| Irascibility | Spiritlessness4 | Gentleness |
| Rashness | Cowardice | Courage |
[1220b]
[1]
as even its
name implies that it has its growth from habit,1 and by our often moving in
a certain way a habit not innate in us is finally trained to be
operative in that way (which we do not observe in inanimate objects,
for not even if you throw a stone upwards ten thousand times will it
ever rise upward unless under the operation of force)—let
moral character then be defined as a quality of the spirit in
accordance with governing reason that is capable of following the
reason. We have then to
say what is the part of the spirit in respect of which our moral
characters are of a certain quality. And it will be in respect of our faculties for
emotions according to which people are termed liable to some emotion,
and also of the states of character according to which people receive
certain designations in respect of the emotions, because of their
experiencing or being exempt from some form of emotion.After this comes the classification, made in previous
discussions,2 of the modes of emotion, the faculties
and the states of character. By emotions I mean such things as anger,
fear, shame, desire, and generally those experiences that are in
themselves usually accompanied by sensory pleasure or pain. And to these there is no
quality corresponding [but they are passive].3 But quality
corresponds to the faculties: by faculties I mean the properties
acting by which persons are designated by the names of the various
emotions, for instance choleric, insensitive, erotic, bashful,
shameless. States of character are the states that cause the emotions
to be present either rationally or the opposite:
[20]
for example courage, sobriety of mind,
cowardice, profligacy.These distinctions having been
established, it must be grasped that in every continuum that is
divisible there is excess and deficiency and a mean, and these either
in relation to one another or in relation to us, for instance in
gymnastics or medicine or architecture or navigation, and in any
practical pursuit of whatever sort, both scientific and unscientific,
both technical and untechnical; for motion is a continuum, and conduct is a motion.
And in all things the mean in relation to us is the best, for that is
as knowledge and reason bid. And everywhere this also produces the
best state. This is proved by induction and reason: contraries are
mutually destructive, and extremes are contrary both to each other and
to the mean, as the mean is either extreme in relation to the
other—for example the equal is greater than the less and
less than the greater.
Hence moral goodness must be concerned with certain means and must be
a middle state. We must, therefore, ascertain what sort of middle
state is goodness and with what sort of means it is concerned.
Let each then be
taken by way of illustration and studied with the help of the
schedule:
1 ἦθος derived from ἔθος by lengthening of ε to η: cf. Aristot. Nic. Eth. 2.3.4 This clause and the one following interrupt the construction of the sentence.
2 Perhaps a reference to Aristot. Nic. Eth. 1105b 20, inserted in the belief that the Eudemian Ethics is the later work.
3 This interpolation was made by an editor who derived ποιότης from ποιεῖν.
4 This place is filled in Aristot. Nic. Eth. 1108a 7 by ἀοργησία, Spiritlessness, lack of irascibility, and perhaps the Greek should be altered to that here.
Aristotle. Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vol. 20, translated by H. Rackham. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1981.
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