On the other hand friendship based on pleasure is the friendship of the young, for they have a sense of what is pleasant; hence young people's friendship easily changes, for since their characters change as they grow up, their taste in pleasure also changes. But the friendship in conformity with goodness is the friendship of the best men.“ Athens no longer knows Megara.
”Fr. Eleg. Adespota 6 (Bergk)
[1236a]
[1]
And similarly also in the case of the spirit,
the really pleasant things are not those pleasant to children and
animals, but those pleasant to the adult; at least it is these that we
prefer when we remember both. And as a child or animal stands to an adult human
being, so the bad and foolish man stands to the good and wise man; and
these take pleasure in things that correspond to their characters, and
these are things good and fine.Since therefore good is
a term of more than one meaning (for we call one thing good because
that is its essential nature, but another because it is serviceable
and useful), and furthermore pleasant includes both what is absolutely
pleasant and absolutely good and what is pleasant for somebody and
apparently good—, as in the case of inanimate objects we may
choose a thing and love it for each of these reasons, so also in the
case of a human being, one man we love because of his character, and
for goodness, another because he is serviceable and useful, another
because he is pleasant, and for pleasure. And a man becomes a friend
when while receiving affection he returns it, and when he and the
other are in some way aware of this.It follows, therefore,
that there are three sorts of friendship, and that they are not all so
termed in respect of one thing or as species of one genus, nor yet
have they the same name entirely by accident. For all these uses of
the term are related to one particular sort of friendship which is
primary, like the term 'surgical'—and we speak of a surgical
mind and a surgical hand and a surgical instrument and a surgical
operation,
[20]
but we
apply the term properly to that which is primarily so called.
The primary is
that of which the definition is implicit in the definition of all, for
example a surgical instrument is an instrument that a surgeon would
use, whereas the definition of the instrument is not implicit in that
of surgeon. Therefore in
every case people seek the primary, and because the universal is
primary they assume that also the primary is universal; but this is
untrue. Hence in the case of friendship, they cannot take account of
all the observed facts. For as one definition does not fit, they think
that the other kinds of friendship are not friendships at all; but
really they are, although not in the same way, but when they find that the
primary friendship does not fit, assuming that it would be universal
if it really were primary, they say that the others are not
friendships at all. But
in reality there are many kinds of friendships: this was among the
things said already,1 as we have distinguished three senses of the term
friendship—one sort has been defined as based on goodness,
another on utility, another on pleasure.Of these the one
based on utility is assuredly the friendship of most people; for they
love one another because they are useful, and in so far as they are
and so, as says the proverb—“Glaucus, an ally is a
friend, as long as he our battle fights,2 and
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