Plato, Republic

[442a] and fostering the one with fair words and teachings and relaxing and soothing and making gentle the other by harmony and rhythm?” “Quite so,” said he. “And these two thus reared and having learned and been educated to do their own work in the true sense of the phrase,¹ will preside over the appetitive part which is the mass² of the soul in each of us and the most insatiate by nature of wealth. They will keep watch upon it, lest, by being filled and infected with the so-called pleasures associated with the body³ and so waxing big and strong, it may not keep to⁴ its own work [442b] but may undertake to enslave and rule over the classes which it is not fitting⁵ that it should, and so overturn⁶ the entire life of all.” “By all means,” he said. “Would not these two, then, best keep guard against enemies from without⁷ also in behalf of the entire soul and body, the one taking counsel,⁸ the other giving battle, attending upon the ruler, and by its courage executing the ruler's designs?” “That is so.” “Brave, too, then, I take it, we call [442c] each individual by virtue of this part in him, when, namely, his high spirit preserves in the midst of pains and pleasures⁹ the rule handed down by the reason as to what is or is not to be feared.” “Right,” he said. “But wise by that small part that¹⁰ ruled in him and handed down these commands, by its possession¹¹ in turn within it of the knowledge of what is beneficial for each and for the whole, the community composed of the three.” “By all means.” “And again, was he not sober [442d] by reason of the friendship and concord of these same parts, when, namely, the ruling principle and its two subjects are at one in the belief that the reason ought to rule, and do not raise faction against it?” “The virtue of soberness certainly,” said he, “is nothing else than this, whether in a city or an individual.” “But surely, now, a man is just by that which and in the way we have so often¹² described.” “That is altogether necessary.” “Well then,” said I, “has our idea of justice in any way lost the edge¹³ of its contour so as to look like anything else than precisely what it showed itself to be in the state?” “I think not,” he said. [442e] “We might,” I said, “completely confirm your reply and our own conviction thus, if anything in our minds still disputes our definition—by applying commonplace and vulgar¹⁴ tests to it.” “What are these?” “For example, if an answer were demanded to the question concerning that city and the man whose birth and breeding was in harmony with it, whether we believe that such a man, entrusted with a deposit¹⁵ of gold or silver, would withhold it and embezzle it, who do you suppose would think that he would be more likely so to act