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[581a]
for
the gratification of such desires.” “And
rightly,” he said. “And if we should also say that its
pleasure and its love were for gain or profit, should we not thus best bring
it together under one head1 in our discourse so as to understand each other when we
speak of this part of the soul, and justify our calling it the money-loving
and gain-loving part?” “I, at any rate, think
so,” he said. “And, again, of the high-spirited element,
do we not say that it is wholly set on predominance and victory and good
repute?”
[581b]
“Yes,
indeed.” “And might we not appropriately designate it as
the ambitious part and that which is covetous of honor?”
“Most appropriately.” “But surely it is
obvious to everyone that all the endeavor of the part by which we learn is
ever towards2 knowledge of the truth of things, and that it least of the
three is concerned for wealth and reputation.” “Much the
least.” “Lover of learning3 and lover of wisdom would be
suitable designations for that.” “Quite so,”
he said. “Is it not also true,” I said,
[581c]
“that the ruling principle4 of men's souls is in
some cases this faculty and in others one of the other two, as it may
happen?” “That is so,” he said. “And
that is why we say that the primary classes5 of men also are
three, the philosopher or lover of wisdom, the lover of victory and the
lover of gain.” “Precisely so” “And
also that there are three forms of pleasure, corresponding respectively to
each?” “By all means.” “Are you
aware, then” said I, “that if you should choose to ask
men of these three classes, each in turn,6 which is the most pleasurable of these
lives, each will chiefly commend his own7? The financier
[581d]
will
affirm that in comparison with profit the pleasures of honor or of learning
area of no value except in so far as they produce money.”
“True,” he said. “And what of the lover of
honor8?” I said; “does he not regard the pleasure
that comes from money as vulgar9 and low, and
again that of learning, save in so far as the knowledge confers honor, mere
fume10 and moonshine?” “It
is so,” he said. “And what,” said I,
“are we to suppose the philosopher thinks of the other pleasures
[581e]
compared with the delight of knowing
the truth11 and the reality, and being always occupied with that
while he learns? Will he not think them far removed from true pleasure,12 and call13 them
literally14 the pleasures of necessity,15 since he would have no use for them if necessity were
not laid upon him?” “We may be sure of that,”
he said.“Since, then, there is
contention between the several types of pleasure and the lives themselves,
not merely as to which is the more honorable or the more base, or the worse
or the better, but which is actually the more pleasurable16 or free from pain,
1 Since there is no one specific name for the manifold forms of this part (580 D-E), a makeshift term is to be used for convenience' sake. See also p. 371, note e.
2 Or “is bent on,”τέταται. Cf. 499 Aζητεῖν . . . τὸ ἀληθὲς συντεταμένως, Symp. 222 A and Bury ad loc., Symp. 186 Bἐπὶ πᾶν ὁ θεὸς τείνει. For the thought cf. also Phileb. 58 D.
3 Cf. Phaedo 67 Bτοὺς ὀρθῶς φιλομαθεῖς.
4 Cf. 338 D, 342 C.
5 Cf. my review of Jowett in A.J.P. xiii. p. 366, which Adam quotes and follows and Jowett and Campbell (Republic) adopt. For the three types of men cf. also Phaedo 68 C, 82 C. Stewart, Aristot. Eth. Nic. p. 60 (1095 b 17), says, “The three lives mentioned by Aristotle here answer to the three classes of men distinguished by Plato (Rep. 581). . . . Michelet and Grant point out that this threefold division occurs in a metaphor attributed to Pythagoras by Heracleides Ponticus (apudCic.Tusc. v. 3). . . . “ Cf. Aristot.Eth. Nic. 1097 a-b (i. 5. 1), also Diog. L. vii. 130 on Stoics, Plutarch, De liber. educ. x. (8 A), Renan, Avenir de Ia science, p. 8. Isoc.Antid. 217 characteristically recognizes only the three motives, pleasure, gain, and honor. For the entire argument cf. Aristot.Eth. Nic. 1176 a 31, 1177 a 10, and supra,Introd. pp. liv-lv.
6 For ἐν μέρει cf. 468 B, 520 C and D, 577 C, 615 A, Gorg. 496 B, Laws 876 B, 943 A, 947 C, Polit. 265 A; Contrasted with ἐν τῷ μέρει, Meno 92 E, Gorg. 462 A, 474 A. The two expressions, similar in appearance, illustrate how a slight change alters an idiom. So e.g.καινὸν οὐδέν（Gorg. 448 A) has nothing to do with the idiom οὐδὲν καινόν（Phaedo 100 B);τοῦ λόγου ἕνεκα（Rep. 612 C) is different from λόγου ἕνεκα（Theaet. 191 C—dicis causa);πάντα τἀγαθά（Laws 631 B) has no connection with the idiomatic πάντ᾽ ἀγαθά（Rep. 471 C, Cf. supra ad loc.); nor Pindar's πόλλ᾽ ἄνω τὰ δ᾽ αὖ κάτω（Ol. xii. 6) with ἄνω κάτω as used in Phaedo 96 B, Gorg. 481 D, etc. Cf. also ἐν τέχνῃProt. 319 C with ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ317 C,νῷ ἔχεινRep. 490 A with ἐν νῷ ἔχειν344 D, etc.,τοῦ παντὸς ἡμάρτηκενPhaedr. 235 E with παντὸς ἁμαρτάνειν237 C. The same is true of words—to confuse καλλίχορος with καλλίχοιρος would be unfortunate; and the medieval debates about ὁμοουσία and ὁμοιουσία were perhaps not quite as ridiculous as they are generally considered.
7 Cf. Laws 658 on judging different kinds of literature.
8 Cf. p. 255, note f, on 549 A. Xenophon is the typical φιλότιμος. In Mem. iii. 3. 13 he says that the Athenians “excel others in love of honor, which is the strongest incentive to deeds of honor and renown” (Marchant, Loeb tr.). Cf. Epist. 320 A, Symp. 178 D, and also Xen.Cyrop. i. 2. 1, Mem. iii. i. 10.
9 Cf. Aristot.Eth. Nic. 1095 b 16, and on 528 E.
10 Cf. Blaydes on Aristoph.Clouds 920, and Turgeniev's novel, Smoke.
11 Cf. Phileb. 58 C on dialectic.
12 Cf. 598 B, Epist. iii. 315 C, Marc. Aurel. viii. 1πόρρω φιλοσοφίας. Hermann's text or something like it is the only idiomatic one, and τῆς ἡδονῆς οὐ πάνυ πόρρω must express the philosopher's opinion of the pleasurableness of the lower pleasures as compared with the higher. Cf. A.J.P. xiii. p. 366.
13 For the infinitive cf. 492 Cκαὶ φήσειν, 530 Bκαὶ ζητεῖν.
14 τῷ ὄντι marks the etymological use of ἀναγκαίας. Cf. on 511 B and 551 E, p. 266, note a.
15 Cf. 558 D f.
16 This anticipates Laws 663 A, 733 A-B, 734 A-B.
Plato. Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vols. 5 & 6 translated by Paul Shorey. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1969.
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