[585c]
knowledge and reason,1 and, in
sum, all the things that are more excellent2? Form your judgement thus.
Which do you think more truly is, that which clings to what is ever like
itself and immortal and to the truth, and that which is itself of such a
nature and is born in a thing of that nature, or that which clings to what
is mortal and never the same and is itself such and is born in such a
thing?” “That which cleaves to what is ever the same far
surpasses,” he said. “Does the essence of that which
never abides the same partake of real essence any more than of
knowledge?” “By no means.” “Or of
truth and reality?” “Not of that, either.”
“And if a thing has less of truth has it not also less of real
essence or existence?” “Necessarily.”
“And is it not generally true
1 Different kinds of intelligence are treated as synonyms because for the present purpose their distinctions are irrelevant. Cf. 511 A, C, and Dδιάνοια. Cf. Unity of Plato's Thought, p. 43 and p. 47, n. 339. Plato does not distinguish synonyms nor virtual synonyms for their own sake as Prodicus did. Cf. Protag. 358 A-B.
Plato. Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vols. 5 & 6 translated by Paul Shorey. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1969.
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