[303a]
or what shall we say? Is that not inevitable?Hippias
It appears so.Socrates
Shall we say, then, that both are beautiful, but that each is not?Hippias
What is to prevent?Socrates
This seems to me, my friend, to prevent, that there were some attributes thus belonging to individual things, which belonged, we thought, to each, if they belonged to both, and to both, if they belonged to each—I mean all those attributes which you specified.1 Am I right?Hippias
Yes.Socrates
But those again which I specified2 did not; and among those were precisely “each” and “both.” Is that so?Hippias
It is. [303b] Socrates
To which group, then, Hippias, does the beautiful seem to you to belong? To the group of those that you mentioned? If I am strong and you also, are we both collectively strong, and if I am just and you also, are we both collectively just, and if both collectively, then each individually so, too, if I am beautiful and you also, are we both collectively beautiful, and if both collectively, then each individually? Or is there nothing to prevent this, as in the case that when given things are both collectively even, they may perhaps individually be odd, or perhaps even, and again, when things are individually irrational quantities they may perhaps both collectively be rational, or perhaps irrational, [303c] and countless other cases which, you know, I said appeared before my mind?3 To which group do you assign the beautiful? Or have you the same view about it as I? For to me it seems great foolishness that we collectively are beautiful, but each of us is not so, or that each of us is so, but both are not, or anything else of that sort. Do you choose in this way, as I do, or in some other way?Hippias
In this way, Socrates.Socrates
You choose well, Hippias, that we may be free from the need of further search; [303d] for if the beautiful is in this group, that which is pleasing through sight and hearing would no longer be the beautiful. For the expression through sight and hearing makes both collectively beautiful, but not each individually; and this was impossible, as you and I agree.Hippias
Yes, we agree.Socrates
It is, then, impossible that the pleasant through sight and hearing be the beautiful, since in becoming beautiful it offers an impossibility.Hippias
That is true.Socrates
“Then tell us again,” he will say, “from the beginning, [303e] since you failed this time; what do you say that this 'beautiful,' belonging to both the pleasures, is, on account of which you honored them before the rest and called them beautiful?” It seems to me, Hippias, inevitable that we say that these are the most harmless and the best of pleasures, both of them collectively and each of them individually; or have you anything else to suggest, by which they excel the rest?Hippias
Not at all; for really they are the best.Socrates
“This, then,” he will say, “you say is the beautiful, beneficial pleasure?” “It seems that we do,” I shall say; and you?Hippias
I also.Socrates
“Well, then,” he will say, “beneficial is that which creates the good, but that which creates and that which is created were just now seen to be different, and our argument has come round to the earlier argument, has it not? For neither could the good be beautiful nor the beautiful good,
It appears so.Socrates
Shall we say, then, that both are beautiful, but that each is not?Hippias
What is to prevent?Socrates
This seems to me, my friend, to prevent, that there were some attributes thus belonging to individual things, which belonged, we thought, to each, if they belonged to both, and to both, if they belonged to each—I mean all those attributes which you specified.1 Am I right?Hippias
Yes.Socrates
But those again which I specified2 did not; and among those were precisely “each” and “both.” Is that so?Hippias
It is. [303b] Socrates
To which group, then, Hippias, does the beautiful seem to you to belong? To the group of those that you mentioned? If I am strong and you also, are we both collectively strong, and if I am just and you also, are we both collectively just, and if both collectively, then each individually so, too, if I am beautiful and you also, are we both collectively beautiful, and if both collectively, then each individually? Or is there nothing to prevent this, as in the case that when given things are both collectively even, they may perhaps individually be odd, or perhaps even, and again, when things are individually irrational quantities they may perhaps both collectively be rational, or perhaps irrational, [303c] and countless other cases which, you know, I said appeared before my mind?3 To which group do you assign the beautiful? Or have you the same view about it as I? For to me it seems great foolishness that we collectively are beautiful, but each of us is not so, or that each of us is so, but both are not, or anything else of that sort. Do you choose in this way, as I do, or in some other way?Hippias
In this way, Socrates.Socrates
You choose well, Hippias, that we may be free from the need of further search; [303d] for if the beautiful is in this group, that which is pleasing through sight and hearing would no longer be the beautiful. For the expression through sight and hearing makes both collectively beautiful, but not each individually; and this was impossible, as you and I agree.Hippias
Yes, we agree.Socrates
It is, then, impossible that the pleasant through sight and hearing be the beautiful, since in becoming beautiful it offers an impossibility.Hippias
That is true.Socrates
“Then tell us again,” he will say, “from the beginning, [303e] since you failed this time; what do you say that this 'beautiful,' belonging to both the pleasures, is, on account of which you honored them before the rest and called them beautiful?” It seems to me, Hippias, inevitable that we say that these are the most harmless and the best of pleasures, both of them collectively and each of them individually; or have you anything else to suggest, by which they excel the rest?Hippias
Not at all; for really they are the best.Socrates
“This, then,” he will say, “you say is the beautiful, beneficial pleasure?” “It seems that we do,” I shall say; and you?Hippias
I also.Socrates
“Well, then,” he will say, “beneficial is that which creates the good, but that which creates and that which is created were just now seen to be different, and our argument has come round to the earlier argument, has it not? For neither could the good be beautiful nor the beautiful good,
