for at all; since if it is to be wished for, it must on
their showing be good, whereas in the case assumed it may so happen that the man wishes
for something bad.
1 i.e., the intellect or reason, which chooses a line of action for the individual, as the Homeric monarch chose a policy for his kingdom.
2 Cf. 2.9.
3 The inherent ambiguity of the Greek verbal adjective form causes some confusion in this chapter between what is and what ought to be wished for, the desired and the desirable.