[333b]
then, who is a good and useful associate and partner in
the placing of draughts or the draught-player?” “The
player.” “And in the placing of bricks and stones is the
just man a more useful and better associate than the builder?”
“By no means.” “Then what is the
association1 in which the just man is a better partner
than the harpist as an harpist is better than the just man for striking the
chords?” “For money-dealings,2 I think.” “Except, I presume,
Polemarchus, for the use of money when there is occasion to buy in common
1 Justice (the political art) must be something as definite as the special arts, yet of universal scope. This twofold requirement no definition of a virtue in the minor dialogues is ever able to satisfy. It is met only by the theory worked out in the Republic. Cf. Unity of Plato's Thought, p. 14.
2 Justice is more nearly defined as having to do with money or legal obligations—the common-sense view to which Aristotle inclines.
Plato. Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vols. 5 & 6 translated by Paul Shorey. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1969.
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