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[1228a]
[23]
It has then been stated in
general terms that there are middle states in the virtues and that
these are purposive, and also that the opposite dispositions are vices
and what these are. But let us take them separately and discuss them
seriatim. And first let us speak about Courage.Now almost everybody holds that the brave man is concerned with
fears, and that courage is one of the virtues. And in our
schedule1 previously we distinguished
daring and fear as contraries, for they are indeed in a manner opposed
to one another. It is
clear, therefore, that the persons named after these states of
character will also be similarly opposed to each other—that
is, the coward (for that is the term that denotes being more afraid
than is proper and less daring than is proper) and the daring man (for
that denotes the characteristic of being less afraid than is proper
and more daring than is proper—and from this the name is
derived, as the word 'daring' is cognate with the word 'dare').
So that since
courage is the best state of character in relation to feelings of fear
and daring, and the proper character is neither that of the daring
(for they fall short in one respect and exceed in another) nor that of
the cowardly (for they also do the same, only not as regards the same
things but inversely—
Aristotle. Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vol. 20, translated by H. Rackham. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1981.
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