[523b]
do not provoke thought to reconsideration because
the judgement1 of them by
sensation seems adequate,2 while others
always invite the intellect to reflection because the sensation yields nothing
that can be trusted.3” “You obviously
mean distant4 appearances,” he
said, “and shadow-painting.5” “You have quite missed my
meaning,6” said I.
“What do you mean?” he said. “The experiences that
do not provoke thought are those that do not
1 Cf. Phileb. 38 C.Unity of Plato's Thought, n. 337.
2 ἱκανῶς is not to be pressed here.
3 For οὐδὲν ὑγιές cf. 496 C, 584 A, 589 C, Phaedo 69 B, 89 E, 90 E, Gorg. 524 E, Laws 776 E, Theaet. 173 B, Eurip.Phoen. 201, Bacch. 262, Hel.. 746, etc.
4 The most obvious cause of errors of judgement. Cf. Laws 663 B.
5 Cf. Vol. I. p. 137 on 365 C.
6 The dramatic misapprehension by the interlocutor is one of Plato's methods for enforcing his meaning. Cf. on 529 A, p. 180, note a, Laws 792 B-C.
Plato. Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vols. 5 & 6 translated by Paul Shorey. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1969.
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