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[435a]
to
the state and test it there and it may be that, by examining them side by
side1 and
rubbing them against one another, as it were from the fire-sticks2 we may cause
the spark of justice to flash forth,3 and when it is thus revealed confirm it in our own
minds.” “Well,” he said, “that seems
a sound method4 and that is what we must
do.” “Then,” said I, “if you call a
thing by the same5 name whether it is big
or little, is it unlike in the way in which it is called the same or
like?” “Like,” he said. “Then a just
man too
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will not differ6 at all from a just city in respect of
the very form of justice, but will be like it.” “Yes,
like.” “But now the city was thought to be just because
three natural kinds existing in it performed each its own function, and
again it was sober, brave, and wise because of certain other affections and
habits7 of
these three kinds.” “True,” he said.
“Then, my friend, we shall thus expect the individual also to have
these same forms
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in his soul, and by
reason of identical affections of these with those in the city to receive
properly the same appellations.” “Inevitable,”
he said. “Goodness gracious,” said I, “here is
another trifling8 inquiry
into which we have plunged, the question whether the soul really contains
these three forms in itself or not.” “It does not seem
to me at all trifling,” he said, “for perhaps, Socrates,
the saying is true that 'fine things are difficult.'9” “Apparently,” said I;
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“and let me tell you, Glaucon, that
in my opinion we shall never in the world apprehend this matter10 from such methods as we are now
employing in discussion. For there is another longer and harder way that
conducts to this. Yet we may perhaps discuss it on the level of previous
statements and inquiries.” “May we acquiesce in
that?” he said. “I for my part should be quite satisfied
with that for the present.” “And I surely should be more
than satisfied,” I replied. “Don't you weary
then,” he said, “but go on with the inquiry.”
“Is it not, then,”
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said I, “impossible for us to avoid admitting11 this much, that the same forms and qualities are to be found
in each one of us that are in the state? They could not get there from any
other source. It would be absurd to suppose that the element of high spirit
was not derived in states from the private citizens who are reputed to have
this quality as the populations of the Thracian and Scythian lands and
generally of northern regions; or the quality of love of knowledge, which
would chiefly be attributed to12 the region where we dwell,
1 Cf. Sophist 230 Bτιθέασι παρ᾽ ἀλλήλας, Isocrates Areopagiticus 79, Nic. 17.
2 Cf. L and S. and Morgan, “De Ignis Eliciendi Modis,”Harvard Studies, vol. i. pp. 15, 21 ff. and 30; and Damascius (Ruelle, p. 54, line 18)καὶ τοῦτό ἐστιν ὅπερ εξαίφνης ἀνάπτεται φῶς ἀληθείας ὥσπερ ἐκ πυρείων προστριβομένων.
3 Cf. Gorgias 484 B, Epistle vii. 344 B.
4 Plato often observes that a certain procedure is methodical and we must follow it, or that it is at least methodical or consistent, whatever the results may be.
5 ὅ γε ταὐτόν: there are several reasons for the seeming over-elaboration of the logic in the next few pages. The analogy between the three classes in the state and the tripartite soul is an important point in Plato's ethical theory and an essential feature in the structure of the Republic. Very nice distinctions are involved in the attempt to prove the validity of the analogy for the present argument without too flagrant contradiction of the faith elsewhere expressed in the essential unity of the soul. Cf. Unity of Plato's Thought, p. 42. These distinctions in the infancy of logic Plato is obliged to set forth and explain as he proceeds. Moreover, he is interested in logical method for its own sake (cf.. Introduction p. xiv), and is here stating for the first time important principles of logic afterwards codified in the treatises of Aristotle.γε marks the inference from the very meaning of ταὐτόν. Cf. on 379 B, 389 B, and Politicus 278 E; cf. also Parmenides 139 E. The language suggests the theory of ideas. But Plato is not now thinking primarily of that. He is merely repeating in precise logical form the point already made (434 D-E), that the definition of justice in the individual must correspond point for point with that worked out for the state.
6 Cf. 369 A and Meno 72 B. In Philebus 12 E-13 C, Plato points out that the generic or specific identity does not exclude specific or sub-specific differences.
7 ἕξεις is here almost the Aristotelian ἕξις. Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 1105 b 20, regards πάθη, ἕξεις and δυνάμεις as an exhaustive enumeration of mental states. For δυνάμεις cf. 477 C, Simplic.De An. Hayduck, p. 289ἀλλὰ τὰ ὧν πρὸς πρακτικὴν ἐδεῖτο ζωήν, τὰ τρία μόνα παρείληφεν.
8 Cf. 423 C.
9 A proverb often cited by Plato with variations. Cf. 497 D-E.
10 τοῦτο by strict grammatical implication means the problem of the tripartite soul, but the reference to this passage in 504 B shows that it includes the whole question of the definition of the virtues, and so ultimately the whole of ethical and political philosophy. We are there told again that the definitions of the fourth book are sufficient for the purpose, but that complete insight can be attained only by relating them to the idea of the good. That required a longer and more circuitous way of discipline and training. Plato then does not propose the “longer way” as a method of reasoning which he himself employs to correct the approximations of the present discussion. He merely describes it as the higher education which will enable his philosophical rulers to do that. We may then disregard all idle guesses about a “new logic” hinted at in the longer way, and all fantastic hypotheses about the evolution of Plato's thought and the composition of the Republic based on supposed contradictions between this passage and the later books. Cf. Introduction p. xvi, “Idea of Good,” p. 190, Unity of Plato's Thought, p. 16, n. 90; followed by Professor Wilamowitz, ii. p. 218, who, however, does not understand the connection of it all with the idea of good. Plato the logician never commits himself to more than is required by the problem under discussion (cf. on 353 c), and Plato the moralist never admits that the ideal has been adequately expressed, but always points to heights beyond. Cf. 506 E, 533 A, Phaedo 85 C, Ti. 29 B-C, Soph. 254 C.
11 Plato takes for granted as obvious the general correspondence which some modern philosophers think it necessary to reaffirm. Cf. Mill, Logic, vi. 7. 1 “Human beings in society have no properties, but those which are derived from and may be resolved into the laws and the nature of individual man”; Spencer, Autobiog. ii. p. 543 “Society is created by its units. . . . The nature of its organization is determined by the nature of its units.” Plato illustrates the commonplace in a slight digression on national characteristics, with a hint of the thought partially anticipated by Hippocrates and now identified with Buckle's name, that they are determined by climate and environment. Cf. Newman, Introduction to Aristotle Politics pp. 318-320.
12 αἰτιάσαιτο: this merely varies the idiom αἰτίαν ἔχειν, “predicate of,” “say of.” Cf. 599 E. It was a common boast of the Athenians that the fine air of Athens produced a corresponding subtlety of wit. Cf. Euripides Medea 829-830, Isocrates vii. 74, Roberts, The Ancient Boeotians, pp. 59, 76.
Plato. Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vols. 5 & 6 translated by Paul Shorey. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1969.
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