[896a]
Can we give it any other definition than that stated just now—“the motion able to move itself”?Clinias
Do you assert that “self-movement” is the definition of that very same substance which has “soul” as the name we universally apply to it?Athenian
That is what I assert. And if this be really so, do we still complain that it has not been sufficiently proved that soul is identical with the prime origin and motion of what is, has been, and shall be, and of all
[896b]
that is opposite to these, seeing that it has been plainly shown to be the cause of all change and motion in all things?Clinias
We make no such complaint; on the contrary, it has been proved most sufficiently that soul is of all things the oldest, since it is the first principle of motion.Athenian
Then is not that motion which, when it arises in one object, is caused by another, and which never supplies self-motion to anything, second in order—or indeed as far down the list as one cares to put it,—it being the change of a really soulless body?Clinias
True.Athenian
Truly and finally, then, it would be a most veracious and complete statement
[896c]
to say that we find soul to be prior to body, and body secondary and posterior, soul governing and body being governed according to the ordinance of nature.Clinias
Yes, most veracious.Athenian
We recollect, of course, that we previously agreed1 that if soul could be shown to be older than body, then the things of soul also will be older than those of body.Clinias
Certainly we do.
[896d]
Athenian
Moods and dispositions and wishes and calculations and true opinions and considerations and memories will be prior to bodily length, breadth, depth and strength, if soul is prior to body.Clinias
Necessarily.Athenian
Must we then necessarily agree, in the next place, that soul is the cause of things good and bad, fair and foul, just and unjust, and all the opposites, if we are to assume it to be the cause of all things?Clinias
Of course we must.Athenian
And as soul thus controls and indwells in all things
[896e]
everywhere that are moved, must we not necessarily affirm that it controls Heaven also?Clinias
Yes.Athenian
One soul, is it, or several? I will answer for you—“several.” Anyhow, let us assume not less than two—the beneficent soul and that which is capable of effecting results of the opposite kind.Clinias
You are perfectly right.Athenian
Very well, then. Soul drives all things in Heaven and earth and sea by its own motions,
Plato. Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vols. 10 & 11 translated by R.G. Bury. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1967 & 1968.
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